[Cite as Gowdy v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 2011-Ohio-2156.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95956
JUANITA GOWDY
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-707419
BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Blackmon, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 5, 2011
FOR APPELLANT
Juanita Gowdy
1857 Rosalind Avenue
East Cleveland, Ohio 44112
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Steven W. Ritz
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
3955 Euclid Avenue
Room 305E
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
ALSO LISTED:
James Gowdy
c/o 1857 Rosalind Avenue
East Cleveland, Ohio 44112
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant, Juanita Gowdy, appeals the November 13, 2010 trial
court judgment granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
appellee, Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services
(“CCDCFS”). We affirm.
{¶ 2} Appellant was a state licenced Type-B day care provider through
the Cuyahoga County Department of Employment and Family Services
(“EFS”). After appellant became a licensed day care provider, the licensing
rules changed, and EFS was mandated to conduct a review of child welfare
records pursuant to O.A.C. 5101:2-14-06(C)(1). The statutorily mandated
review showed that appellant had been previously accused of child neglect on
five separate occasions. Specifically, the CCDCFS database indicated that
the reports of prior neglect brought against appellant were “substantiated” on
two separate occasions and “indicated” on three separate occasions.1 As a
result of the findings, EFS revoked appellant’s Type-B day care license on
May 8, 2007. Appellant did not appeal to the common pleas court from the
2007 decision to revoke her day care license.
{¶ 3} Subsequently, in 2009 appellant reapplied for day care license
certification; however, the application for certification was denied by EFS.
On April 7, 2009, a county appeal review hearing was held to assess the
merits of appellant’s renewed application. On April 20, 2009, the
administrative review officers upheld the denial of appellant’s reapplication
for a day care license pursuant to O.A.C. 5101:2-14-02(A)(4), which states
that “[t]he EFS shall deny an application if it determines that, within the last
five years, the applicant was certified as a limited or professional provider
and that his or her certificate was revoked in Ohio or in another state * * *.”
The reports of neglect were “substantiated” on October 4, 1990 and again on January 30,
1
1997. Additionally, reports of neglect were “indicated” on November 27, 1995, July 18, 1996, and
In upholding the denial of appellant’s day care license, the hearing officials
determined that appellant was not eligible to reapply for a day care license
until five years after her revocation date, which would not occur until May 8,
2012.
{¶ 4} On May 19, 2009, appellant appealed the April 20, 2009 EFS
decision to the common pleas court in Gowdy v. Cuy. Cty. Dept. of Emp. &
Family Serv. (2009), Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-09-693196. The appeal was
dismissed by the trial court for being “premature as a matter of law.” The
court explicitly stated that appellant was not eligible to reapply for day care
certification until May 8, 2012. Appellant did not appeal this decision.
{¶ 5} On October 21, 2009, appellant commenced an action requesting
declaratory judgment and other equitable relief against CCDCFS.
Specifically, appellant demanded a declaratory judgment that “no neglect has
ever been substantiated or indicated within the legal system, and that such
allegations are incorrect, and equitable relief by means of an order requiring
CCDCFS and all other parties containing this false information, to correct
their records accordingly, and to delete such mention from any reports, and
for such other relief deemed just and equitable.”
{¶ 6} On June 15, 2010, CCDCFS filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings; appellant did not oppose the filing. The court granted the motion
May 8, 1998.
on October 30, 2010 and stated: “Defendant Cuyahoga County Department
of Children and Family Services’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed
06/15/2010, is unopposed and granted. The court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.” This appeal
followed the dismissal of appellant’s complaint for declaratory judgment.
{¶ 7} Appellant raises four issues in her brief for our review:
{¶ 8} “1. Did [EFS] err in its judgment in upholding the May 8, 2007
revocation of [appellant’s] certification as a Type-B child care provider?
{¶ 9} “2. Did [EFS] err in failing to properly investigate accusations of
child abuse and negligence [sic] in [appellant’s] home?
{¶ 10} “3. Did [EFS] willingly uphold erroneous evidence against
[appellant] because of their failure to properly investigate accusations
brought against [her] which led to the May 8, 2007 revocation of [her]
certification as a Type-B child care provider?
{¶ 11} “4. Did the [CCDCFS] knowingly and with malicious intent,
misconstrue and present false evidence against [appellant], which led to the
May 8, 2007 revocation of [her] certification as a Type- B child care provider?”
{¶ 12} Based on appellant’s listed issues, it appears that appellant, filing
this appeal pro se, is attempting to retroactively appeal the 2007 revocation of
her day care license by EFS. However, EFS is not a party to the underlying
complaint for declaratory judgment, and this court may not review issues
raised in appellant’s brief that go beyond the complaint filed against
CCDCFS. The underlying complaint sought declaratory judgment against
CCDCFS based on its investigatory findings of “substantiated” and
“indicated” neglect against appellant, and the trial court dismissed the action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will only review the
ruling of the trial court and determine whether it erred in dismissing
appellant’s motion for declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Law and Analysis
Declaratory Judgment
{¶ 13} Civ.R. 12(B)(1) permits dismissal where the trial court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation. A “court has subject
matter jurisdiction over a case if the court has the statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate that case.” Garrett v. Columbus, Franklin App. No.
