UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 01-31080
Summary Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SNAPPER CORTEZ BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(00-CR-54-ALL-C)
March 15, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Snapper Cortez Brown, who conditionally pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress cocaine seized
from his person following an investigatory stop and statements he
gave at that time. He contends: the pat-down search was not
justified; and, even if it was justified by a reasonable belief
that he was armed, it ran afoul of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366, 373 (1993), thereby exceeding the bounds of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we employ a
two-tiered standard, examining the factual findings of the district
court for clear error, and its ultimate conclusion as to the
constitutionality of the law enforcement actions de novo.” United
States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. 120 S. Ct. 117 (1999), and cert. denied sub nom. 120 S. Ct.
312 (1999). “[W]e must view the evidence presented at the hearing
on the motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party — in this case, the government.” United States v.
Nichols, 142 F.3d 857, 866 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1056
(1998). Nor will we “second guess the district court’s factual
findings as to the credibility of witnesses”. United States v.
Garza, 118 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. 522
U.S. 1051 (1998).
The testimony presented at the suppression hearing indicates
that “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger”. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also United States v. Rideau,
969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“We must attempt to
put ourselves in the shoes of a reasonable police officer as he or
she approaches a given situation and assesses the likelihood of
danger in a particular context.”). Therefore, a protective search
for weapons was justified. The district court, while noting
inconsistencies in testimony, found: Officer Brewer’s testimony
was credible; and he “discovered the cocaine in [Brown’s] pocket
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only as a response to [Brown’s] actions of covering his pocket with
his hand and then muttering that he had cocaine”.
These findings are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the
suppression motion was properly denied.
AFFIRMED
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