In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 12‐3877
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY D. WOMACK, ALSO KNOWN
AS T‐MONEY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:08‐cr‐30023‐DRH‐PMF‐1 — David R. Herndon, Chief Judge.
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 — DECIDED OCTOBER 9, 2013
Before BAUER, POSNER, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. On November 19, 2008, a jury con‐
victed Anthony Womack of distributing more than five grams
of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced Womack to 360 months’
imprisonment. He appealed the sentence to this Court; we
vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. At
resentencing, the district court imposed the same sentence;
2 No. 12‐3877
Womack again appealed to this Court. This Court again
vacated Womack’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.
At the second resentencing hearing on December 20, 2012,
the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months’ imprison‐
ment. It is this sentence that Womack now appeals. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm Womack’s 262‐month sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
At Womack’s resentencing hearing, the district court
determined the correct Sentencing Guidelines calculation.
Womack qualified as a Career Offender due to his prior felony
convictions, so U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(2) established his offense
level at 34. His criminal history category was determined to be
a 6 due to his criminal history, so the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a sentence of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.
Womack’s counsel agreed that the district court had
properly calculated the statutory and Guidelines ranges, but
requested a sentence of only 110 months based on a theory of
progressive punishment. He argued that since Womack had
spent only six months in prison prior to this conviction, a
sentence of 262 months would be unduly harsh. Womack’s
counsel advocated for a downward variance on alternative
grounds as well, contending that Womack was not a typical
violent offender who was “out there shooting people.” He
stated that “Womack has only been convicted of one domestic
violence case, and other than that, in his criminal history he has
no other crimes of violence.” The district court disagreed,
noting that Womack “took a pretty good effort at shooting
somebody once back in 1992. Took a shot at James Mitchell.
That was a crime of violence.”
No. 12‐3877 3
After hearing from both parties as well as from Womack,
the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months, at the
lowest end of the recommended Guidelines range. Womack
filed a timely appeal, and raises two issues. First, he contends
that the district court committed procedural error by failing to
consider his progressive punishment argument at sentencing.
Second, he argues that the district court improperly catego‐
rized his prior conviction as a “crime of violence,” which
unjustly enhanced his sentence. We will address each argu‐
ment in turn.
II. DISCUSSION
This Court reviews de novo the procedures used during
sentencing. United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir.
2010)(citing United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir.
2009)). Once the Court has determined that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, this Court will
review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Coopman, 602 F.3d 814, 819
(7th Cir. 2010). Sentences within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range are presumed reasonable. United States v.
Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2008).
A. Womack’s Progressive Punishment Argument
The district court must give reasons for its sentencing
decision and address all of the defendant’s principal argu‐
ments that “are not so weak as to not merit discussion.” United
States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). Courts,
however, need not “tick off every possible sentencing factor in
detail and discuss separately every nuance of every argu‐
ment.” United States v. Collins, 640 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 2011).
4 No. 12‐3877
“As long as the sentencing court considers the arguments
made in mitigation, even if implicitly and imprecisely, the
sentence imposed will be found reasonable.” United States v.
Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2010).
Womack contends that the district court committed
procedural error by failing to properly address his mitigating
argument for a downward variance based on the concept of
progressive punishment. We disagree. Though the district
court never explicitly used the term “progressive punishment”
when responding to Womack’s argument, it adequately
considered the issue. The court acknowledged that Womack
had only been incarcerated for six months in the past, but
refused to give him a below‐Guidelines sentence on this basis.
The district court highlighted the fact that Womack had a
handful of convictions for which no points had been assessed
within the Guidelines system, a series of controlled substance
and violent offender offenses, as well as 48 traffic‐related
convictions. The district court explained that “from the time
Mr. Womack was 18, he had one serious offense after another,”
and commented that due to his sheer number of convictions,
Womack seemed like someone who was “not willing to live
within society’s rules.” The court emphasized “the need for the
sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the
offense, … [provide] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct
and protect[] the public from further crimes.” Though the
district court did not explicitly address Womack’s progressive
punishment argument, it considered the argument and
dismissed it. The court then imposed a sentence of 262 months’
imprisonment, at the lowest end of the Guidelines range. We
No. 12‐3877 5
do not find it unreasonable that the court chose to impose a
within‐Guidelines sentence in light of Womack’s lengthy
criminal history.
B. Womack’s Argument That His Prior Conviction Is
Not A “Crime Of Violence”
Womack contends that the court committed procedural
error by characterizing his 1992 conviction for aggravated
discharge of a firearm as a “crime of violence.” The pre‐
sentence investigation report notes that “[Womack] knowingly
discharged a firearm into a building … which he knew to be
occupied by James Mitchell, and the firearm was discharged
from a place or position outside that building.” Though the
presentence investigation report does not specify the subsec‐
tion of the statute under which Womack was convicted,
subsection (a)(1) of Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24‐1.2 states, “A person
commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he or she
knowingly or intentionally 1) discharges a firearm at or into a
building he or she knows or reasonably should know to be
occupied and the firearm is discharged from a place or position
outside that building.” Womack’s conduct falls squarely within
the language of subsection (a)(1).
This Court has already concluded that a conviction for
aggravated discharge of a firearm under subsection (a)(1) of
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24‐1.2 qualifies as a crime of violence in
the immigration context. Quezada‐Luna v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 403
(7th Cir. 2006). Quezada‐Luna was convicted under subsection
(a)(1) of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24‐1.2, a conviction he did not
contest; instead, he challenged its characterization as a “crime
of violence.” Id. at 404. The Immigration and Naturalization
6 No. 12‐3877
Act (“INA”) defines “crime of violence” as “(a) an offense that
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b)
any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16. We held that a
conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm under
subsection (a)(1) of the statute qualifies as a crime of violence,
since it “both has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another and describes conduct that presents a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used.” 439 F.3d at 406.
Though “crime of violence” is defined slightly differently
by the Sentencing Guidelines than by the INA, the relevant
language is the same. Both define a “crime of violence” as an
offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 16. Thus, we reach the same
conclusion here, and hold that the district court properly
categorized Womack’s prior conviction for aggravated dis‐
charge of a firearm as a “crime of violence.”
This Court previously considered whether a conviction for
aggravated discharge of a firearm under subsection (a)(2) of
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24‐1.2 qualifies as a crime of violence
under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Curtis, 645
F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2011). Curtis was convicted under subsection
(a)(2), which states, “A person commits aggravated discharge
of a firearm when he or she knowingly or intentionally
No. 12‐3877 7
discharges a firearm in the direction of another person or in the
direction of a vehicle he or she knows or reasonably should
know to be occupied by a person.” Though Curtis argued that
this conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence, we held
that it does, explaining that “[d]ischarging a firearm in the
direction of a person or a vehicle containing a person (regard‐
less of what the shooter knows or reasonably should know)
is unquestionably the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of ‘physical force against the person of another.’” Id. at 941.
Though Womack was convicted under subsection (a)(1) of the
statute, he “knowingly discharged a firearm into a building …
which he knew to be occupied by James Mitchell.” Thus, the
analysis is the same, and Womack’s conviction for aggravated
discharge of a firearm qualifies as a “crime of violence.”
The district court’s within‐Guidelines sentence of 262
months’ imprisonment was reasonable and well within its
discretion. It properly characterized Womack’s prior convic‐
tion as a “crime of violence,” and committed no procedural
error at sentencing. It based its decision on Womack’s exten‐
sive criminal record, the need to protect the public from further
crimes, and to deter future criminal conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence of the district
court.