FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SATPAL SINGH CHAWLA; JASBIR No. 05-74823
KAUR; INDERPREET SINGH CHAWLA,
Petitioners, Agency Nos.
v. A077-427-104
A077-427-105
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney A077-427-108
General,
OPINION
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted
February 9, 2010—San Francisco, California
Filed March 26, 2010
Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Stephen S. Trott and
Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Trott
4965
4968 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
COUNSEL
Christopher Stender, San Francisco, California, for the peti-
tioner. Martin Avila Robles, San Francisco, California, was
on the briefs.
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4969
William Munick, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., for the respondent. Marion E. Guyton, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Washington, D.C., was on the brief.
OPINION
TROTT, Circuit Judge:
Satpal Singh Chawla (“Chawla”), his wife Jasbir Kaur, and
his son Inderpreet Singh Chawla (collectively “Petitioners”)
petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”)
denial of Chawla’s applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief. The
BIA’s decision was based on an adverse credibility finding.
We grant the petition for review and remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.1
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioners are a Sikh family from Delhi, India. Chawla,
who was the president of a local Young Sikh Association in
India, claims he was persecuted by the Indian police on two
occasions. According to Chawla, the first incident of persecu-
tion occurred on March 15, 1998, when he was arrested by
Indian police at a rally attended by Sikhs protesting the imple-
mentation of a new helmet law. The helmet law required all
Sikhs to wear helmets while driving or riding on two-wheeled
vehicles unless they were wearing a turban. The Sikhs were
protesting the law because wearing helmets is against the Sikh
religion.2 Chawla testified that while he was making a speech,
1
In Chawla v. Holder, No. 05-77410, Petitioners petition for review of
the BIA’s denial of their motion to reopen. We address that petition in a
separate memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.
2
Evidence in the record explains that Sikh scriptures provide clear
guidelines that “cursed is the Sikh who wears headgear,” and that by forc-
ing Sikh women to wear helmets, the Indian government is “prohibiting
[Sikhs] from practicing [their] religion.”
4970 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
rally participants began shouting anti-government slogans and
the police began beating them with sticks. The police then
arrested Chawla and detained him for seven days, during
which time they kicked him, slapped him, beat him with
sticks, tied him to a cart, pushed a stick into his mouth, and
told him “now make a speech now against us. . . . Sikh’s [sic]
like you we are going to wipe them out.” Chawla was released
after his father paid the police a bribe of 10,000 rupees.
The second incident of alleged persecution began on May
15, 1998, when Chawla was arrested following an explosion
on the bus he was driving. Chawla testified he was driving the
bus when a gas cylinder, which belonged to a passenger who
sold balloons, exploded on the bus. The police stopped to
investigate the explosion, arrested Chawla, and detained him
for ten days. Chawla testified that during his detention, the
police beat him, broke his right wrist, and accused him of
having links with terrorists and deliberately causing the explo-
sion. Chawla was released after his father and two others paid
the police a bribe of 50,000 rupees.
Chawla testified that after he was released, he went to Pati-
ala, Pajabi, and stayed at his brother-in-law’s house. He
stayed there for only a few weeks, however, because his rela-
tives asked him to leave after the police came looking for him
at the house. Chawla testified that he then returned to Delhi
and stayed in a Sikh temple for a few days, during which time
his wife came to see him and told him that, on three or four
occasions during the previous month, the police came to the
family home looking for him. Chawla then moved to his
father-in-law’s house, where he stayed until he, his wife, and
his child left India.
Petitioners entered the United States on non-immigrant
visas. Prior to the expiration of his visa, Chawla applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Chawla’s
wife and son are beneficiaries of the asylum application.
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4971
After three merits hearings, the IJ found Chawla not credi-
ble and denied all forms of relief. The IJ further found that
even if Chawla was credible, he had not established that he
will suffer future persecution on account of a protected
ground.
The BIA dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of the IJ’s decision.
