Eggers (Daniel) v. State

in the information, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. See State v. Jones, 96 Nev. 71, 73-74, 605 P.2d 202, 204 (1980). Second, Eggers contends that the district court abused its discretion by giving an instruction which stated that "Mlle amount of a controlled substance needed to sustain a conviction for the crime(s) charged against the Defendant is that amount necessary for identification • as a controlled substance by a witness qualified to make such identification," rather than his proposed instruction. We review a district court's decision whether to give an instruction for an abuse of discretion, but review de novo whether an instruction accurately stated the law. Funderburk v. State, 125 Nev. 260, 263, 212 P.3d 337, 339 (2009). We conclude that the instruction given accurately stated the law, see NRS 453.570, and Eggers fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by giving it rather than his proposed instruction or a version thereof. Moreover, Eggers had an opportunity to explain the meaning of the instruction during his closing argument. Third, Eggers contends that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence which would have demonstrated that the amount of methamphetamine in his possession had no monetary value and could not be sold. When Eggers attempted to elicit this information, the State objected on the grounds that quantity was not an element of the crime and therefore the testimony was irrelevant and misleading. The district court agreed and sustained the State's objections. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion. See Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) I947A et. 328, 344, 213 P.3d 476, 487 (2009). Although quantity is not an element of the crime, the monetary value of the methamphetamine and whether it could be sold was relevant to whether it was possessed for the purpose of sale and was not misleading. See NRS 48.015 (defining relevant evidence). While this error, standing alone, may be considered harmless, it contributed to the cumulative error in this case. Fourth, Eggers contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. When reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we first consider whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper, and then determine whether the improper conduct warrants reversal. Valdez t). State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). Because Eggers did not object, he must demonstrate plain error which affected his substantial rights. Id. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477. Having considered the prosecutor's comments in context, we conclude that they were improper and constitute misconduct. Although it was appropriate for the prosecutor to argue that the law prohibits the possession of methamphetamine in any amount, it was inappropriate to do so by emphasizing the cost of prisons and drug courts, comparing methamphetamine to anthrax and ricin, and suggesting that Eggers should have been facing a life sentence. While this misconduct, standing alone, may not have affected Eggers' substantial rights, it contributed to the cumulative error in this case. Having considered the relevant factors, see id. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors in this SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A case violated Eggers' right to a fair trial and warrant reversal. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order. 2 p J. Pickering Parraguirre , J. Saitta cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge Humboldt County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Humboldt County District Attorney Humboldt County Clerk The fast track response submitted by the State does not comply 2 with NRAP 32(a)(4) because its pages are not consecutively numbered and the text of the brief is smaller than represented. Counsel for the State is cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A e