regarding the decision to enter a• guilty plea, a petitioner must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112
Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the
inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner
must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the
evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004).
Appellant claimed that his trial counsel promised him that he
would receive two concurrent terms of 12 to 48 months and that trial
counsel should have objected when he received 2 consecutive terms of 19
to 48 months Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced. In
exchange for his guilty plea to one count of carrying a concealed firearm
and one count of possession of a stolen vehicle, the State retained the right
to argue but agreed not to oppose concurrent time between the counts.
The written guilty plea agreement informed appellant of the potential
sentences and the fact that sentencing was strictly within the district
court's discretion. Appellant was further personally canvassed about the
potential sentences and the fact that sentencing was within the district
court's discretion. In entering his plea, appellant acknowledged that he
was not promised a particular sentence by anyone. Appellant's mere
subjective belief regarding sentencing was insufficient to invalidate his
decision to enter a guilty plea. Rouse v. State, 91 Nev. 677, 679, 541 P.2d
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643, 644 (1975). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err
in denying this claim. 2 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
/4cAa Z..431.1 ,
Hardesty
r—D-t LAP-k. 1/4-C J.
Douglas
cksLayr J.
Cherry
cc: Hon. Abbi Silver, District Judge
Darrion Headd
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
2To the extent that appellant claimed that the State breached the
plea agreement, this claim fell outside the scope of claims permissible in a
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a judgment
of conviction based upon a guilty plea. NRS 34.810(1)(a).
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