FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 11, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 13-2230
v. (D.Ct. No. 2:00-CR-00557-LH-1)
(D. N.M.)
JAMES EARL MERIDYTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument.
A jury convicted Appellant James Earl Meridyth of one count of possession
with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine) in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); one count of conspiracy to
distribute the same cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and an additional
count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced him to 360 months
imprisonment on the first two counts, to run concurrently with 240 months
imprisonment on the latter count. Thereafter, we affirmed his conviction. See
United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004). Mr. Meridyth now
appeals the district court’s grant of his motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)
and reduction of his sentence to 300 months imprisonment, arguing the district
court abused its discretion by failing to reduce his sentence even further.
Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Prior to the district court’s sentencing Mr. Meridyth to 360 months
imprisonment, a federal probation officer prepared a presentence report,
calculating his sentencing range under the 2000 United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). Based on a total offense level of 38,
together with a criminal history category of VI, the Guidelines range was
determined to be 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court imposed a
sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range to 360 months imprisonment.
On May 1, 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission issued
Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)
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downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and
retroactive as of March 3, 2008. 1 Two year later, Congress enacted the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the statutory mandatory minimum
sentencing penalties for crack cocaine by significantly reducing the prior
crack/powder ratio but which did not apply retroactively to defendants previously
sentenced under the prior existing mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. See
Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010). See also United States v. Lewis,
625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010). The Act also directed the Sentencing
Commission to revise the Guidelines to reflect a change in the crack/powder
ratios. See Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374. Based on this directive, the
Commission again reduced the Drug Quantity Table offense levels for crack
cocaine through Amendment 750 to the Guidelines and, in another amendment,
gave the reduction retroactive effect by amending Guidelines § 1B.10(c), which
allows district courts to retroactively reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for certain expressly-cited amendments. 2
On July 28, 2011, Mr. Meridyth filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
1
See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 706 (Reason for Amend.), 712, and 713;
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2).
2
U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendments 748, 750, and 759 amended U.S.S.G.
§§ 1B1.10 and 2D1.1 and provided retroactive application of the lower crack
cocaine drug offense levels when proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 748, 750, and 759. See also Sentencing Commission’s
Sentencing Guidelines Notice, 76 FR 41332-01, 2011 WL 2689212, at *1 (July
13, 2011).
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§ 3582(c)(2), seeking a reduction of sentence based on these amendments to the
Guidelines. The government argued for no reduction based, in part, on his
extensive criminal history. Following the parties’ submissions and arguments, the
district court granted Mr. Meridyth’s motion, reducing his sentence to 300 months
imprisonment. In so doing, it applied the amendments to the Guidelines,
determining Mr. Meridyth’s total offense level changed to 34, which, when
combined with his criminal history category of V, resulted in a Guidelines range
of 235 to 293 months imprisonment for two of the counts and 235 to 240 months
for the other. However, it found he engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct his
entire adult life, which included more than a few violent acts, and that he
committed a number of disciplinary infractions since his incarceration, several of
which also involved violence. Based on these circumstances, including Mr.
Meridyth’s extensive criminal history, characteristics, and behavior in prison,
together with the need for his sentence to promote respect for the law, provide
adequate deterrence, and protect the public, it determined a full reduction in his
sentence would be inappropriate and, instead, re-sentenced him to 300 months
imprisonment. In discussing Mr. Meridyth’s sentence and the sentencing factors,
it also noted he “is working closely with psychology services regarding his
medication and self-improvement programming.”
II. Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Meridyth contends the district court abused its discretion by
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sentencing him outside his amended Guidelines range to a higher sentence than
calculated under the applicable amendments. He also claims it abused its
discretion by not allowing him a “downward departure” based on his mental
impairment, which he contends the district court acknowledged when it
referenced the fact he is working closely with psychology services.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a court may reduce a previously-imposed
sentence if the requested reduction is based on “a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission ....” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). See also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010). Mr.
Meridyth received the instant reduction in his sentence through Amendments 706
and 750 to the Guidelines which changed the Drug Quantity Table and may be
applied retroactively. See United States v. Osborn, 679 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 n.1
(10th Cir. 2012). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
on a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See id. at 1195. In
determining whether to apply such a reduction, the Supreme Court has held a
court must follow a two-step approach by determining: 1) if the reduction is
consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10; and 2) whether the authorized reduction is
warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. This is in accord with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), which states a district court may modify a sentence when a
sentencing range has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission
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but only after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a). See Osborn, 679
F.3d at 1195 (emphasis added). As a result, in determining whether a reduction is
warranted, we have held a district court “shall consider” the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, including the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant, and any threat to public safety. Id. at 1195-96
(relying on § 1B1.10(a)(1) cmt. n.1(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The need for a
defendant to receive medical care and other treatment is also within the
sentencing factors in § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). While not
mandatory, a district court may also consider a defendant’s post-sentencing
conduct. Osborn, 679 F.3d at 1195; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B). Given these
considerations, “an ameliorative amendment to the Guidelines in no way creates a
right to sentence reduction,” and, instead, the district court has discretion to
determine what the extent of such reduction should be. Osborn, 679 F.3d at
1196. 3
In this case, the district court determined a sentence reduction was
warranted by the amendments on crack cocaine and appropriately considered the
3
We generally “review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
to deny a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),” Osborn, 679 F.3d
at 1195, and we review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines and
other legal issues de novo, see United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th
Cir. 1997). We also construe Mr. Meridyth’s filings liberally as he is proceeding
pro se. See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007).
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§ 3553(a) factors to determine the extent of such a reduction. These factors
included Mr. Meridyth’s extensive criminal history where he engaged in a pattern
of criminal conduct his entire adult life, including certain violent acts; his
characteristics and behavior in prison where he committed a number of
disciplinary infractions, some of which were violent; and the need for his
sentence to promote respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence, and protect
the public. After considering these factors and the extent of the treatment he was
receiving for his mental health, it determined a full reduction in his sentence
would be inappropriate and only a reduction to a 300-month sentence was
warranted.
This determination clearly falls within the district court’s discretion, and
our review of the record establishes no abuse of its discretion in the sentence
imposed. As to the district court’s statement regarding Mr. Meridyth working
closely with psychology services regarding his medication and self-improvement
programming, it merely shows it considered the § 3553(a) factor concerning his
medical care and/or other treatment in considering the extent of the reduction in
his sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Finally, because a § 3582(c)(2)
motion is not the proper vehicle for a motion for downward departure, Mr.
Meridyth’s newly-raised issue on his mental impairment and request for such a
departure is meritless.
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III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we AFFIRM. All pending motions are DENIED.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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