[Cite as State v. Minite, 2011-Ohio-3585.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95699
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JOSEPH MINITE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN
PART; AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-531532 and CR-531739
BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Boyle, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 21, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Russell S. Bensing
1350 Standard Building
1370 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: John P. Colan
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ALSO LISTED
Joseph Minite
Inmate No. 581-245
Lake Erie Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 8000
Conneaut, Ohio 44030
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph Minite, appeals the trial court’s judgment
sentencing him to a four-year prison term following his guilty plea to five counts of
receiving stolen property and one count of theft. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court for the limited
purpose of properly imposing postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191.
{¶ 2} In December 2009, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury charged appellant in
two separate indictments for various offenses occurring in the parking lots of the
Cleveland Metroparks Zoo and Bally’s Total Fitness. In both instances, appellant was
arrested after witnesses observed him suspiciously peering into parked cars. When
appellant was searched, the police found several stolen credit cards on his person. After
an investigation, the detectives were able to obtain video surveillance of appellant using
the stolen credit cards at various gas stations, department stores, and ATMs.
{¶ 3} In Case No. CR-531532, appellant was charged with five counts of
receiving stolen property and two counts of forging identification cards. In Case No.
CR-531739, he was charged with two counts of theft, one count of breaking and entering,
one count of criminal damaging, and one count of misuse of credit cards. All offenses
were fifth-degree felonies.
{¶ 4} On January 19, 2010 appellant entered into a plea agreement with the state.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to five counts of receiving stolen
property in Case No. CR-531532 and to one count of theft in Case No. CR-531739. The
remaining counts were dismissed. At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced him to eight months on each of the six counts, and ordered them to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate four-year term of imprisonment. The only advisement
regarding postrelease control was the trial court’s statement at the end of the proceeding,
“you’ve got three years postrelease control when you come out.” However, appellant’s
sentencing journal entry stated, in pertinent part:
{¶ 5} “Postrelease control is part of this prison sentence for up to 3 years for the
above felonies under R.C. 2967.28. Defendant advised that if postrelease control
supervision is imposed following his release from prison and if he violates that
supervision or condition of postrelease control under R.C. 2967.131(B), parole board may
impose a prison term as part of the sentence of up to one-half of the stated prison term
originally imposed upon the offender.”
{¶ 6} Appellant filed this timely appeal, raising two assignments of error through
counsel and three supplemental assignments of error pro se.
Law and Analysis
I
{¶ 7} Through counsel, appellant raises two assignments of error for review:
{¶ 8} I. “The trial court erred in improperly imposing postrelease controls, thus
resulting in a void sentence.”
{¶ 9} II. “The trial court erred in sentencing appellant to consecutive terms of
imprisonment without making the findings required under R.C. 2929.14(E)(4).”
Postrelease Control
{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by
improperly imposing postrelease controls, rendering his entire sentence void. Appellant
acknowledges that the sentencing entry correctly states the applicable term of postrelease
control. However, he argues that under Ohio law, where the trial court fails to properly
impose postrelease control at sentencing, the remedy is to remand the case to the trial
court for a sentencing hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.191.
{¶ 11} If a court imposes a prison sentence that includes a term of postrelease
control, the court must notify the offender, both at the sentencing hearing and in its
journal entry, that the parole board could impose a prison term if the offender violates the
terms and conditions of postrelease control. R.C. 2929.191(B)(1).
{¶ 12} Upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court failed to notify
appellant at sentencing that if he violates a condition of postrelease control, the parole
board could impose a prison term as part of the sentence of up to one-half of the stated
prison term originally imposed upon the appellant. R.C. 2929.19(B)(3); State v.
Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶2.
{¶ 13} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2929.191 in order to establish a
procedure to remedy a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of postrelease control.
