[Cite as Neinast v. Fairfield Cty. Dist. Library Bd. of Trustees, 2011-Ohio-6492.]
COURT OF APPEALS
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROBERT A. NEINAST : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF : Case No. 11-CA-26
THE FAIRFIELD COUNTY :
DISTRICT LIBRARY :
:
Defendant-Appellee : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 09-CV-0657
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 14, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
ROBERT A. NEINAST, Pro Se JASON M. DOLIN
8617 Ashford Lane Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Pickerington, OH 43147 Fairfield County, Ohio
239 West Main Street, Suite 101
Lancaster, OH 43130
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Robert A. Neinast appeals the March 29, 2011
judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. Defendant-Appellee is the
Board of Trustees of the Fairfield County District Library (“the Library”).
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} In the beginning of 2008, Neinast visited the Fairfield County District
Library on three occasions. Each time, Neinast was barefoot. On his fourth barefooted
visit to the Library in April 2008, the Library informed Neinast it had a footwear policy
and Neinast would have to leave the premises. The Library Code of Conduct, enacted
April 17, 2007, states, “[s]hirt and shoes must be worn in any library facility. If a child
has learned to walk, the child must wear shoes.”
{¶3} On May 20, 2008, Neinast asked the Library to revoke its footwear policy.
The Library refused and retained the footwear policy.
{¶4} Neinast made an oral presentation to the Library, outlining the benefits of
going barefoot. On February 17, 2009, the Library again decided to retain its footwear
policy.
{¶5} On May 13, 2009, Neinast filed a declaratory judgment action against the
Library with the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. In his action, he requested
the following:
{¶6} "WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Robert A. Neinast respectfully requests that this
Court grant him judgment as follows:
{¶7} "(A) Declare that the Board does not have the statutory authority under the
law to make regulations requiring that patrons wear shoes in the Library.
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 3
{¶8} "(B) Declare that the footwear rule infringes upon Mr. Neinast's personal
liberty, is arbitrary and capricious, and does not bear a real and substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public.
{¶9} "(C) Issue a permanent injunction preventing the Board of Trustees, the
Director, or any other Library employee from enforcing any rule or regulation specifying
that footwear must be worn in the Fairfield County District Library.
{¶10} "(D) Award Plaintiff any other legal and equitable relief to which he is
entitled."
{¶11} Neinast filed a motion for summary judgment and the Library filed a Civ.R.
12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. By entry filed December 9, 2009, the trial court converted
the Library’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and gave all parties
time to file their respective motion, response, and reply.
{¶12} By judgment entry filed February 16, 2010, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Library. Neinast appealed the decision to this Court
in Neinast v. Fairfield Cty. Dist. Library Bd. of Trustees, Fairfield App. No. 10-CA-11,
2010-Ohio-5569 (“Neinast I”).
{¶13} In the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the
Library, the trial court found the Library had authority to promulgate
decorum/shoes/dress rules based on Federal and Ohio precedent. The trial court then
found the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred (1) Neinast’s claim of infringement of his
personal liberty; (2) whether the Library’s footwear rule has a real and substantial
relation to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public; and (3) the barring
of the enforcement of the Library’s footwear rule.
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 4
{¶14} In Neinast I, we affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Library had the
authority to promulgate and enforce a rule relative to footwear.
{¶15} We then analyzed Neinast’s argument that his claims were not barred by
the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on the lack of mutuality of the parties. The trial
court found Neinast’s claims were estopped based on Neinast’s previous unsuccessful
litigation between Neinast and the Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan
Library, where Neinast also argued he should be permitted to go barefoot in the library.
See Neinast v. Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan Library (2002), 190
F.Supp.2d 1040; Neinast v. Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan Library
(2003), 346 F.3d 585; and Neinast v. Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan
Library, 165 Ohio App.3d 211, 2006-Ohio-287. It was undisputed the Library in the
present case was not a party to the above cases.
{¶16} After analyzing the applicable law to collateral estoppel and the mutuality
of interests, we held the reason or purpose for the footwear policy must be established
by the individual library board. We stated:
{¶17} “We therefore determine because there is non-mutuality of parties, it was
error to impose collateral estoppel. We remand this case to the trial court to determine
if in fact appellee [Library] can establish reasons for the footwear rule that applies
specifically to appellee. All other issues, including the authority to establish rules and
the Federal Courts’ holdings that a properly formulated footwear rule does not violate
personal freedoms, are resolved under applicable case law.
