July 2012. Shortly thereafter, Robles engaged in numerous sexual acts
over a four-month period, including vaginal intercourse, attempted anal
intercourse, oral sex, showering with the victim, fondling her, and forcing
the victim to masturbate him.
The State seeks to admit evidence of Robles' prior sexual
contact with then 13-year-old S.R. for which he incurred a conviction for
coercion. At a Petrocellil hearing, S.R. testified that Robles was her
karate instructor. He frequently transported her to and from the karate
studio and became a father figure to her. She described incidents where
Robles held her hand, rubbed her leg, back, and butt, and asked her if she
wanted to be with him. She also testified that on one occasion Robles
forced her to have sexual intercourse at the karate studio. After that
incident, S.R. never returned to karate class. According to the minutes of
the Petrocelli hearing, the district court determined that S.R.'s testimony
was credible and that the State had proved the incident by clear and
convincing evidence, but that "there are not enough unique similarities
between the allegations and what happened to S.R." and therefore the
State could not introduce the evidence in its case in chief "unless the door
is opened by the defense." The State argues that the district court
manifestly abused its discretion by denying its motion because evidence of
Robles' sexual abuse of S.R. was relevant to the current offenses to show
intent, motive, common scheme or plan, and absence of mistake.
As a general matter, the district court enjoys broad
discretion when it comes to evidentiary rulings. See Fields v. State, 125
1Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46,692 P.2d 503 (1985).
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Nev. 776, 782, 220 P.3d 724, 728 (2009). The question before us is not
whether members of this court or other jurists would have ruled
differently than the district court did in this case, see Collier v. Legakes, 98
Nev. 307, 310, 646 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1982) ("[W]hile mandamus lies to
enforce ministerial acts or duties and to require the exercise of discretion,
it will not serve to control the proper exercise of that discretion or to
substitute the judgment of this court for that of the lower tribunal."),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
(Zogheib), 130 Nev. , 321 P.3d 882 (2014); rather, we must determine
"whether the district court's evidentiary ruling was a manifest abuse or
arbitrary or capricious exercise of its discretion." Armstrong, 127 Nev. at
, 267 P.3d at 780. In answering that question, we look to whether the
district court's evidentiary ruling was based on prejudice or preference
rather than reason, is contrary to the evidence, or is contrary to or based
on a clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Id.
Although the district court has not entered a written order explaining its
factual findings and conclusions, the documents provided to this court
indicate that the district court conducted the hearing required by law and
applied the three-part analysis for determining the admissibility of prior
bad act evidence: "(1) the prior bad act is relevant to the crime charged
and for a purpose other than proving the defendant's propensity, (2) the
act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value
of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. „ 270 P.3d 1244, 1249-50
(2012). It thus appears that the district court's evidentiary ruling was
based on reason, not prejudice or preference. And given the dissimilarities
between the current allegations and the prior bad acts, the district court
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could reasonably conclude that the challenged evidence was not relevant
to show intent, motive, common scheme or plan, or absence of mistake or
accident or that the probative value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Although the opposite
conclusion may also be reasonable, the district court's decision is not
clearly contrary to the evidence or a clearly erroneous interpretation or
application of the law. Cf. Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 260-63, 129
P.3d 671, 677-79 (2006) (rejecting modus operandi and common scheme or
plan as grounds for admitting evidence of prior sex offenses where
defendant's identity was not at issue and there was no evidence of an
"overarching and explicitly preconceived plan" despite "numerous
similarities" between prior conduct and charged abuse, but concluding
that evidence was relevant where prior conduct and charged abuse showed
"sexual attraction to and obsession with the young female members of [the
defendant's family], which explained to the jury [the defendant's] motive
to sexually assault [the victim of the charged abuse]"). Because the State
has not demonstrated that the district court manifestly abused or
arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion and we will not substitute
our judgment for that of the district court absent such a demonstration,
we
ORDER the petition DENIED.
4 WP J.
Pickering
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ti±L-jit Saitta
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cc: Hon. Valerie Adair, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Clark County Public Defender
Eighth District Court Clerk
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