The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that, “[f]or criminal sentences imposed on or after
July 11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial
courts shall apply the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191.” State v. Singleton, 124
Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 14} The Singleton court stated: “Effective July 11, 2006, R.C. 2929.191
establishes a procedure to remedy a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of
postrelease control. It applies to offenders who have not yet been released from prison
and who fall into at least one of three categories: [1] those who did not receive notice at
the sentencing hearing that they would be subject to postrelease control, [2] those who did
not receive notice that the parole board could impose a prison term for a violation of
postrelease control, or [3] those who did not have both of these statutorily mandated
notices incorporated into their sentencing entries. R.C. 2929.191(A) and (B). For those
offenders, R.C. 2929.191 provides that trial courts may, after conducting a hearing with
notice to the offender, the prosecuting attorney, and the Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, correct an original judgment of conviction by placing on the journal of the
court a nunc pro tunc entry that includes a statement that the offender will be supervised
under R.C. 2967.28 after the offender leaves prison and that the parole board may impose
a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed if the offender
violates postrelease control.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶23.
{¶ 15} The state contends that this is harmless error, arguing that appellant is not
prejudiced by the trial court’s error at sentencing because the trial court corrected its error
in the sentencing entry. We find this contention to be without merit.
{¶ 16} Appellant is entitled to a hearing where postrelease control can be properly
imposed. See Singleton; State v. Kelley, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 94487 and 94488,
2011-Ohio-88; State v. Nicholson, Cuyahoga App. No. 95327, 2011-Ohio-14. The trial
court had an affirmative obligation under R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(e) to inform appellant that
he could face up to one-half of his originally stated prison term for violating his
postrelease control. The trial court’s failure to provide the required notice under R.C.
2929.19(B)(3)(e) cannot be corrected by the trial court’s inclusion of the language in its
sentencing journal entry.
{¶ 17} Appellant is entitled to notice that he is subject to a discretionary three-year
period of postrelease control and the consequences associated with any subsequent
violation of its terms. Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand to the
trial court for the limited purpose of the proper imposition of postrelease control pursuant
to R.C. 2929.191.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶ 18} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
by imposing consecutive sentences without making the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(E)(4) and asserts that the holding in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1,
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, is no longer valid in light of Oregon v. Ice (2009), 555
U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517.
{¶ 19} The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected this argument in State v. Hodge,
128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768. The Court concluded that Ice did
not require it to depart from its holding in Foster “[b]ecause there is no constitutional
requirement that a judge make findings of fact before imposing consecutive sentences,”
and requiring resentencing to include findings of fact would “disrupt reasonable and
settled expectations of finality” and impose an “undue burden on our judicial system.”
Hodge at ¶30-32.
{¶ 20} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 21} Appellant raises three supplemental assignments of error pro se:
{¶ 22} I. “Defendant-Appellant was denied of his due process and fundamental
fairness when the trial judge exhibited deep-seated bias in violation of appellant’s right to
impartial tribunal under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Ohio Constitution.”
{¶ 23} II. “Defendant-Appellant’s right to due process was violated where the
indictments in case No. CR-531532 and CR-531739 are products of bootstrapping in
violation of the Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Article 1 Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.”
{¶ 24} III. “Appellant’s trial counsel’s performance fell below reasonable
professional assistance in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.”
Judicial Bias
{¶ 25} In his first supplemental assignment of error, appellant argues that he was
denied due process of law and fundamental fairness when the trial judge exhibited a
deep-seated bias against him during the sentencing hearing. Appellant specifically
claims that this bias resulted in the trial court’s refusal to place him in a rehabilitation
program. Appellant submits that he is entitled to a discharge of his guilty plea based on
the trial judge’s personal bias.
{¶ 26} This court lacks jurisdiction to consider appellant’s first supplemental
assignment of error. “The Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, or his designee, has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claim that a common pleas judge is biased or
prejudiced.” Section 5(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 27} R.C. 2701.03 provides the exclusive means by which a litigant may claim
that a common pleas court judge is biased and prejudiced. State ex rel. Pratt v.
Weygandt (1956), 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191, paragraph three of the syllabus;
Jones v. Billingham (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 8, 663 N.E.2d 657. A litigant who
believes that the trial judge should be disqualified must file an affidavit of bias or
prejudice with the clerk of the supreme court pursuant to R.C. 2701.03. Id.
