ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and resulting prejudice such that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d
504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). To demonstrate
prejudice regarding the decision to enter a guilty plea, a petitioner must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112
Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the
inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner
must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the
evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We
give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's
application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev.
682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).
First, appellant claimed that trial counsel failed to adequately
assist him in light of his disability. Appellant failed to provide any specific
facts in support of this claim and thus he failed to demonstrate that his
...continued
original petition for a writ of mandamus. See Peck v. Grouser, 129 Nev.
295 P.3d 586, 588 (2013).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) I947A
counsel's performance was deficient. Appellant was evaluated for
competency and found to be competent. Appellant was further personally
canvassed about entering a guilty plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate
that there was a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a
guilty plea and would have gone to trial in light of the benefit he
received—the State agreed not to seek habitual criminal adjudication.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying this
claim.
Second, appellant claimed that his trial counsel intended to do
him harm, had malice, and was deceitful. Appellant failed to provide any
facts in support of this claim, and thus he failed to demonstrate that his
counsel's performance was deficient. Appellant failed to demonstrate that
he was prejudiced in light of the benefit discussed above. Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim.
Third, appellant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective
at sentencing for not presenting the court with his medical history, for not
securing an expert to discuss appellant's rehabilitation, and for not asking
for probation. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient as appellant himself informed the district court
about his disability and the district court accepted appellant's statement
of fact regarding his disability (brain injury). Appellant's counsel did
argue for leniency and presented the court with letters from appellant's
mother and social worker. In light of his prior convictions and the facts of
this offense, appellant failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at sentencing had trial counsel
presented the court with more information about appellant's medical
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A e
history, presented an expert regarding rehabilitation, or asked for
probation. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying this claim. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3
Pickering
J.
Parraguirre
J.
cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge
Thomas N Muldoon
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
3 We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in
proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude
that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent
that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those
submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings
below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A 4ipip