The BIA, citing In re Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA
1994), adopted and affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility find-
ing and thereby affirmed the IJ’s denial of Chawla’s applica-
tion for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
However, the BIA did not adopt or affirm the portion of the
IJ’s decision finding that even if Chawla were credible, he
failed to meet his burden for relief.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence
and law, appellate review “is limited to the BIA’s decision,
except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopt-
ed.” Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Adverse credibility findings are reviewed under the sub-
stantial evidence standard and “will be upheld unless the evi-
dence compels a contrary result.” Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d
738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted). The agency must
articulate a legitimate basis to question the petitioner’s credi-
bility and must offer specific and cogent reasons for any
stated disbelief. Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.
2002) (citation omitted). The articulated reasons “must be
substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen each
of the IJ’s or BIA’s proffered reasons for an adverse credibil-
ity finding fails, we must accept a petitioner’s testimony as
credible.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.
2004).
4972 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
III. DISCUSSION
Our review is limited to the BIA’s decision and the portion
of the IJ’s decision concerning the adverse credibility finding.
We do not review the portion of the IJ’s decision that found
that Chawla failed to meet his burden of proof for relief even
if he were credible because the BIA did not expressly adopt
or affirm that holding. See Hosseini, 471 F.3d at 957.
The IJ articulated six reasons for finding Chawla not credi-
ble, and the BIA independently articulated a seventh reason.
None of the reasons articulated by the IJ or BIA, considered
either separately or in combination, provide a legitimate basis
to question Chawla’s credibility. Therefore, we hold that the
adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evi-
dence.
A. Submission of Differing Newspaper Articles
At the first merits hearing, Chawla testified that, at the
March 15, 1998 rally, Indian police beat protestors with sticks
and arrested several protestors, including Chawla. Chawla
also submitted Exhibit 4G, a newspaper article about the
March 15, 1998 rally. The article is from “Current News
Today,” a newspaper distributed throughout Delhi, India. The
article specifically names Chawla and notes that he gave a
speech at the rally, but it does not indicate that any arrests or
violence occurred. The last lines of the article reads: “[T]he
police headquarters and senior officers have guaranteed . . .
that this law will not be enforced, that they will not issue tick-
ets. . . . After that the demonstration was ended.”3
3
Two different translators offered two different translations of Exhibit
4G. The translator present at the hearing provided the translation quoted
above. Prior to the hearing, another translator provided a written transla-
tion of Exhibit 4G. According to the second translator, the final sentence
of Exhibit 4G reads: “The senior officers of police assured the Sikhs to
consider this matter sympathetically and the protest was finished after
this.” The minor differences in these translations are immaterial to our
analysis.
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4973
The IJ asked Chawla if Exhibit 4G was the only news
report of the rally in question and if there were any news
reports indicating that protestors were arrested. Chawla
replied that he had read some news articles that reported the
arrests, but that he did not currently have any of those articles
in his possession. Chawla explained that he originally submit-
ted Exhibit 4G to an asylum officer because the asylum offi-
cer had asked him for supporting documentation, and Exhibit
4G is what he obtained through his father. When the IJ asked
Chawla why Exhibit 4G did not indicate that anyone at the
rally had been arrested, Chawla replied, “Maybe it’s not writ-
ten there, I don’t know. There are some people who are
against the Sikh’s [sic].” When asked on cross-examination
why Exhibit 4G indicates that the protestors “had a peaceful
meeting with the police officials,” Chawla replied, “[E]ven
the press is prone to lying about issues. What can I say about
this?” When asked why he would submit Exhibit 4G, an “in-
accurate” article, in support of his case, Chawla replied, “This
was to prove basically the fact that the rally did in fact take
place and so I was asked to furnish some kind of documenta-
tion that affected and this was not given to the court, this was
submitted to the INS office.”
At the end of the first merits hearing, the IJ again asked
Chawla if Chawla had any reports that might confirm his ver-
sion of what happened. Chawla replied that he did not have
any reports at the present time, but that he would ask his
father.