{¶ 28} Since only the Chief Justice or her designee may hear a disqualification
matter, a court of appeals is without authority to void the judgment of the trial court
because of bias or prejudice of the judge. Beer v. Griffith (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 440,
441-442, 377 N.E.2d 775. See, also, State v. Bacon, Cuyahoga App. No. 85475,
2005-Ohio-6238, ¶66.
{¶ 29} If appellant believed that the trial judge should be removed from his case
due to bias or prejudice against him, his exclusive remedy was to file an affidavit of
disqualification pursuant to R.C. 2701.03. Since appellant failed to comply with the
procedures set forth in R.C. 2701.03, this court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of
his first supplemental assignment of error.
{¶ 30} Appellant’s first supplemental assignment of error is overruled.
Indictment
{¶ 31} In his second supplemental assignment of error, appellant argues that the
charges filed against him did not constitute felony offenses and violated the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Appellant
submits that, based on the defective and unconstitutional nature of the indictment, his
charges must be dismissed in the interest of justice. Despite appellant’s contentions, the
indictments and the information presented to the grand jury constituted felony offenses
under the statutory scheme.
{¶ 32} In the instant matter, appellant was arrested after the police received
numerous complaints from witnesses that he was peering into cars parked in the parking
lots at the Cleveland Metroparks Zoo and Bally’s Total Fitness. Upon his arrest, the
police discovered several stolen credit cards on appellant’s person that he had previously
stolen from the cars parked at the zoo and fitness center. Further, detectives obtained
video surveillance from surrounding businesses and ATMs that showed appellant using
the stolen credit cards. Based on the facts and circumstances surrounding appellant’s
arrest, he was indicted on various offenses, including theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02
and receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51.
{¶ 33} R.C. 2913.71, entitled “Degree of Offense When Certain Property
Involved,” provides that “[r]egardless of the value of the property involved and regardless
of whether the offender previously has been convicted of a theft offense, a violation of
section 2913.02 or 2913.51 of the Revised Code is a felony of the fifth degree if the
property involved is * * * a credit card.” Therefore, appellant’s indictment correctly
indicated that the charges presented to the grand jury constituted felony offenses because
they involved the use of stolen credit cards.
{¶ 34} Appellant also argues that the indictment violated the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment based on the inclusion of duplicate charges arising out of
the same set of circumstances. The guarantees against double jeopardy secured by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Section 10, Article I, of the
Ohio Constitution protect criminal defendants from being placed in jeopardy twice for the
same offense, but not necessarily the same conduct. State v. White, Cuyahoga App. No.
92972, 2010-Ohio-2342.
{¶ 35} Here, appellant was indicted on various charges arising out of the same set
of circumstances because his conduct constituted numerous offenses and injured
numerous victims. The charges included in appellant’s indictment were not merely
duplicates of the same criminal offense, and therefore did not violate his Fifth
Amendment rights. Further, the indictments sufficiently informed appellant of the nature
of the criminal accusations and provided him with the information necessary to prepare
his defense.
{¶ 36} Appellant’s second supplemental assignment of error is overruled.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 37} In his third supplemental assignment of error, appellant argues that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to
investigate the claims and charges brought against him. Appellant contends that his trial
counsel improperly advised him to enter a plea agreement without adequately
investigating and challenging the state’s defective indictments. Appellant submits that
his denial of effective assistance of counsel renders his guilty plea involuntary and
invalid.
{¶ 38} It is well established that a guilty plea waives the defendant’s right to claim
he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the
defects complained of caused the plea to be less than knowing and voluntary. State v.
King, 184 Ohio App.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-4551, 920 N.E.2d 399, ¶47. Thus, to prove a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with a guilty plea, appellant must demonstrate
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52,
106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203.
{¶ 39} A review of the record does not support appellant’s contentions. As
discussed, appellant’s indictments were not defective, and his trial counsel did not err in
advising him to enter a guilty plea in compliance with the state’s proposed plea
agreement. Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to only five of the 12
counts he was charged with and received a sentence that was below the maximum penalty
permitted by statute. Appellant provides no specific examples of his trial counsel’s
deficient performance and has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pled guilty.
{¶ 40} Appellant’s third supplemental assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR