This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-1632
In re the Marriage of:
Charles A. T. Gill, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Kathryn E. K. Gill,
Respondent.
Filed August 11, 2014
Affirmed; motion denied
Reilly, Judge
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-10-1618
Carol Grant, Kurzman Grant Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Patrice M. Rico, Rico Law Office, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s entry of judgment against him resulting
from a failure to pay a property settlement. Appellant asserts that the district court did
not have the authority to modify the parties’ property settlement in the marriage-
dissolution judgment and decree and that it incorrectly interpreted the marriage-
dissolution judgment. We conclude that the district court did not err in interpreting the
marriage-dissolution judgment and decree and affirm the district court’s entry of
judgment against appellant.
FACTS
The district court dissolved the marriage of appellant-husband Charles A.T. Gill
and respondent-wife Kathryn E.K. Gill on September 21, 2011. At the time of
dissolution, husband was 62 years old and wife was 56 years old. The parties have three
children together. The parties’ marriage was dissolved pursuant to a stipulated marriage-
dissolution judgment and decree. Husband was employed as a physician and earned a
gross monthly income of $15,065. Wife was a licensed registered nurse, but she has not
been employed since July 1990. The parties retained joint legal and physical custody of
the one minor child. Husband pays spousal maintenance. The spousal maintenance
payments commenced the first month after the sale of the homestead.
The parties participated in a Financial Early Neutral Evaluation as part of the
marriage dissolution process. Through the mediated sessions, the parties reached a
stipulated dissolution agreement that the judgment and decree incorporated. In their
dissolution agreement, the parties contemplated an equal division of their marital assets.
In addition to the homestead, automobiles, and personal property, the dissolution
agreement divided various retirement, investment, and bank accounts. At the time of
dissolution, the parties had a total of $220,186 in after-tax marital assets. Husband
received $141,853 of the assets, and wife received $78,333 of the assets. Wife’s after-tax
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assets included a $10,000 advance and a $31,760 equalization payment, to be paid at a
future date. With the equalization payment, both parties were to receive $110,093 in
after-tax assets. In addition to the after-tax assets, each party received half of the
retirement assets.
Paragraphs 10 through 13 of the marriage-dissolution judgment concern marital
and nonmarital real property. Paragraph 10 addresses the sale of the parties’ homestead.
In addition to listing the legal description, this paragraph describes husband’s nonmarital
interest in the homestead, procedures for selling the homestead and financing any
required improvements to facilitate its sale, the division of the homestead’s net proceeds,
and the occupation of the homestead. Husband had a nonmarital interest in the
homestead of $105,069.
Husband was to receive the first $105,069 of the homestead’s net sale proceeds to
satisfy his nonmarital interest in the homestead, and the remaining net sale proceeds were
to be divided equally between the parties. The dissolution agreement defines “net sale
proceeds” as the gross sale price of the homestead less the costs of sale and satisfaction of
the first mortgage and home equity line of credit. At the time of the dissolution, a
mortgage with an approximate balance of $417,000 and a home equity line of credit with
an approximate balance of $146,800 encumbered the homestead.
Paragraph 24 of the marriage-dissolution judgment is entitled “Equalization
Payment” and is separate from paragraphs 10 through 13 dealing with real property. It
provides:
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24. EQUALIZATION PAYMENT. [Husband] shall pay
to [wife] the sum of $31,760 from his share of the homestead
sale proceeds at closing to equalize the division of the parties’
after-tax assets. A copy of the spreadsheet detailing the
parties’ property division is attached hereto and incorporated
herein as Exhibit F.
Exhibit F, referenced in paragraph 24, is a copy of a spreadsheet, dated February 2011,
detailing the parties’ nonmarital assets and property division.
The marriage-dissolution judgment required the parties’ to list the homestead for
sale by March 1, 2011. The home equity line of credit was to pay for any home
improvements required for sale. The parties initially listed the homestead for $849,000 in
the summer of 2011. The homestead’s after-tax value was listed at $750,000 on Exhibit
F. The parties used this value in calculating the division of their marital assets. The
homestead sold in March 2013 for $700,000. After all encumbrances and closing costs
were paid, the net equity in the homestead at the time of closing was $1,073.13.
On June 6, 2013, wife brought a motion seeking attorney fees and a judgment for
$31,760 against husband due to his failure to pay her $31,760 after the homestead closed.
In her attached affidavit, wife argued that until husband makes the $31,760 payment, he
has received more marital assets. Husband argued that had the parties known there
would be no equity left in the homestead at its selling date, the final agreement would
have been substantially different. Thus, when the net proceeds from the sale of the
homestead totaled $1,073.13, the lack of sale proceeds effectively extinguished his
obligation to make the $31,760 payment. In addition, husband claimed that both his
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nonmarital interest in the homestead and wife’s equalization payment were contingent
upon the existence of sale proceeds from the homestead.
