UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4850
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID L. HUGGARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00005-JPJ-1)
Submitted: July 11, 2014 Decided: August 1, 2014
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dennis E. Jones, DENNIS E. JONES & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David L. Huggard pled guilty to travel in interstate
commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct
with another person and was sentenced to 210 months’
imprisonment. He appeals his conviction, asserting that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We find no abuse of discretion and
therefore affirm Huggard’s conviction.
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea.” United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, once the
district court has accepted a guilty plea, it is within the
district court’s discretion whether to grant a motion to
withdraw it based on the defendant’s showing of a “fair and just
reason.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Battle,
499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007).
When considering whether to allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court must consider six
factors:
(1) whether the defendant has offered
credible evidence that his plea was not
knowing or not voluntary, (2) whether the
defendant has credibly asserted his legal
innocence, (3) whether there has been a
delay between the entering of the plea and
the filing of the motion, (4) whether
defendant has had close assistance of
competent counsel, (5) whether withdrawal
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will cause prejudice to the government, and
(6) whether it will inconvenience the court
and waste judicial resources.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).
Although all of the Moore factors should be considered, the
first, second, and fourth are the most important factors in
making the determination of whether to allow withdrawal of the
plea. United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir.
1995).
We have reviewed the record submitted on appeal and
the arguments of the parties, and we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in determining that Huggard had the
assistance of competent counsel throughout the proceedings,
failed to offer credible evidence that the plea was not knowing
or voluntary, and failed to credibly assert his legal innocence.
Additionally, the district court did not err in determining that
the three-month delay and the prejudice to the government
counseled against granting the motion to withdraw the plea. *
In conclusion, we have determined that the district
court properly weighed the Moore factors and did not abuse its
discretion in denying Huggard’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. See United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th
*
The district court determined that the final factor—
inconvenience to the court and waste of judicial resources—was
not a serious factor in this case.
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Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial
of the motion to withdraw the plea and affirm Huggard’s
conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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