At the second merits hearing, Chawla submitted Exhibit 13,
a newspaper article from the “Evening Punjabi Samachar,”
which is a newspaper distributed in an area inhabited by a
large number of Sikhs. The last lines of Exhibit 13 read,
When Satpal Singh Chawla, president of Young Sikh
Association was speaking, some Sikhs raised anti
police and anti government slogans. Some of them
started pro Khalistan slogans. On this the police
4974 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
force started mercilessly beating the Sikhs. In the
rally, many Sikh men, women and children were
injured. Satpal Singh Chawla and few other Sikhs
arrested.
Although the IJ agreed with the government attorney that
Exhibit 13 was “highly suspicious,” the IJ did not question the
authenticity of Exhibit 13 in his decision.
The IJ questioned Chawla’s credibility based on Chawla’s
submission of Exhibits 4G and 13 because Chawla “never sat-
isfactorily explained, if he did not agree with Exhibit 4G, why
he presented it in the first place.” The BIA characterized this
as a “compelling aspect” of the IJ’s decision and concluded
that Chawla “should have contemporaneously clarified the
article’s inaccuracy.”
[1] Chawla’s submission of Exhibits 4G and 13 does not
support the adverse credibility finding. First, we note that
Exhibits 4G and 13 are not wholly inconsistent. Exhibit 4G
simply states that the March 15, 1998 rally ended after the
police assured the Sikh protestors that no tickets would be
issued for violations of the helmet law, and although Exhibit
4G fails to report that any violence or arrests did in fact occur,
it also does not state that violence or arrests did not occur.
[2] Second, Chawla provided reasonable explanations for
the different accounts of the rally in Exhibits 4G and 13, and
he reasonably explained why he submitted Exhibit 4G in sup-
port of his case. Chawla explained that the newspaper articles
likely differ because Exhibit 4G is from a newspaper distrib-
uted throughout Delhi, whereas Exhibit 13 is from a newspa-
per distributed in an area with a large Sikh population.
Chawla also explained that Exhibit 4G may be inaccurate
because “the press is prone to lying about issues.” Further,
Chawla explained that he submitted Exhibit 4G because the
INS office asked him for documents supporting his claim for
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4975
asylum, and when he submitted the article, his focus was on
proving that the March 15, 1998, rally occurred.
[3] Third, neither the IJ nor the BIA specifically addressed
Chawla’s explanation for the different accounts of the rally
contained in the articles or his explanation as to why he sub-
mitted Exhibit 4G. See Kaur, 379 F.3d at 887 (“An adverse
credibility finding is improper when an IJ fails to address a
petitioner’s explanation for a discrepancy or inconsistency.”).
[4] Finally, Chawla’s submission of Exhibit 4G, without
providing a contemporaneous clarification that the article was
not entirely accurate, does not support the adverse credibility
finding because, again, Exhibit 4G is not wholly inconsistent
with Chawla’s testimony or Exhibit 13. Thus, requiring
Chawla to clarify Exhibit 4G’s “inaccuracy” upon submission
of that exhibit to the immigration court would have required
that Chawla be omniscient; Chawla would have had to have
known that the IJ would find Exhibit 4G as different as “night
and day” from Exhibit 13. An asylum applicant cannot be
expected to sua sponte “clarify,” upon submission to the
immigration court, evidence that is not wholly inconsistent
with the applicant’s testimony or other documentary evidence.
[5] For the above reasons, we conclude that Chawla’s sub-
mission of Exhibits 4G and 13, and his failure to clarify upon
submission that Exhibit 4G was not entirely accurate, do not
support the adverse credibility finding.
B. Failure to Explain Sentence in Newspaper Article
Submitted by the Government
At Chawla’s second merits hearing, the government intro-
duced Exhibit 17 into evidence. Exhibit 17 is a compilation
of various newspaper articles, some of which discuss the
Indian helmet law. One of those articles is dated January 5,
1998, and one sentence in that article reads, “Accused of
interfering with religious freedom, the Delhi Police hastily
4976 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
exempted sardarnis (Sikh women) from a new law requiring
helmets for pillion riders on two-wheelers.” Another article in
Exhibit 17 contains a copy of the helmet law, which reads, in
part, “provided further that the State Government [may] pro-
vide for such exceptions [to the helmet law] as it may think
fit.”
Chawla was asked why Exhibit 17 states that Sikh women
had been exempted from the helmet law as of January 5,
1998, a date that preceded the March 15, 1998 rally. In
response, Chawla testified, “I don’t know why this article
says what it says,” and “It’s solely published but its not true,
it’s a lie.” The BIA, adding to the reasons articulated by the
IJ for the adverse credibility finding, questioned Chawla’s
credibility based on Chawla’s failure to explain the above-
quoted sentence from the newspaper article in Exhibit 17.
[6] Chawla’s failure to explain the sentence in the newspa-
per article does not support the adverse credibility finding.
First, we question the reliability of the newspaper article’s
sentence at issue because the sentence says that the Delhi
police exempted Sikh women from the helmet law. However,
according to the helmet law as reproduced in Exhibit 17, only
state governments can craft exceptions to the helmet law, not
state police. Both the IJ and the BIA failed to note this inter-
nal contradiction contained in Exhibit 17.
Additionally, Exhibit 6, a newspaper article from “The Hin-
dustan Times,” introduced into evidence by Chawla, appears
to contradict the sentence at issue in Exhibit 17, a fact that the
IJ and BIA also failed to note. Specifically, Exhibit 6 states
that Sikh women were protesting the helmet law on July 25,
1998, by refusing to wear helmets. However, if, as the sen-
tence at issue in Exhibit 17 states, Sikh women had indeed
been exempted from the helmet law as of January 5, 1998,
there would have been no reason for the Sikh women to pro-
test that law more than six months later, in July 1998.
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4977
For the above reasons, we conclude that Chawla’s inability
to explain the single, contradicted sentence in Exhibit 17 does
not support the adverse credibility finding.
C. Failure to Provide Corroborating Evidence
Regarding Suspension from Employment, and
“Inconsistent” Evidence Regarding End of
Employment
At the first merits hearing, Chawla testified that on March
27, 1998, he was suspended from his job at the Hotel Kan-
ishka because his employer considered the seven days during
which he was detained after the March 15, 1998, rally to be
leave without permission. Chawla testified that he was given
a written letter of suspension, and the IJ stated that he would
like to see that letter. Chawla informed the IJ that he did not
have the letter with him, but that he would check his files or
ask his father “if it [was] still available.” Chawla then testified
that he had never been formally terminated from his job at the
Hotel Kanishka because “[t]hat takes time for the inquiries
and everything, I came here in August.”
At the second merits hearing, Chawla submitted Exhibit 12,
which is titled, “Termination Order,” and is dated June 7,
1999. The Termination Order is from the Hotel Kanishka and
reads, in part,
This is in reference to the Show Cause Notice
referred to above sent to you . . . in respect of the
charges contained in the charge sheet . . . dated
27.10.1998. . . . Since the charges levelled [sic] and
proved against you in the enquiry are grave and seri-
ous in nature, you are hereby awarded the punish-
ment of TERMINATION OF SERVICES with
immediate effect.
The IJ asked Chawla where the suspension letter was, and
Chawla replied, “It’s in De[lh]i in India. I didn’t know that I
4978 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
have to bring so many papers, bring them across with me.”
Chawla informed the IJ that he had not been aware of the Ter-
mination Order until his father sent it to him after he asked his
father to send documents regarding the end of his employ-
ment at the Hotel Kanishka.
At the third merits hearing, Chawla testified that his father
could not find the original suspension letter and that his father
tried to get a copy of the suspension letter but was unable to
do so because all of the hotels under the India Tourism Devel-
opment Corporation (“ITDC”), including the Hotel Kanishka,
had been closed.
The IJ questioned Chawla’s credibility, concluding that the
Termination Order did not relate to the suspension letter. The
IJ reasoned that, because the Termination Order indicated that
the charges leveled against Chawla were “grave and serious”
in nature, the Termination Order must relate “to some other
charges far more serious than leave without permission.”