In its July 16, 2013 order, the district court denied both parties’ motions for
attorney fees and entered a monetary judgment of $31,760 against husband. The district
court stated that it did not have authority pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2
(2012), to modify the marriage-dissolution judgment but that it did have authority to
interpret the marriage-dissolution judgment. The district court concluded that the
judgment clearly “contemplated a payment of $31,760.00 from [husband] to [wife] to
equalize the assets.” The district court found that after “[v]iewing the plain language of
the Judgment and Decree as a whole,” the parties intended that husband pay the
equalization payment of $31,760 regardless of any changes in their positions.
Husband appeals.
DECISION
I.
As an initial matter, we will first address husband’s argument that the district court
did not have authority to grant wife’s motion for judgment. Specifically, husband argues
that granting wife’s motion was improper because it was a modification of the marriage-
dissolution judgment and decree. Wife claims that the district court’s July 2013 order
was only a clarification of the judgment and decree.
Divisions of marital property in dissolution actions are final, subject only to the
same standards required to reopen a judgment. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f) (2012)
(finality of property division); Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2012) (listing possible
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bases for reopening judgment). Once a judgment is entered on a dissolution stipulation,
the stipulation is deemed to have merged into the judgment, and the “sole” method for
obtaining relief from the judgment is to satisfy Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. Shirk v.
Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997). Under section 518.145, subdivision 2, a party
may be relieved of a judgment and decree for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect or for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the adverse party. If,
however, the terms of a judgment are ambiguous or uncertain, upon a party’s motion, the
district court that issued the judgment may issue appropriate orders clarifying or
interpreting it. Stieler v. Stieler, 244 Minn. 312, 319, 70 N.W.2d 127, 131 (1955).
Whether language is ambiguous is a question of law initially decided by the district court.
Halverson v. Halverson, 381 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1986). That decision is subject
to de novo review on appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, 400 N.W.2d 157, 158 (Minn. App.
1987).
Language within a judgment and decree is ambiguous if it “is reasonably
susceptible of more than one meaning.” Landwehr v. Landwehr, 380 N.W.2d 136, 138
(Minn. App. 1985). The determination of whether an ambiguity exists cannot be made
by reading words in isolation. Id. at 139. Rather, the court should construe the judgment
as a whole. Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001). We treat
stipulated marriage-dissolution judgments as contracts for purposes of construction.
Grachek v. Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. App. 2008). Contract language is
interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
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The district court did not make a specific finding that the language at issue was
ambiguous. The district court did, however, analyze wife’s motion for a monetary
judgment as one requesting interpretation of the judgment and decree because the district
court recognized that it did not have authority “pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 518.145,
subdivision 2 to modify the parties’ [j]udgment and [d]ecree.”1 Thus, we infer that the
district court implicitly concluded that the relevant judgment provision was ambiguous.
See Landwehr, 380 N.W.2d at 138-39 (recognizing district court’s implicit determination
that a judgment provision was ambiguous).
The language at issue states: “[Husband] shall pay to [wife] the sum of $31,760
from his share of the homestead sale proceeds at closing to equalize the division of the
parties’ after-tax assets.” Viewed in isolation, this clause does not appear ambiguous.
When viewed in the context of the dissolution judgment as a whole, however, this
judgment provision is ambiguous: The provision requires husband to make a payment
from what turned out to be a nonexistent source of funds. The judgment provision does
not explain why the homestead sale proceeds were to be the source of the $31,760 sum,
and does not explain what to do if the homestead proceeds were insufficient to allow
husband to make this payment. Thus, under the circumstances, we affirm the district
court’s implicit determination that the judgment provision is ambiguous, and the district
court did not err in clarifying this language. See Erickson v. Erickson, 449 N.W.2d 173,
1
Minnesota Statute section 518.145, subdivision 2, requires any motion to reopen a
judgment to be brought within one year of entry of the judgment. Here, wife moved the
court for judgment against husband in June 2013—clearly more than one year after the
September 21, 2011 judgment date.
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178 (Minn. 1989) (“Disagreement between the parties as to the interpretation of a
[stipulation] may be tantamount to a finding of ambiguity.”).
Husband also argues that the district court imposed the wrong interpretation or
clarification of paragraph 24. The interpretation of an ambiguous judgment provision is a
factual question. Landwehr, 380 N.W.2d at 140; see Trondson v. Janikula, 458 N.W.2d
679, 682 (Minn. 1990) (recognizing where a contract is ambiguous, the district court’s
resolution of ambiguity is treated as a finding of fact). On appeal, the district court’s
factual findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., N. States Power Co. v.
Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975) (defining
“clearly erroneous” as “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole”). When deciding whether a finding of
fact is clearly erroneous, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
district court’s findings. Trondson, 458 N.W.2d at 682. “Divorce decrees should be
given that interpretation which will render them reasonable, effective, and conclusive and
which will make them harmonize with facts and law of the case.” Palmi v. Palmi, 273
Minn. 97, 104, 140 N.W.2d 77, 82 (1966).
Recently, this court held that the district court did not err when it interpreted an
ambiguous provision in a marriage-dissolution judgment and entered a personal judgment
against a party when the party failed to pay a lien. Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870
(Minn. App. 2011). In Nelson, the martial-termination judgment awarded the family’s
homestead to the wife, subject to a lien in favor of the husband for $67,725, payable with
interest. Id. at 871. Payment was due when either the wife remarried, the homestead was
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sold, or the youngest child turned 18, whichever occurred first. Id. Once the youngest
child turned 18, the husband demanded the amount specified in the lien. Id. While still
in possession of the homestead, wife refused to pay, claiming that there was no remaining
equity in the homestead and that husband was not entitled to anything. Id. The husband
sued to enforce the dissolution judgment by seeking an entry of a monetary judgment
against the wife, and the district court entered judgment against the wife. Id.
On appeal, the issue before this court was whether the district court abused its
discretion when it entered a personal judgment against the wife after she failed to satisfy
the amount of the lien granted to the husband in the dissolution judgment. Id. This court
stated
[t]he district court had the discretion to resolve an ambiguous
provision and the responsibility of sorting out a situation nine
years after the marriage-dissolution judgment was entered. It
was dealing with a dramatically changed real estate market.
The district court construed the dissolution judgment to
impose on wife a responsibility to pay husband $67,725 (plus
interest) upon the occurrence of any one of the three specified
events. It reasoned that wife has sole title to the homestead
and husband only has a lien for the amount specified.
Id. at 873. Accordingly, this court affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment against
the wife due to the ambiguity and because the judgment did not alter the initial division
of marital property. Id. at 873-74.
Like the court in Nelson, we must resolve a situation where the parties
overestimated the amount of homestead equity and now face circumstances not addressed
by the marriage-dissolution judgment. If we were to accept husband’s argument that he
does not have to pay the $31,760 payment, then the parties’ division of after-tax assets
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will not be equal and not reflect the initial asset division contemplated in Exhibit F. This
unequal property division would result in an improper modification of the parties’
substantive rights. See Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Minn. 1996) (“The
court has the power to implement or enforce the provisions of a judgment and decree so
long as the parties’ substantive rights are not changed.”).
Reading the marriage-dissolution judgment and decree as a whole, we conclude
that the language in paragraph 24 regarding the source of the equalization payment
controls the timing of when the parties’ intended that the equalizing payment would be
paid as opposed to if the equalizing payment would be paid. Moreover, viewing the
clause “from his share of the homestead sale proceeds at closing,” found in paragraph 24,
to relate to the timing of the equalization payment, aligns with original intent of the
parties. See Thompson v. Thompson, 385 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. App. 1986) (“[An
interpretation] does not result in a judgment different from the original, but serves only to
express accurately the thoughts the judgment intended to convey.”).
Paragraph 24 specifically incorporated Exhibit F. Exhibit F details an equal
division of the parties’ assets. After all after-tax marital assets were tallied, an
equalization payment was added to wife’s share of assets to give each party $110,093 in
after-tax assets. The equalization payment is not contingent on the sale price of the
homestead or the amount of net proceeds from the homestead sale. Rather, the division
of assets calculated the payment as a fixed sum that the marriage-dissolution judgment
and decree labeled as an “equalization payment.”
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Lastly, the district court’s interpretation is consistent with Minnesota’s
requirement that the district court “shall make a just and equitable division of the marital
property of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2012). Minnesota law presumes
that at the dissolution of a long-term marriage, “equal division of the wealth accumulated
through the joint efforts of the parties is appropriate.” Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738,
742 (Minn. 1984). Husband and wife were married for 23 years, and the marriage-
dissolution judgment and decree supports the conclusion that both parties intended an
equal division of the marital assets. Moreover, parties may not seek a modification of a
property division based on a subsequent change in their financial circumstances. Kaiser
v. Kaiser, 290 Minn. 173, 179, 186 N.W.2d 678, 683 (1971). When considering the
marriage-dissolution judgment as a whole, the district court’s interpretation of the
ambiguous provision is entirely reasonable and supported by the evidence. Accordingly,
the district court did not err by determining that the marriage-dissolution judgment
required a $31,760 equalization payment and entered a $31,760 judgment against
husband.
II.
Wife moves to strike portions of husband’s brief and appendix as referring to or
containing extra-record materials. Husband, in his response, agreed in part and disputed
in part the motion to strike. He also asked this court to strike portions of wife’s brief, but
did not file a written motion requesting relief. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127 (requiring
requests for relief to be made by serving and filing written motion).
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We depend only on those facts that are in the record to decide an appeal, and a
party does not add to that record merely by including extraneous material with her appeal
submissions. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The documents filed in the trial court,
the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on
appeal in all cases.”); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 130.01, subd. 1 (limiting an appellant to
append only portions of the record to her brief). Although we frequently entertain
motions to strike noncomplying submissions, we also may disregard attachments and
references that are beyond the record, with or without “striking.” Because the challenged
statements and documents are irrelevant to issues on appeal, we deny the wife’s motion
but our opinion rests only on facts in the record. Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728
N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007). Due to husband’s failure to file a written motion, we
decline to consider his request for relief.
Affirmed; motion denied.
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