{¶18} “* * *
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 5
{¶19} “* * * we concur that public libraries have the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations as to public health and safety. This does not mean that the authority
sub judice is unfettered, but requires an examination of the relationship of the shoes
requirement to health and public safety.” Neinast I, at ¶56, ¶60.
{¶20} We reversed the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment
based on collateral estoppel and ordered the case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
{¶21} Upon remand, the trial court set the case for an evidentiary hearing.
Neinast moved to have the evidentiary hearing converted to a non-oral hearing. The
trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidentiary hearing was proper pursuant to
this Court’s remand in Neinast I.
{¶22} On February 22, 2011, Neinast filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice.
Neinast moved the trial court to take judicial notice that “1) the Library is statutorily
immune from liability regarding injuries on its property except for those caused by
physical defects on the grounds of the Library and 2) Library patrons are licensees, and
the duty of care owed to such a patron is a duty to avoid wanton, reckless, or willful
conduct in disregard of the safety of such individuals.”
{¶23} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on March 8, 2011. At the
beginning of the hearing, the trial court denied Neinast’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice.
The hearing proceeded with testimonial evidence from the Library’s witnesses and from
Neinast.
{¶24} On March 29, 2011, the trial court issued its decision finding that the
preponderance of the evidence established the Library’s footwear policy was related to
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 6
public health and safety. The trial court thereby entered judgment in favor of the Library
and against Neinast. The trial court also denied Neinast’s Motion to Take Judicial
Notice.
{¶25} It is from this decision Neinast now appeals.
{¶26} Neinast raises three Assignments of Error:
{¶27} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE
THAT THE LIBRARY WAS PROTECTED BY STATUTORY IMMUNITY AND THAT
LIBRARY PATRONS ARE LICENSEES.
{¶28} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
{¶29} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE DEFENDANT, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FAIRFIELD COUNTY
DISTRICT LIBRARY, AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF, ROBERT A. NEINAST.”
I.
{¶30} Neinast argues in his first Assignment of Error the trial court erred in
denying Neinast’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice. We disagree.
{¶31} Neinast moved the trial court to take judicial notice that “1) the Library is
statutorily immune from liability regarding injuries on its property except for those
caused by physical defects on the grounds of the Library and 2) Library patrons are
licensees, and the duty of care owed to such a patron is a duty to avoid wanton,
reckless, or willful conduct in disregard of the safety of such individuals.” Neinast cited
Ohio case law to support the statements of law, but did not raise any specific cases for
the trial court’s attention.
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 7
{¶32} At trial, the trial court addressed Neinast’s motion:
{¶33} “THE COURT: * * * The Court intends to apply the correct law, I’ll say that.
And what I’ve been asked to do is take judicial notice of law. At least Evidence Rule
201 applies to judicial notice and that applies to judicial notice of what are called
adjudicative facts, not law. So the Court is always obligated to apply the correct law.
And again, I intend to do that. So I’ll overrule the motion, but not – I’m not necessarily
saying – by doing that, Mr. Neinast, I’m not necessarily saying that I’m not going to
apply the law that you’ve cited there. I’m not saying I am or I’m not, because what I’m
going to do is hear what has to be said by everybody, take the evidence, and then – and
also, the Court of Appeals has laid out what the law is and I’m to follow it. At least that’s
my interpretation of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. The purpose of this hearing is for the
Court to find facts and then, as I see it, apply the law that the Court of Appeals has
determined. So, to that extent, I’ll overrule the motion, but I’ll let everybody argue what
law they want to – they think should be applied.” (T. 12-13).
{¶34} Evid.R. 201 governs the trial court’s ability to take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts, or the facts of the case. Civ.R. 44.1(A)(1) governs the court’s ability
to take judicial notice of law. It states, “[j]udicial notice shall be taken of the rules of the
supreme court of this state and of the decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law
of this state.” A court may take judicial notice of findings and judgments as rendered in
other Ohio cases. Morgan v. Cincinnati (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 285, 496 N.E.2d 468; In
re Adoption of Lassiter (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 367, 655 N.E.2d 781. In this case,
Neinast requested the trial court to take judicial notice of two points of established Ohio
law as to statutory immunity and the duties of property owners. Neinast did not request
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 8
the trial court to take judicial notice of a specific decision rendered by an Ohio court on
those points of law relevant to the issue before the court, whether the Library’s footwear
policy is necessary for public health and safety.