[7] The IJ’s conclusion that the charges referred to in the
Termination Order must be “far more serious than leave with-
out permission” was based on speculation and conjecture.
Chawla testified that, to his knowledge, no formal criminal or
civil charges had ever been filed against him in India, and
there is no evidence demonstrating that Chawla was ever
accused or convicted of any crime or civil charge more seri-
ous than being absent from work without permission.
Although the Termination Order refers to charges that are
“grave and serious in nature,” it provides no further explana-
tion or hint as to what those charges could be. Any specula-
tion as to what charges the Termination Order refers to is just
that—pure speculation. Such speculation cannot be used to
support the adverse credibility finding. See Shah v. INS, 220
F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We cannot uphold an
adverse credibility finding that rests on conjecture and specu-
lation.” (citation omitted)).
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4979
The IJ also did not believe Chawla’s testimony that his
father was unable to obtain the charge sheet referred to in the
Termination Order because all the hotels operated under the
ITDC were closed. The IJ stated that “[t]his court does not
accept that testimony as credible, but will demand corrobora-
tion that such is the case.”
An IJ can demand corroborating evidence when he “has
reason to question the applicant’s credibility,” and when the
evidence requested is “non-duplicative, material, [and] easily
available.” Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000);
see also Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that corroborative evidence of job termination
was not “easily available” because the certificate of dismissal
was in China). Here, however, the charge sheet was not easily
available to Chawla because it was in India and under the
control of a third party, the ITDC. Further, because the charge
sheet was not easily available, Chawla’s failure to provide
that corroborating evidence does not support the adverse cred-
ibility finding. See Sidhu, 220 F.3d at 1092; Guo, 361 F.3d at
1201.
Adding to the IJ’s reasoning, the BIA articulated four addi-
tional reasons for finding Chawla not credible based on the
above evidence. First, the BIA found that the Termination
Order did “not comport with [Chawla’s] earlier testimony
regarding the suspension,” and that Chawla “specifically
stated that he was not terminated from his employment.” We
disagree with the BIA because our review of the evidence
demonstrates no inconsistency between Chawla’s testimony
and the Termination Order. Specifically, Chawla’s testimony
that he had never formally been terminated from the Hotel
Kanishka took place at his first merits hearing, before Chawla
was informed by his father that a formal Termination Order
had arrived at his father’s house in India. At the second merits
hearing, Chawla explained, “I didn’t even know that letter had
arrived. . . . [My father] said there was a termination order or
letter of that effect and I asked him to send it to me conse-
4980 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
quently.” That Chawla was unaware of the existence of the
Termination Order at the first merits hearing is further sup-
ported by the fact that Chawla arrived in the United States on
August 11, 1998, nearly ten months before the Termination
Order was issued on June 7, 1999.
Second, the BIA concluded that the Termination Order was
“poorly drafted and formatted,” which undermined its reliabil-
ity. Again, we disagree. Looking at the Termination Order,
we fail to see how the BIA concluded that it was “poorly
drafted and formatted,” and the BIA offered no specific or
cogent reason supporting its conclusion. Moreover, even if the
Termination Order were “poorly drafted and formatted,” such
a conclusion does not bear a substantial and legitimate nexus
to the adverse credibility finding. To the contrary, if the Ter-
mination Order was not reliable, then the nexus relied on by
the IJ—that the charges in the Termination Order relate “to
some other charges far more serious than leave without
permission”—would be further undermined. Thus, the BIA’s
conclusion that the Termination Order was “poorly drafted
and formatted” does not support the adverse credibility find-
ing. See Gui, 280 F.3d at 1225 (“The IJ must have a legiti-
mate articulable basis to question the petitioner’s credibility,
and must offer a specific, cogent reason for any stated disbe-
lief. Any such reason must be substantial and bear a legiti-
mate nexus to the finding.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
Third, the BIA questioned “why [Chawla] chose not to
challenge his suspension in light of the fact that he acknowl-
edged it was basically due to a personal dispute with his man-
ager, that he had been employed by the company since 1977,
and was the General Secretary of the union.” The BIA’s dis-
belief of Chawla’s decision not to challenge his suspension
from work was based on speculation and conjecture about
what someone in Chawla’s position would or would not do;
thus, it does not support the adverse credibility finding. See
Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071 (“We cannot uphold an adverse credi-
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4981
bility finding that rests on conjecture and speculation.” (cita-
tion omitted)); see also Zhou v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 860, 865
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an IJ’s disbelief of an applicant’s
testimony did not support an adverse credibility finding
because the IJ’s disbelief was “based on speculation and con-
jecture about Zhou’s position in Chinese society and what
someone in that position would or would not do”).
Fourth, the BIA found that Chawla’s “account also con-
flicts with an affidavit submitted by his neighbor in India, that
states that [Chawla] quit his job.” Again, we disagree because,
contrary to the BIA’s assertion, the neighbor’s affidavit is not
inconsistent with Chawla’s testimony.4 The neighbor’s affida-
vit begins by stating that Chawla “was forced to leave his
job,” which is consistent with Chawla’s testimony that he was
suspended from work. The later statement in the affidavit that
Chawla “quit” his job was made in reference to the fact that,
in order to keep his job, Chawla would have to compromise
his religion by cutting his hair and beard, and Chawla was not
willing to do so. This statement in the affidavit is consistent
with Chawla’s testimony that the general manager of the
Hotel Kanishka told Chawla that he would give Chawla his
job back if Chawla cut his hair and trimmed his beard, but
that Chawla was not willing to do so.
[8] Finally, we note that Chawla did not claim that being
suspended or terminated from his employment at the Hotel
Kanishka was an act of persecution. Thus, even if there were
a minor inconsistency between Chawla’s testimony and the
4
The affidavit states, in relevant part,
Satpal Singh’s trouble was further compounded because he was
forced to leave his job at a prestigious Delhi Hotel. Satpal Singh
told me that his boss was prejudiced against Sikhs and wanted
him to cut his hair and shave his beard in order to continue work-
ing at the hotel. The growing of a beard and long hair is a
requirement of Sikhism and Satpal Singh told me that he was not
willing to compromise his religion for the sake of his job so he
quit the hotel.
4982 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
exhibits he submitted, such an inconsistency would not go to
the heart of Chawla’s claims of persecution and, thus, would
not support the adverse credibility finding. See Mendoza
Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Minor inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the
basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, go to the
heart of the asylum claim, or reveal anything about an asylum
applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an
adverse credibility finding.” (citation omitted)).
D. Failure to Provide “Strong” Corroborating Evidence
of Bus Explosion and Subsequent Arrest and
Mistreatment
Chawla testified that following the May 15, 1998, explo-
sion on the bus he was driving, the police arrested him,
detained him, beat him, and broke his right wrist. Chawla
went to a chiropractor in the United States who told him that
“all of the bones [in his right wrist] are jammed, not fixed
properly.” Chawla testified that no media reports related to
the bus explosion exist and, therefore, he was unable to locate
any such reports. He explained to the IJ, “It was a minor inci-
dent, these kind[s] of minor accidents go unreported, they are
too small.” When the IJ questioned Chawla about characteriz-
ing the incident as “minor,” Chawla replied, “They knew it
was not a bomb. The police got to it, it was not a bomb.”
Chawla testified that the police did not issue an accident
report, but that the police did take written notes from witness
interviews. Later during the hearing, the IJ stated, “you see
the police might have thought it was a bomb which is all the
more reason why I would have expected there to have been
a report of what happened and an investigation to find out
why it happened.” Chawla reiterated his earlier testimony that
the police did investigate, but that there was no report. At the
end of Chawla’s second merits hearing, the IJ acknowledged
that Chawla is “absolutely convinced there is [no accident
report] so I won’t pursue that. I can’t imagine it but stranger
things have happened. I’m not disputing it.”
