Filed 8/7/14 P. v. Naranjo CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064726
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE327329)
LAWRENCE NARANJO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William J.
McGrath, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila O'Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott Taylor and Stacy Tyler,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Lawrence Naranjo of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code,1
§ 496, subd. (d)). Naranjo admitted a prior serious/violent felony conviction (§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i)) and three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Naranjo
to a determinate term of five years in prison.
Naranjo appeals contending the trial court erred in denying his motion under
section 1118.1 for a judgment of acquittal and that in any event there was not sufficient
evidence to support the conviction. We will reject both contentions and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of January 28, 2013, Elvira Garcia discovered her red 1987
Chevrolet pickup truck was missing. There was only one set of keys for the truck and
they were still at Ms. Garcia's house. She reported the loss to the Sheriff.
At around 11:00 a.m., on January 29, 2013, San Diego Sheriff's Deputy Winferd
Vermillion observed the stolen truck parked outside a residence at 659 Sacramento
Avenue. He observed Naranjo get out of the driver's seat of the truck and walk toward
the house.
Vermillion called for assistance and continued to observe the truck. While he was
waiting, Vermillion saw Naranjo return to the truck and get into the driver's seat.
Vermillion then approached the truck, drew his firearm and ordered Naranjo to get out of
the truck and put his hands in the air. Naranjo did not immediately comply.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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Vermillion continued to order Naranjo to put his hands in the air and to get down
on the ground. Naranjo turned in circles and the deputy thought he might be looking to
run. However, Deputy Torres arrived at that moment and blocked any escape path.
Naranjo finally got down on the ground.
A search of the truck revealed a number of Naranjo's belongings, including his
wallet. A set of keys was found but when the keys were shown to Ms. Garcia she said
they were not for her truck. When Deputy Torres examined the truck ignition he
discovered the truck could be started without keys, which Torres said was not uncommon
for older vehicles.
During the investigation on January 29, Deputy Vermillion interviewed Joseph
Pollard who lived at 659 Sacramento Street. Pollard told Vermillion that he had seen
Naranjo, who he referred to as "Lawrence" driving the truck at around 4:00 p.m. the day
before.
When Pollard testified he said he had met Naranjo on January 28, but denied ever
seeing Naranjo driving the stolen truck. Pollard denied seeing the truck until January 29
when the deputy pointed it out to him. Pollard testified the deputy must have
misunderstood him when they discussed his observations. He said he was half asleep
when he talked to authorities and did not remember what he said.
Defense
Naranjo testified and denied ever driving the truck. He testified that on the
morning of January 29, a man named "John" picked him up at a bus stop in the stolen
truck and drove him to the Sacramento Street address. Naranjo did not ask John to pick
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him up, did not know how John came to be at the bus stop, and did not know John's last
name, or how to contact him. Naranjo did specifically recall that John had the keys to the
truck when he picked him up, but could not remember much else because he was "out of
it."
Naranjo explained entering the driver's side of the truck as observed by
Vermillion. Naranjo realized John had taken his money and went to the truck to search
through his belongings. He said he used a key to open the door. It was at that point when
Vermillion approached him with gun drawn, screaming orders at him.
Naranjo explained his entry through the driver's side of the truck was part of his
effort to retrieve his belongings, which he variously said were in the middle of the seat or
"all over the truck" or that he could not remember.
DISCUSSION
Although Naranjo divides the issue into two parts, his essential challenge to his
conviction is that there is not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He argues
that the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal at the close of the
prosecution's case. If the court had done so, Naranjo would not have been required to
testify, which we agree was not likely helpful to his defense. In any event, he contends
that even if we consider his highly doubtful testimony, there is not enough evidence to
establish he had knowledge of the stolen nature of the property. We will find the
evidence sufficient at the close of the prosecution to warrant denial of the motion to
acquit. Having said that, we are well satisfied the totality of the evidence supports the
jury's finding that Naranjo knew the truck was stolen and that he had possession of it.
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A. Standard of Review
When we review a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction we apply
the familiar substantial evidence standard of review. Under that standard, we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment. We draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the trial court decision. However, we do not reweigh the evidence
nor do we make credibility decisions. The question we must resolve is whether there is
sufficient, substantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that
each element of the offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
B. Receiving Stolen Property
In order to convict a person of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (d)), the
prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the property was stolen;
(2) the defendant knew it was stolen; and (3) that the defendant possessed the property.
(People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223.)
Proof of the required mental state can be proved by direct evidence, but is often
shown by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003,
1019.) Possession of recently stolen property raises a strong inference of knowledge of
its stolen nature. Such strong inference requires only "slight" additional corroboration to
support a guilty verdict. (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421.)
The parties in this case do not disagree as to the applicable law. Rather they
dispute the application of the facts to the law. However, as we will explain, we do not
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believe Naranjo is accurately applying either the substantial evidence standard or the
requirement of "slight" corroboration.
C. Denial of the Motion to Acquit
Section 1118.1 provides: "In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the
defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the
case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal
of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then
before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on
appeal. If such a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by
the prosecution is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without first having
reserved that right."
The trial court in applying the statute follows essentially the same standard of
review as that used on appeal. Assuming the jury believes the prosecution evidence, the
court must determine if such evidence is substantial and could be found to prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Cole (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212-1213; People v. Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.)
In this case, the jury had before it the testimony of Deputy Vermillion which
placed Naranjo in the driver's seat of the truck when he was first observed. Vermillion
saw Naranjo come back to the truck and enter through the driver's side door. Naranjo had
a quantity of his belongings inside the truck which had been stolen only the day before.
Thus it is clear Naranjo could reasonably have been found to be in possession of
the recently stolen truck. When confronted by the deputies, Naranjo's movements were at
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least unusual and the jury could have considered them to be evasive, but blocked by
Deputy Torres.
Next, the jury could have considered the testimony of Joseph Pollard and the
contradicting evidence from Deputy Vermillion. Certainly Pollard appears to be of
doubtful credibility. However, Vermillion testified that Pollard said he had observed
Naranjo driving the truck on the afternoon of January 28. Pollard denied the observation,
and perhaps denied making the statement to Vermillion, since he testified he did not
remember what he said when he was interviewed. The jury was not required to believe
any or all of Pollard's testimony. Pollard's prior inconsistent statements were admissible
to prove the truth of such statements. (Evid. Code, § 1235.) Thus, if the jury believed
Vermillion and disbelieved Pollard's in-court testimony, it could find that Naranjo was
seen driving the stolen truck mere hours after it had been reported stolen.
In short, the trial court viewed the evidence in light of what the jury could
reasonably believe from the testimony before it. The trial court's analysis and decision
were sound. We are satisfied that the jury could have properly found Naranjo guilty
based solely on the evidence presented in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The only change in the nature of the evidence after the trial court denied the
motion to acquit was that Naranjo testified. We recognize that he denied both possession
of the truck and that he had any knowledge the truck was stolen. Under Naranjo's version
of the events he was merely a passenger in the truck when John provided him an
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unsolicited ride from a bus stop to the Sacramento Street house. However, the jury was
not required to believe his version of the events.
Naranjo was impeached at trial and his testimony was both internally inconsistent
and at odds with other evidence in the case. Reasonable jurors could have found all or
portions of Naranjo's testimony not to be credible. In sum, there was sufficient evidence
to support a conviction before Naranjo testified and nothing in his testimony required
reasonable jurors to reject the prosecution's evidence. The jury's verdict is well supported
by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
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