10AP-77, 2010-Ohio-3895, ¶13, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81,
2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶11. The standard of review for a
dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether any cause of action
cognizable by the forum has been raised in the complaint. Milhoan v. E. Loc.
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 157 Ohio App.3d 716, 2004-Ohio-3243, 813 N.E.2d
692, ¶10; State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 537
N.E.2d 641. We review an appeal of a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) de novo. Boutros v. Noffsinger, Cuyahoga
App. No. 91446, 2009-Ohio-740, ¶12.
{¶ 14} Appellant requested relief as follows: “Plaintiff demands a
Declaratory Judgment that no ‘neglect’ has ever been ‘substantiated’ or
‘indicated’ within the legal system, that such allegations are incorrect, and
equitable relief by means of an order requiring Defendant to correct its
records accordingly, and to delete all such mentions from any reports, and for
such other relief as is just and equitable.” A declaratory judgment is a
judgment in a civil case that declares the rights, status, or other legal
relations of a party in a dispute. R.C. 2721.02(A).
{¶ 15} Appellant’s motion for declaratory judgment is merely an appeal
of CCDCFS’s findings of “substantiated” and “indicated” neglect. Concerned
Citizens of Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Greene
App. No. 01 CA 0059, 2002-Ohio-540 (“The action authorized by R.C. 2506.01
is in the nature of an action for declaratory judgment.”). Appellant’s right to
appeal the investigatory findings of CCDCFS in the county common pleas
court is governed by R.C. 2506.01, which states that “* * * every final order,
adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau,
commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision of the
state may be reviewed by the common pleas court of the county in which the
principal office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter
2505. of the Revised Code. * * *.” R.C. 2506.01. As used in this chapter,
“final order, adjudication, or decision” means an “order, adjudication, or
decision that determines rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal
relationships of a person.” Id.
{¶ 16} In Ferren v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs.,
Cuyahoga App. No. 92294, 2009-Ohio-2359, the county department of
children and family services sent a letter to appellant that stated that an
“indicated” report of sexual abuse of a child had been filed against him.
Thereafter, appellant filed a notice of administrative appeal with the common
pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2506.01. In particular, appellant challenged the
merits of CCDCFS’s dispositional finding of “indicated” abuse. In response,
CCDCFS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The motion was unopposed and granted by the trial court. On appeal, this
court recognized that CCDCFS’s finding of “indicated” abuse, in and of itself,
did not determine appellant’s rights, privileges, benefits, or other legal
relationships. Therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
address his appeal. Id.
{¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “‘the party appealing
must have a “present” and “substantial” interest in the subject matter of the
litigation and must be “aggrieved or prejudiced” by the decision.’” In re
Petition for Incorporation of the Village of Holiday City, 70 Ohio St.3d 365,
371, 1994-Ohio-405, 639 N.E.2d 42, quoting Ohio Contract Carriers Assn. v.
Pub. Util. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 160, 161, 42 N.E.2d 758. “Such an
interest must affect a substantial right and it must be ‘immediate and
pecuniary, and not a remote consequence of the judgment; a future,
contingent or speculative interest is not sufficient.’” Village of Holiday City,
supra, at 371, quoting Ohio Contract Carriers, supra, at 161.
{¶ 18} Appellant failed to establish a present and identifiable intrusion
on her rights as a result of the registry information. As stated in Ferren, this
court has held that “a listing on a confidential registry is not an injury in
itself.” Ferren, citing Battles v. Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Edn. (D.Md.1995),
904 F.Supp. 471, 477. Despite appellant’s argument to the contrary, we find
that the 2007 revocation of her day care license does not constitute a present
intrusion on her rights. On May 19, 2009, the common pleas court held that
appellant is not eligible to reapply for child care licensure until May 8, 2012.
As such, appellant has no right to a child care license until that date.
{¶ 19} We note that appellant had the opportunity in 2007 to appeal
EFS’s initial revocation of her Type-B day care license in the common pleas
court pursuant to R.C. 2506.01. However, appellant waived her right to
appeal in that action, and she cannot use the motion for declaratory judgment
as an attempt to retroactively appeal the 2007 revocation of her license. Had
appellant appealed the revocation of her license by EFS at that time, the
common pleas court would have had jurisdiction to review the issue, and she
could have challenged the revocation on the basis that the findings of neglect
were unsupported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, the trial court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to review the investigatory findings of CCDCFS and properly
granted CCDCFS’s motion on the pleadings.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR