respondents, ruling that the applicable regulation was reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest, and therefore, did not violate
appellant's First Amendment rights. This appeal followed.
This court reviews a district court's order granting summary
judgment de novo. Wood u. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d
1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all
other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id.
On appeal, appellant summarily argues that he presented
genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment,
but he failed to identify any such issues of fact either in the district court
or on appeal. See Wood, 121 Nev. at 730-31, 121 P.3d at 1030 (requiring
the presentation of specific facts to oppose summary judgment, not mere
conclusory allegations). Thus, no genuine issues of material fact were
presented that would prevent the district court from granting summary
judgment in respondents' favor. Id.
Appellant also asserts that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment without allowing him to proceed with discovery. But
in requesting further discovery in opposing summary judgment, appellant
failed to identify what discoverable information he sought to oppose the
summary judgment motion. As a result, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellant's request for further discovery. See
NRCP 56(f) (requiring a party requesting discovery in opposition to a
...continued
750.03(5)(A) limits the documents to ten pages. Thus, appellant's
distinction is inconsequential to our decision on appeal.
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motion for summary judgment to state in an affidavit the reasons the
party cannot currently oppose the motion); Francis v. Winn Las Vegas,
LLC 127 Nev. „ 262 P.3d 705, 714 (2011) (noting that the denial of
an NRCP 56(f) request is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and holding
that denial of such a request is appropriate if the requesting party failed
to state how additional discovery will lead to the creation of a genuine
issue of material fact).
Finally, appellant argues that NDOC AR 750.03(5)(A) violates
his First Amendment rights by impinging on his freedom of speech, so that
the district court erred as a matter of law in granting respondents
summary judgment. A prison regulation that affects constitutional rights
is valid "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To determine if a regulation
meets this standard, courts must assess the existence of a valid rational
connection between the regulation and the proffered government interest;
whether there are alternative means for inmates to exercise the affected
right; whether an accommodation would negatively impact guards, other
inmates, or the allocation of prison resources; and, whether there are any
alternatives that would not infringe on legitimate penological interests.
Id. at 89-90. In First Amendment cases, it is also important for courts to
evaluate the content neutrality of the regulation. Id. at 90.
Based on the parties' arguments, the appellate record, and the
Turner factors, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment because NDOC AR 750.03(5)(A) is reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest. Here, respondents have a legitimate
penological interest in ensuring the safety and security of the inmates,
guards, and other persons at the prison. See id. at 93 (recognizing security
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and safety as valid penological interests). And, as respondents noted
below, NDOC AR 705.03(5)(A) is rationally connected to these interests
because it prevents incoming contraband and decreases the likelihood that
inmates will communicate with others via coded messages or that
significant mail accumulation will create fire hazards in the cells.
Additionally, alternative means exists to allow appellant to
exercise his constitutional rights, such as requesting that materials be
sent in multiple mailings so that the enclosures do not exceed the ten-page
per-letter limit. See id. at 90. With regard to the remaining Turner
factors, respondents demonstrated that removal of the regulation would
greatly impact the allocation of prison resources because additional
personnel would be needed to review the larger volume of incoming mail,
and appellant failed to suggest any less restrictive alternatives to the
regulation, thereby demonstrating its reasonableness. See id. at 90-91.
Finally, the regulation is content neutral as it applies equally to all mail
regardless of content. See id. at 90.
In light of the above analysis, and having concluded that
appellant's remaining arguments lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
--gea-t1 j.
Hardesty
J.
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cc: Hon. Steve L. Dobrescu, District Judge
Amadeo J. Sanchez
Attorney General/Carson City
White Pine County Clerk
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