{¶35} It is well-established that a trial court is presumed to know the applicable
law and apply it accordingly. See Bush v. Signals Power & Grounding Specialists, Inc.,
Richland App. No. 08 CA 88, 2009-Ohio-5095, at ¶17. The trial court denied Neinast’s
motion to take judicial notice of the law, but stated it would consider Neinast’s
arguments and apply the law accordingly. We find no error in the trial court’s decision
to deny the motion to take judicial notice and proceed as such.
{¶36} Neinast’s first Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶37} In Neinast’s second Assignment of Error, he argues the trial court erred in
conducting an evidentiary hearing on the matter upon remand of the case by this Court.
Neinast states the trial court should have relied upon the previously filed motions for
summary judgment to make its decision upon remand. We disagree.
{¶38} Neinast brought this matter before the trial court through a declaratory
judgment action without a jury demand. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Library on two issues: that the Library had authority under Ohio and Federal
law to promulgate a footwear policy and Neinast’s claim against the footwear policy was
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Upon Neinast’s appeal, we found
summary judgment in favor of the Library was inappropriate. We agreed in Neinast I
that the Library had the authority to promulgate the footwear policy, but the doctrine of
collateral estoppel did not apply to Neinast due to the non-mutuality of the parties. We
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 9
remanded the matter to the trial court to take further evidence on the issue of whether
the Library could establish reasons its footwear policy was necessary for public health
and safety. Upon remand, the trial court conducted a hearing to take evidence to
determine whether the Library could establish reasons for its footwear policy.
{¶39} Because we determined summary judgment was inappropriate in this
declaratory judgment action, we find the trial court’s use of an evidentiary hearing after
remand to be appropriate based on our directive in Neinast I.
{¶40} Neinast’s second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶41} Neinast contends in his third Assignment of Error that the trial court erred
in granting judgment in favor of the Library. Based on the evidence presented, we find
the trial court’s decision that the Library established reasons the footwear policy applied
to the Library and promoted public health and safety is supported by competent,
credible evidence.
{¶42} As stated above, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine if
the Library could establish reasons for the footwear policy that applied specifically to the
Library. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing where an expert in the field of
epidemiology, the Library Director, two Library Board members, and Neinast testified.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a decision on March 29, 2011
stating the Library demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Library’s
footwear policy was related to public health and safety. In its decision, the trial court
cited to the testimony of the Library’s expert regarding the existence of pathogens on
the Library surfaces, including the floors. A person wearing shoes has a lower risk of
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 10
acquiring and transmitting the pathogens located on the floors than a person not
wearing shoes. The trial court also referred to the recorded hazards located on the
floors of the Library that at times have included blood, feces, urine, vomit, saliva,
staples, and broken glass.
{¶43} Our review of the record shows the trial court’s decision is supported by
the evidence presented. The Library’s footwear policy was first issued in 1997. (T.
244). The purpose of the footwear policy, as part of a Code of Conduct, was to
maintain proper decorum in the Library, prevent injury to its patrons, to prevent staff
time in responding to injuries at the Library, and to limit the Library’s liability for any
potential injury claims. (T. 134, 147). The Library has recorded instances of blood,
feces, vomit, urine, and saliva on the floor of the Library. (T. 115-119). There has also
been glass and staples on the floor. (T. 117). Neinast presented his testimony that he
had never suffered an injury during his barefooted forays and gave examples of where
Neinast has tread unshod. As the Library’s expert testified however, the issue is not the
individual risk, but the risk to the community that must be considered in determining
whether the Library’s policy is reasonable. (T. 87).
{¶44} We find the evidence showed the Library’s footwear policy is related to the
governmental interests in preventing injuries to its patrons from documented hazards
within the Library, as well as to protect the economic interests of the Library. We cannot
say the Library’s footwear policy is unreasonable or the trial court’s decision was in
error. See Neinast v. Bd. of Trustees of the Columbus Metro. Library, 2006-Ohio-287,
¶17.
{¶45} Neinast’s third Assignment of Error is overruled.
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 11
{¶46} The judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Farmer, J. concur.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
Fairfield County, Case No. 11-CA-26 12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROBERT A. NEINAST :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE :
FAIRFIELD COUNTY DISTRICT :
LIBRARY :
:
Defendant-Appellee : CASE NO. 11-CA-26
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio is affirmed.
Costs to Appellant.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER