J-S43008-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHARIFFA STEPHENS
Appellant No. 2930 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 13, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002834-2012
MC-51-CR-0043809-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2014
Appellant, Shariffa Stephens, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following her
bench trial conviction for aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly
1
We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
On October 13, 2011, Appellant and two cohorts drove to an area near 2100
South Olden Street in Philadelphia, where Saprina Jackson was taking a
walk. Appellant and her companions exited the vehicle together and quickly
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 2701(a), 2705, and 903, respectively.
______________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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approached Ms. Jackson. Appellant, or one of her cohorts, immediately
struck Ms. Jackson in the head with a brick several times, causing Ms.
Jackson to fall to the ground. For approximately ten to fifteen minutes,
Appellant and her cohorts punched and kicked Ms. Jackson as she lay on the
took Ms.
fled the scene together.
Appellant after they received information that connected Appellant and two
other women, Nicole Doughty and Kayana Blunt, with the earlier incident.
When the police asked Appellant if she knew anything about the incident,
asked Appellant if she knew where to find Ms. Doughty and Ms. Blunt,
Appellant told the police that Ms. Doughty and Ms. Blunt were upstairs in
maintained that whatever happened was a fair fight. The police handcuffed
Appellant, Ms. Doughty, and Ms. Blunt, and drove them to the hospital,
where Ms. Jackson was receiving treatment. After Ms. Jackson positively
identified Appellant, Ms. Doughty, and Ms. Blunt as the women who had
attacked her and took her pocketbook, the police arrested Appellant, Ms.
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Following a one-day bench trial on April 24, 2013, the court found
Appellant guilty of aggravated assault, simple assault, REAP, and criminal
conspiracy. On August 13, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of twenty-four (24) to forty-
imprisonment, followed by forty-
2013, Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the court
subsequently denied by order dated August 21, 2013. Appellant timely filed
a notice of appeal on September 10, 2013. The court ordered Appellant on
September 25, 2013, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely complied.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
[APPELLANT] GUILTY [OF] AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,
SIMPLE ASSAULT AND RECKLESS ENDANGERING OF
ANOTHER PERSON (REAP) WHEN IN FACT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED ESTABLISHED THAT [APPELLANT] WAS
MERELY PRESENT WHILE THE OTHER CHARGED CO-
DEFENDANTS, KAYLA BLUNT AND NICOLE DOUGHTY, HIT
THE [VICTIM], SAPRINA JACKSON, WITH A BRICK AND
KICKED HER REPEATEDLY. [MS.] JACKSON TESTIFIED
THAT IT WAS HER BELIEF THAT [APPELLANT] WAS NOT
INVOLVED AND TRIED TO BREAK UP THE FIGHT.
WHETHER [THE] TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
[APPELLANT] GUILTY [OF] CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT [APPELLANT] AND
HER CO-DEFENDANTS, KAYLA BLUNT AND NICOLE
DOUGHTY ACTED WITH INTENT OF PROMOTING OR
FACILITATING THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE AND
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANTS
WERE IN AGREEMENT TO COMMIT A CRIME. THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS THAT [APPELLANT] WAS
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MERELY PRESENT AND ATTEMPTED TO BREAK UP THE
FIGHT BETWEEN CO-DEFENDANTS AND MS. JACKSON.
WHETHER [THE] COURT ERRED IN FINDING [APPELLANT]
GUILTY, WHICH WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE [VICTIM], MS.
JACKSON, EXONERATED [APPELLANT] WITH HER
TESTIMONY BY STATING THAT SHE BELIEVED
[APPELLANT] WAS MERELY PRESENT AND ATTEMPTED TO
BREAK-UP THE ALTERCATION BETWEEN THE [VICTIM]
AND THE CO-DEFENDANTS WHO SHE TESTIFIED WERE
MORE INVOLVED [THAN] [APPELLANT]. MORE
IMPORTANTLY BASED ON EVIDENCE ILLUMINATING CO-
WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY THE COURT ON ALL
CHARGES.
consistently exonerated Appellant. Appellant claims Ms. Jackson repeatedly
stated that Appellant was not part of the group that attacked her.
Furthermore, Appellant contends Ms. Jackson suggested Appellant tried to
break up the fight. Appellant also asserts police officer testimony regarding
nt
to convict Appellant of aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP; and
this Court should reverse.
In her second issue, Appellant argues Ms. Jackson testified that
Appellant tried to break up the fight rather than aid the assailants.
Appellant contends the evidence actually gives rise to the inference that
Appellant worked to stop the crime rather than facilitate it. Furthermore,
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-defendant, Ms.
Blunt, was not guilty on all counts is contra
Appellant did participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault. Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to convict
Appellant of criminal conspiracy; and this Court should reverse and dismiss
the case with prejudice.
In her third issue, Appellant argues the victim consistently testified
-defendant
participated in the attack. Appellant avers her conviction and co-
acquittal ar
justified only by concluding the court was confused about the identity of
each co-defendant. Appellant suggests her co
justice and is made even more shocking when one considers the court found
her co-defendant not guilty. Appellant concludes her conviction was against
the weight of the evidence, and this Court should invalidate the verdict and
dismiss the case with prejudice.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence implicates the following
legal principles:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
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and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Barnswell Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super.
2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
as follows:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of
fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An
appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the lower
court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate
not to consider the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight
claim.
Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408
(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)
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(internal citations omitted). We also observe:
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is entirely
distinct from a challenge to the weight of the evidence.
The distinction between these two challenges is
critical. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the
double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas
a claim challenging the weight of the evidence if
granted would permit a second trial.
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is
a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient
to support the verdict when it establishes each
material element of the crime charged and the
commission thereof by the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to
support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical
facts, in contravention to human experience and the
laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a
matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim
the court is required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner giving the
prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence.
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence,
concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain
the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
obligation to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new
trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict
in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A
trial judge must do more than reassess the
credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would
not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror.
Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is
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against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the
thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is
to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the
facts is to deny justice.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 853 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 318-20, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52
(2000) (internal citations omitted)). See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825
A.2d 710, 713-14 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding sufficiency of evidence review
does not include assessment of credibility; review of witness testimony
constitutes
evidence challenge implicated review of witness credibility, claim was
actually weight challenge and deemed waived, for failure to preserve it in
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 motion before trial court).
The Crimes Code defines aggravated assault in relevant part as
follows:
§ 2702. Aggravated assault
(a) Offense defined. A person is guilty of aggravated
assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life;
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). The court must evaluate each case on its own
particular facts, but under appropriate circumstances, even a single punch to
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the face can constitute aggravated assault. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911
A.2d 558, 564 (Pa.Super. 2006). Probative circumstances in this inquiry
have included evidence that the assailant was disproportionately larger or
stronger than the victim, that the assailant had to be restrained from
escalating the attack, that the assailant had a weapon or other implement to
aid the attack, or that the assailant made statements before, during, or after
the attack which might indicate an intent to inflict further injury.
Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). Evidence showing that an
appellant intended to strike a dazed and helpless victim again can establish
intent to cause serious bodily injury. Id. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code
defines simple assault as follows:
§ 2701 Simple Assault
(a) Offense defined. A person is guilty of assault if
he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon;
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in
fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1)-(3).
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of REAP as follows:
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engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the
2301. A person is guilty of REAP when that person: (1) possessed a mental
state of recklessness; (2) committed a wrongful act; and (3) created the
danger of death or serious bodily injury in the performance of the wrongful
act. Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2006).
This statutory provision was directed against reckless
conduct entailing a serious risk to life or limb out of
proportion to any utility the conduct might have. The
crime of REAP is a crime of assault which requires the
actual
present ability to inflict harm.
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 727-28 (Pa.Super. 2003).
mens rea
Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 949 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Section 903(a)(1) of the Crimes Code provides:
§ 903 Criminal Conspiracy
(a) Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of
conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a
crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
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(1) agrees with such person or persons that they or one
or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes
such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such
crime;
* * *
(b) If a person
guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection (a) of this
section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to
commit a crime has conspired with another person or
persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of
conspiring with such other person or persons, to commit
such crime whether or not he knows their identity.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), (b). To sustain a conviction for criminal
conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish the defendant: 1) entered
into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person
or persons; 2) with a shared criminal intent; and 3) an overt act was done in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Jones, supra at 121. Additionally:
Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the
conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. An agreement can
be inferred from a variety of circumstances including, but
not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge
of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances
and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal
episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a
conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt
where one factor alone might fail.
Id. at 121-22.
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common
understanding that a particular criminal objective is to be
accomplished. Mere association with the perpetrators,
mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the
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crime is insufficient. Rather, the Commonwealth must
prove that the defendant shared the criminal intent, i.e.,
that the [defendant] was an active participant in the
criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the
conspiratorial agreement. The defendant does not need to
commit the overt act; a co-conspirator may commit the
overt act.
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa.Super. 2002),
appeal denied, 569 Pa. 701, 805 A.2d 521 (2002) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Circumstances such as an
association between alleged conspirators, knowledge of the commission of
the crime, presence at the scene of the crime, and/or participation in the
conjunction with each other and Id.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Chris R.
court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2013, at 2-6)
(finding: (1) victim identified Appellant as member of group that exited
vehicle together; one member of group struck victim in head with brick; one
or more than one member of group struck victim several more times with
brick; all members of group surrounded victim and punched and kicked
victim while victim lay on ground; assault continued until one member of
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assailant; victim could not explicitly identify which blows she received from
individual group members, but evidence was sufficient to establish
everity of blows rose to level required
for aggravated assault, even if Appellant did not use brick to beat victim;
Appellant was properly convicted of aggravated assault, simple assault,
REAP; (2) victim identified Appellant as having exited vehicle with other
during assault is sufficient for finding that Appellant was engaged in conduct
of assault; all women, including Appellant, left scene of crime together in
vehicle they arrived in af
testimony that Appellant exited van with other women, remained present at
scene, surrounded victim, and fled from scene with other women sufficiently
established Appellant did aid in commission of crime; Appellant was properly
convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault; (3) testimony by
victim and police officers was sufficient to establish crime; record does not
trial is not imperative and justice was properly served). Accordingly, we
affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/4/2014
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