J-S50037-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MELVIN RAY JONES,
Appellant No. 441 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered February 28, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001196-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2014
imposed after he pled guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent assault
and one count of indecent assault.1 Relevant to this appeal, the trial court
ordered Appellant to lifetime registration as a sex offender pursuant to
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14-15. We affirm.
-year-old victim to the
Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Uniontown and reported that Appellant
had engaged in sexual conduct with the victim. Affidavit of Probable Cause,
3/4/13. The Commonwealth filed a criminal information on August 12,
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A §§ 3125(a)(1) and (7), and 3126(a)(7).
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2013, charging Appellant with three counts of aggravated assault, and one
count of indecent assault.
On November 4, 2013, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of
aggravated indecent assault and one count of indecent assault. That same
day, the trial court ordered an assessment from the Sexual Offender
Assessment Board.
On February 28, 2014, the trial court conducted a sexual offender
assessment hearing, at the conclusion of which it determined that Appellant
was a sexually violent predator, and sentenced Appellant to a term of five to
ten years in prison. The trial court also directed Appellant to comply with
the lifetime registration requirement under SORNA. Appellant filed a post-
sentence motion on March 5, 2014, which the trial court denied on March
10, 2014. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THE
APPELLANT WAS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR WHEN THE
REPORT WAS BASED IN PART ON A CRIMINAL CHARGE THAT
DID NOT RESULT IN A CONVICTION?
2. IS IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO REQUIRE AN APPELLANT TO
REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME WHEN SAID REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENT EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM PENALTY
3. IS THE ADAM WALSH STATUTE [SORNA]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO
REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME?
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In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the report of the Sexual
determination that Appellant was a sexually violent predator, a
for a sexual offense that did not result in a c
10-
comprises one and a half pages of his brief with no reference to any
argument consists entirely of general assertions that are unsupported by any
discussion and analysis of relevant legal authority.
Pennsylvania R.A.P. 2119(a) provides:
General rule. The argument shall be divided into as many
parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have
... such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent.
We recently explained:
The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that
each question an appellant raises is to be supported by
discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Appellate
arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may be
considered waived, and arguments which are not
appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not
appropriately developed include those where the party has
failed to cite any authority in support of a contention. This
Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover ... [m]ere
issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to support
an assertion precludes our appellate review of [a] matter.
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Coulter v. Ramsden, --- A.3d ----, 2014 WL 2787216 at 7 (Pa. Super. June
20, 2014) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
his first issue contains no reference to legal authority, and lacks an
appropriately developed analysis. Moreover, although Appellant asserts that
the SOAB representative erroneously referred to and relied upon an arrest
that did not result in a conviction, Appellant fails to reference the certified
record or cite to notes of testimony to support his assertion. See
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 66-67 (Pa. Super. 2014) (it is
not the responsibility of this Court to scour the record to find evidence to
support an argument).
development of this claim, we are precluded from conducting meaningful
address them together. Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an
illegal sentence by subjecting him to lifetime registration under SORNA
because the lifetime registration requirement exceeds the statutory
maximum sentences for the offenses of which he was convicted. App
Brief at 12-16. Additionally, Appellant argues that the lifetime registration
Id. at 15.
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econd and
two issues comprises approximately four pages, with no reference to any
applicable statutory authority or the precise Constitutional provisions on
which he bases his assertions. See Coulter, supra; and Commonwealth
v. Howe, 842 A.2d
statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared
unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
constitution [and] the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has
claim that the SORNA lifetime registration requirement effectively subjects
him to a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum sentences for his
Brief at 12-14. Additionally, Appellant contends that lifetime registration
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 13 of
-16. See
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1026, n. 20 (Pa. Super. 2011)
protection against cruel and unusual punishment than does the Eighth
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see also Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 267 (Pa.
Super. 2013).
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Perez, --- A.3d ----, 2014 WL
3339161 (Pa. Super. July 9, 2014), we addressed whether SORNA was
state constitutions. We held in Perez that the effects of SORNA were not
SORNA as a
Id. at 11; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.11(b)(2). Rather, we explained
sequences that flow
therefrom [and] those effects, while not insignificant, are merely secondary
Id. at 9.
Given our determination in Perez that SORNA restraints are
inadequate to overcome the General Assemb
in excess of the statutory maximum is meritless because the lifetime
registration requirement did not constitute a sentence. Additionally, because
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registration requirement constitutes unusual punishment is without merit.2
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/11/2014
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2
See e.g. McCarty v. Roos, 2014 WL 551543 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 2014)
(citations omitted) (explaining that the federal SORNA cannot violate rights
implicated by the criminal justice system, such as double jeopardy and cruel
and unusual punishment, because it is a civil regulatory scheme); Spiteri v.
Russo, 2013 WL 4806960 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013) (sex offender
classifications under SORNA could not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment for the same reasons that SORNA was found not to violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause, i.e. because the registration requirement is not
punitive); United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2013)
(SORNA is a non-punitive, civil regulatory scheme and its registration
requirements do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment); United States v. Davis, 352 F. App'x 270, 272
(10th Cir. 2009) (holding that registration of convicted sex offenders under
unu
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