enhancement due to a mistake about his criminal record. The district
court summarily denied the motion. Based upon our review of the record
on appeal, we conclude the district court erred in denying the motion.
A motion to modify a sentence "is limited in scope to sentences
based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which
work to the defendant's extreme detriment." Edwards v. State, 112 Nev.
704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). A motion to modify a sentence that
raises issues outside the very narrow scope of issues permissible may be
summarily denied. Id. at 708-09 n.2, 918 P.2d at 325 n.2.
To be sentenced under NRS 207.010(1)(b), the large habitual
criminal statute, a defendant must have three qualifying prior felonies.
And "[&11 prior convictions used to enhance a sentence must have
preceded the primary offense." Brown v. State, 97 Nev. 101, 102, 624 P.2d
1005, 1006 (1981). Here, the murder that appellant was convicted of
occurred in August of 1992, but the three Nevada convictions used to
enhance his sentence occurred in November of 1992 and January of 1993.
Because the three Nevada felonies occurred after the murder, it was
improper to use those in enhancing appellant's sentence pursuant to the
large habitual criminal statute.
The State argued below that appellant also had three valid
convictions from Texas and that those were sufficient to impose the large
habitual criminal enhancement. 2 However, this argument was flawed
because the sentencing court found that only two of the convictions from
2 TheState also argued that this motion was subject to the equitable
doctrine of laches. We disagree. This court has held that "time
constraints and procedural defaults necessarily do not apply." Edwards,
112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 324.
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Texas were valid and that the third conviction was not presented with
sufficient identifiers to tie appellant to that conviction. Thus, only two
valid prior convictions were presented at sentencing. Therefore, the
sentencing court relied on mistaken assumptions about appellant's
criminal record when it determined that appellant was eligible for large
habitual criminal treatment. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order. 3
Saitta
cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge
Jamie Allen Cunningham
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
3 Wehave considered all proper person documents filed or received in
this matter. We conclude that appellant is only entitled to the relief
described herein.
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