NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 18, 2013
Decided July 30, 2013
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 12‐3109
GAJINDER PAL SINGH CHAWLA and Petition for Review of
MAHONJEET KAUR, an Order of the Board of
Petitioners, Immigration Appeals.
v.
Nos. A096‐493‐562
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney A096‐493‐563
General of the United States, A099‐769‐358
Respondent.
O R D E R
Gajinder Pal Singh Chawla and Mahonjeet Kaur fear persecution if they return to their
native India, based on police hostility towards Chawla because of his involvement in a police
corruption lawsuit in Punjab. Chawla petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board denied his application
after upholding the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding based on, among other
things, Chawla’s inconsistencies about the number of times he was kidnaped and threatened
by the Punjab police. As substantial evidence supports this adverse credibility finding, we
deny the petition for review.
No. 12‐3109 Page 2
Chawla and his wife were admitted to the United States on February 14, 2003, as
nonimmigrant visitors and were granted permission to remain for three months. On March 7,
2003, Chawla filed an asylum application with the Department of Homeland Security’s
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), listing his wife as a derivative
beneficiary. Following an interview with Chawla, USCIS declined to grant his application
and on June 24, 2003, referred his application to the Chicago immigration court for a de novo
review. Removal proceedings were commenced on June 30, 2003, when the Department of
Homeland Security filed Notices to Appear in Immigration Court. The Notices charged that
the Petitioners were removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as aliens who remained in
the United States longer than their temporary admission as nonimmigrants allowed. In
immigration court, Chawla admitted to all factual allegations in the Notices to Appear,
conceded removability as charged, and indicated he wished to renew his application for
asylum, withholding of removal and protection under CAT.
The crux of Chawla’s argument before the immigration court was that he feared
persecution from certain corrupt police officers in Punjab because of his work as a press
reporter. Chawla claims that he documented police abuses in Punjab, and as a result, a police
officer was charged with corruption. Chawla claims he was kidnaped upwards of thirty
times by the Punjab police, who kept him captive for days and threatened him with death
if Chawla gave in‐court testimony against the Punjab police. Chawla’s story, however, is
inconsistent at best. A review of the record indicates that Chawla provided three significantly
different accounts of his alleged prior persecution: in his asylum application, his asylum
interview, and before the immigration court.
In his asylum application, Chawla details two traumatic and lengthy abductions, where
he was denied food and water for days on end, because he testified against a Punjab police
officer at trial. During an interview with his asylum officer, Chawla then claimed that he was
actually abducted “twenty or thirty times” and was on the witness list to testify against the
Punjab police, but was never called to testify. Before the immigration court Chawla, while
under oath, testified that he was abducted once and it occurred at the Indian courthouse
immediately following his in‐court testimony against a Punjab police officer.
It is Chawla’s burden to provide evidence to show he has a well‐founded fear of
persecution in his native India. Ni v. Holder, 635 F.3d 1014,1019 (7th Cir. 2011). When the
immigration judge asked Chawla to account for the material inconsistencies in his story,
Chawla explained that he did not mention the prior twenty to thirty times he was kidnaped in
his asylum application or in his testimony before the immigration court, because they were not
“major incidents.” Accordingly, the immigration judge found Chawla not credible, and that
he failed to provide sufficient corroborative evidence to overcome the negative credibility
No. 12‐3109 Page 3
determination. Chawla then filed a timely appeal of the immigration judge’s decision to the
Board. The Board dismissed Chawla’s appeal, affirming the immigration judge’s decision
denying Chawla’s asylum application, as it found the immigration judge’s adverse credibility
determination was not clearly erroneous.
In his petition before this court, Chawla challenges the adverse credibility determination
relied up on by the immigration judge (and the Board) to deny his application. Chawla argues
that he presented credible testimony and substantial evidence demonstrating that he harbors
a well‐founded fear of persecution, should he return to India.
This court will uphold the Board’s decision so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence, and will overturn it only if the record compels a contrary result. Xiao v. Mukasey, 547
F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2008); Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 2008). The
immigration judge found, and the Board affirmed, that Chawla’s testimony regarding past
persecution and his fear of future persecution was incredible, and that Chawla failed to provide
either a convincing explanation or adequate corroborating evidence to support his asylum
claim. The Board concluded that the immigration judge properly based her adverse credibility
finding on the repeated inconsistencies in Chawla’s account of how many times, if at all, he was
kidnaped. Chawla attempts to characterize these inconsistencies as “trivial” but we disagree.
Whether Chawla was actually kidnaped by his persecutors is clearly relevant to the heart of his
claim. Further, Chawla’s story was inconsistent, to say the least, as to how many times he was
kidnaped, varying wildly from once to thirty times. The adverse‐credibility determination was
based in part on this discrepancy, which we believe is a “specific, cogent reason that bear[s] a
legitimate nexus to the finding.” Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004). We may
not disturb such a judgment.
Further, when an alien is found to be incredible, as is the case here, it is incumbent on him
to provide “a convincing explanation of the discrepancies or extrinsic—and credible—
corroborating evidence.” Capric, 355 F.3d at 1086 (citation omitted). Chawla has failed to do
so. His explanation of the inconsistencies in his story are vague at best and border on
nonsensical. Accordingly, the immigration judge did not err in finding, nor the Board in
affirming, that Chawla failed to demonstrate the requisite persecution needed to qualify for
asylum. And because Chawla cannot meet the standard for his asylum claim, he necessarily
cannot satisfy the more stringent standards for withholding of removal and protection under
the CAT. Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 568 n. 14 (7th Cir. 2008). The petition for review
is DENIED.