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4983
Additionally, Chawla testified that he did not file an insur-
ance claim or report for the damage done to the bus by the
explosion because he was able to fix the damage—which con-
sisted of broken windows—himself and making an insurance
claim is an extremely lengthy procedure that wastes a lot of
time.
Finally, Chawla submitted a letter from Professional Chiro-
practic Care, located in Sacramento, California; notes from an
Indian doctor; and notes from an Indian hospital. The letter
from Professional Chiropractic Care, dated March 6, 2000,
states, in relevant part: “Mr. Satpal Chawla . . . . has right
wrist pain from injury in India approximately May 1998. The
injury left him with two fractured bones in the wrist.” The
Indian doctor’s notes, dated May 25, 1998, contain Chawla’s
name at the top and refer to a right wrist. The Indian hospital
notes, also dated May 25, 1998, contain Chawla’s name at the
top and refer to an x-ray for a right wrist.
In finding Chawla not credible, the IJ acknowledged that
Chawla provided evidence that he suffered a fractured wrist,
but then noted, “but the question persists as to the circum-
stances under which [Chawla] might have sustained the
injury, since that is not confirmed in terms of the medical
record.” Similarly, the BIA questioned Chawla’s credibility in
regard to the bus explosion because Chawla “did not provide
any strong corroborating evidence to verify that it occurred
and resulted in his arrest and mistreatment.”
[9] The IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that media or police
reports of the explosion exist was based on impermissible
speculation and conjecture. Chawla repeatedly testified that
no such reports exist, or, if they did, that he was unable to
locate such reports, and neither the IJ nor the BIA point to any
evidence in the record that indicates that such reports do exist.
Accordingly, Chawla’s failure to provide corroborating media
or police reports does not support the adverse credibility find-
ing. See Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071 (“We cannot uphold an
4984 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
adverse credibility finding that rests on conjecture and specu-
lation.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, to the extent the IJ and BIA faulted Chawla for
not providing a corroborating police report, we find that such
a report, if it does exist, would not be easily available to
Chawla because obtaining such a report would require
Chawla’s persecutors to comply with his request for evidence.
Accordingly, Chawla’s failure to provide a corroborating
police report does not support the adverse credibility finding.
See Sidhu, 220 F.3d at 1092 (holding that an IJ can, in certain
circumstances, demand corroborating evidence when that evi-
dence is “non-duplicative, material, [and] easily available”).
[10] Finally, we hold that the BIA improperly questioned
Chawla’s credibility based on Chawla’s failure to provide
“strong” corroborating evidence of the bus explosion and his
subsequent arrest and mistreatment. Likewise, the IJ improp-
erly required Chawla to submit medical records that conclu-
sively establish that Chawla’s injury resulted from police
mistreatment. When appropriate, our case law provides that
an IJ or the BIA can require corroborating evidence. How-
ever, our case law does not require that such evidence be
“strong” or “conclusive.” See, e.g., id.
E. “Implausible” Explanation of How Chawla Received
Visa to Enter the United States
Chawla testified that he and his family physically went to
the U.S. Consulate in New Delhi in order to obtain visas to
enter the United States. When asked what he told the officer
as a basis for his visa to the United States, Chawla testified,
“Just to visit.” Chawla further testified that, at the time the
visas were issued, he did not have intentions of permanently
residing in the United States. The IJ then asked Chawla,
“What were you thinking?” and Chawla replied, “I was very
afraid at that time. The only intention was to get away from
there. . . . I thought maybe if I’m able to come here I might
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4985
be able to save myself.” Chawla then reiterated that he did not
come to the United States with the intention of seeking asy-
lum, and that he “thought that when the conditions improve
in India, [he] would return back.”
The IJ characterized Chawla’s testimony as follows:
During the [hearing, Chawla] was questioned with
regard to the circumstances under which he applied
for and received the visas and he indicated that he
wished to visit the United States to “save himself”
and that he would return to India when “conditions
changed.” This Court finds any such conversation
with the United States Consulate at the Embassy in
New De[lh]i inherently unworthy of belief if it
resulted in the issuance of a non-immigrant visitors
visa.
