J-S37029-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ANGEL ROSA
Appellant No. 2080 MDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered October 30, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No: CP-38-CR-0001564-2011
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2014
Appellant, Angel Rosa, appeals from the October 30, 2013 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County dismissing his petition pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
Appellant argues the trial court erred in not finding plea counsel provided
ineffective assistance. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts and the procedural history underlying
this appeal in its opinion, which we incorporate herein by reference. See
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13, at 1-8.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. [Appellant] was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to
effective representation when Plea Counsel unlawfully induced
[Appellant] to plead guilty by advising him he would get a
lesser sentence if he accepted the open plea proffered by the
Commonwealth.
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2. Whether [Appellant] was denied his constitutionally
guaranteed right to effective representation when Plea
Counsel failed to investigate mitigating factors, such as the
mental illness?
In an appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief, our standard and
scope of review is as follows:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
if it
is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal
citations omitted).
The PCRA subsection governing relief from a guilty plea requires that
the defendant prove that he was unlawfully induced to plead guilty and that
he is innocent:
To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner
must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of
the following: (2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from
one or more of the following: (iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully
induced where the circumstances make it likely that the
inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the
petitioner is innocent.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).
counsel.
Counsel is presumed effective and will only be deemed
performance was deficient and he was prejudiced by that
deficient performance. Prejudice is established if there is a
result of
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.
To properly plead ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must plead and prove: (1) that the underlying issue has
reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from
meet any elements of the above-cited test, his claim must fail.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1271-72 (Pa.
Super. 2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 733
In his first issue, Appellant argues plea counsel was ineffective
because he led Appellant to believe he would get a lesser sentence if he
at 9.
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In its opinion
that plea counsel coerced him into accepting an open plea, discussed the
See Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13, at 5-6, 10-11. As the trial court noted,
Appellant did not allege he is innocent. Id. at 10. Second, the court noted
this case, clearly indicates that [Appellant] was well aware of his options and
10/30/13, at 10, 11. The trial court finally noted that Appellant did not
rial court] did actually impose a sentence which
Id.
analysis and conclusions are correct, and we therefore affirm on this basis in
1
Next, Appellant argues plea counsel was ineffective because counsel
failed to properly investigate the case. Had he done so, counsel would have
discovered that he was under the influence at the time of the underlying
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1
To the extent Appellant now argues he wanted to proceed to trial, as
opposed to taking a plea, Appellant provides no evidence in the record
supporting this claim. Assuming it is not waived, the claim is nonetheless
without merit because it is devoid of any support in the record.
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crimes and that he had a long history of mental illness
10.
The trial court noted that voluntary intoxication was not a defense
applicable in this matter. Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13, at 12 (citing 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 308, relating to intoxication or drugged condition). The trial
court also noted Appellant himself, after hearing from his plea counsel what
was involved, decided he did not want to pursue the insanity defense. Id. at
12-13. The court also noted that the insanity defense would not have been
both his statements to his attorney and his
Id. at 13.2 Accordingly, the
trial court concluded plea counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert
Id. The trial cou
conclusions are correct, and we therefore affirm on this basis in rejecting
be attached to any future filings in this case.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/20/2014
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2
See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315 (relating to insanity).
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