in part that "[a]ll motions in limine to exclude or admit evidence must be
in writing and noticed for hearing not later than calendar call, or if no
calendar call was set by the court, no later than 7 days before trial." The
State filed its "Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine" more than 7 days
before the start of the trial. According to the district court minutes, at the
hearing on the motion, the district court stated that "[t]he Court does not
think the State's late filing of the motion violated anything." We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the
State's motion.
Second, McNeal contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial after the State presented
testimony from the victim on a subject previously prohibited by the
district court. We disagree. According to McNeal, the State was allowed
to introduce evidence that he "was involved with a group of individuals
who were selling drugs, but not evidence that [he] personally sold drugs."
After hearing arguments from counsel, the district court found that the
State did not elicit "any comment with the intent to infer that [McNeal]
was selling drugs," and that after the initial objection and subsequent
bench conference, "questions posed by the State clarified that [McNeal]
was not doing drugs." The district court denied McNeal's motion and
informed defense counsel that "[y]ou're free on cross-examination . . . to
reiterate again with this witness that he did not see your client involved in
any hand-to-hand drug sales." We conclude that the challenged testimony
was not improper and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying McNeal's motion for a mistrial. See Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194,
206-07, 163 P.3d 408, 417 (2007) (we review a district court's decision to
deny a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion).
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Third, McNeal contends that the district court abused its
discretion by overruling his hearsay objection to testimony pertaining to
an anonymous note discovered near the crime scene by investigating
•
officers. We disagree. A district court's decision to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Mclellan v. State, 124
Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). Here, the district court allowed
the State to question Detective Marc Colon about the anonymous note only
to the extent that it aided in the development of the investigation; the
content of the note was not the subject of the State's direct examination,
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, or admitted as an exhibit for
the jury's consideration. We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by overruling McNeal's objection to the State's line of
questioning. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2
J.
2 Thefast track statement submitted by McNeal fails to comply with
NRAP 3C(h)(1) because the footnotes are not "in the same size and
typeface as the body of the brief," NRAP 32(a)(5). Counsel for McNeal is
cautioned that the failure to comply with the briefing requirements in the
future may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
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cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Anthony M. Goldstein
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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