[11] The IJ’s characterization of Chawla’s testimony is
inaccurate. Specifically, Chawla did not testify that he
received a visa as a result of telling the officer at the U.S.
Consulate that he wished to visit the United States in order to
“save himself.” To the contrary, Chawla testified that he told
the officer that he wanted a visa so that he could “visit” the
United States. Chawla’s testimony regarding “saving himself”
was in response to the IJ’s question of what Chawla was
thinking at the time; there is no evidence that Chawla shared
that thought aloud with the officer.
[12] Because the IJ’s skepticism as to the plausibility of
Chawla’s testimony was based on a mischaracterization of
that testimony, such skepticism did not provide a proper basis
for upholding the adverse credibility finding. See Singh v.
Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The IJ’s
skepticism as to the plausibility of [an applicant’s] account
may be a proper basis for finding his testimony is inherently
unbelievable, if [the IJ’s] logical inferences are supported by
substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)).
4986 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
F. Background Information Regarding Current
Treatment of Sikhs in New Delhi
At the final merits hearing, the government submitted the
“U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices — 2003” for India (“2003 Country Conditions
Report”). This report was the last exhibit admitted into evi-
dence that provided statistics about the Sikh population in
India.
While discussing the grounds on which he was basing the
adverse credibility finding, the IJ stated,
In terms of the latest statistics, there is a sizeable
Sikh community currently residing outside of the
Punjab and in particular, in New De[lh]i. There is
nothing in this background information that suggests
that the Sikh community in New De[lh]i is suffering
persecution at this particular time on account of any
one or more of the five factors for consideration.
[13] The IJ and BIA erred to the extent they based the
adverse credibility finding on the statistics contained in the
2003 Country Conditions Report because those statistics
reveal nothing about the circumstances or persecution of
Sikhs living in New Delhi in 1998, the year in which Chawla
claims he was persecuted. Gui, 280 F.3d at 1225 (holding that
a reason supporting an adverse credibility finding “must . . .
bear a legitimate nexus to the finding” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
G. Testimony that the Indian Police are Still Interested
in Chawla
Chawla testified that his father told him on several occa-
sions that the Indian police had come looking for Chawla
since he departed for the United States. Chawla also submit-
CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4987
ted Exhibit 19, an affidavit from his father, which reads, in
relevant part,
[D]uring the previous days I have been threatened by
the Local Police, who always forced me to call you
son/children from USA. [O]n [February 23, 2004,]
the local police also threate[ne]d . . . me and also
harrassed [sic] me for calling my children from USA
which is not easy presently, and when I argued with
them they pressurised [sic] me very badly.
The IJ concluded that, unless there were facts that Chawla
withheld from the court as to precisely what his situation was
in India when he left, it was “inherently unworthy of belief”
that the local police would still be interested in Chawla after
almost six years simply because Chawla was communicating
with his father by phone from the United States.
[14] The IJ’s disbelief of Chawla’s testimony and his
father’s affidavit was based on speculation and conjecture
about the circumstances under which the local Indian police
would remain interested in Chawla, and that Chawla may be
withholding facts from the court. Such “conjecture and specu-
lation cannot serve as a reason for an adverse credibility find-
ing.” Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071 (citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
[15] Because each of the IJ’s and BIA’s proffered reasons
for the adverse credibility finding fail, we accept Chawla’s
testimony as credible. See Kaur, 379 F.3d at 890. This deter-
mination, however, is not the end of the matter, because the
BIA did not address (1) whether Chawla’s treatment in India
amounted to persecution, (2) whether his treatment was on
account of one of the grounds protected by our asylum law,
and (3) whether he has a well-founded fear of persecution
should he be returned. See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d
1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
4988 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
(42)(A)). Thus, we remand to the BIA for further proceedings,
including a determination of his eligibility for withholding of
removal or CAT relief.
Petition GRANTED.