[Cite as State ex rel. Hassen v. Maier, 2014-Ohio-3459.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE EX REL., : JUDGES:
JOSEPH HASSEN :
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Petitioner : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
:
-vs- :
:
GEORGE T. MAIER : Case No. 2014CA00109
STARK COUNTY SHERIFF :
:
Respondent : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Writ of Habeas Corpus
JUDGMENT: Dismissed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 4, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Petitioner For Defendant-Respondent
DONALD GALLICK JOHN D. FERRERO
190 North Union Street #102 Stark County Prosecuting Attorney
Akron, OH 44304
By: ROSS RHODES
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Chief of the Civil Division
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510
Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00109 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Petitioner, Joseph Hassen, has filed an Original Action in Habeas Corpus
alleging unlawful detention due to excessive bail. Respondent has filed an Answer,
Return and Motion to Dismiss.
{¶2} Petitioner was charged with a felony violation of a protection order. While
out on bond on that charge, Petitioner was charged with a second felony violation of a
protection order. The trial court set Petitioner’s bond at 1.5 million dollars.
{¶3} “The principles governing habeas corpus in these matters are well
established. Under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions, ‘excessive bail shall
not be required.’ If the offense is bailable, the right to reasonable bail is an inviolable
one which may not be infringed or denied. In re Gentry (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 143, 7
OBR 187, 454 N.E.2d 987, and Lewis v. Telb (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 11, 26 OBR 179,
497 N.E.2d 1376. The purpose of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at trial.
Bland v. Holden (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 50 O.O.2d 477, 257 N.E.2d 397. In Ohio,
the writ of habeas corpus protects the right to reasonable bail. In re Gentry. A person
charged with the commission of a bailable offense cannot be required to furnish bail in
an excessive or unreasonable amount. In re Lonardo (1949), 86 Ohio App. 289, 41 O.O.
313, 89 N.E.2d 502. Indeed, bail set at an unreasonable amount violates the
constitutional guarantees. Stack v. Boyle (1951), 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3.
Pursuant to Crim.R. 46, in determining what is reasonable bail, the court must weigh
various factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the
evidence, the accused's history of flight or failure to appear at court proceedings, his
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00109 3
ties to the community, including his family, financial resources and employment, and his
character and mental condition. After weighing these factors, the trial judge sets the
amount of bail within his sound discretion. In a habeas corpus action to contest the
reasonableness of bond, this court must determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Jenkins v. Billy (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 84, 538 N.E.2d 1045; In re Gentry
(1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 143, 7 OBR 187, 454 N.E.2d 987; Lewis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d
11, 26 OBR 179, 497 N.E.2d 1376; and In re Green (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 726, 656
N.E.2d 705.” In re Periandri, 142 Ohio App. 3d 588, 591, 756 N.E.2d 682, 684 (8th
Dist.).
{¶4} “What bail is or is not reasonable is a question for the exercise of sound
discretion by the court. The decision is dependent upon all the facts and circumstances
in each individual case. Bland v. Holden (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 257 N.E.2d 397 [50
O.O.2d 477].” Petition of Gentry, 7 Ohio App. 3d 143, 145, 454 N.E.2d 987, 989-90
(1982).
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00109 4
{¶5} One of the factors in Crim.R. 46(C)(5) is whether the defendant is under a
protection order. In this case, it is alleged that Petitioner has committed multiple
offenses while under a protection order. We cannot say under these circumstances that
we find the trial court abused its discretion in setting the bond in this case given the
nature of the charges, the fact that the most recent charge is alleged to have been
committed while Petitioner was out on bond, and the multiple charges for the same
offense. For this reason, the motion to dismiss is granted.
By: Baldwin, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur.