UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4747
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
YOUNIS EL SAYEDRI, a/k/a Younis Badri, a/k/a Younis
Abdulkarim Mohamed El Sayedri, a/k/a Younis Abdalkarim
Mohamed, a/k/a Younis Abdel Mohamed Badri, a/k/a Younis
Abdelkar Badri, a/k/a Youngish Elsayedri,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4761
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RUNEEN SABAR, a/k/a Runeen Mohamed Osman Sabar, a/k/a Maryam
Hasan Khariri, a/k/a Runeen Bar Mohamed Osman Sabar, a/k/a
Runeen Mohamed Osman Ali Sabar, a/k/a Runeen Mohamed Osman,
a/k/a Ariej Ali, a/k/a Ariej Mossman Ali Sabar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00290-AJT-1; 1:12-cr-00290-AJT-2)
Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: August 22, 2014
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph J. McCarthy, DELANEY, MCCARTHY & COLTON, P.C.,
Alexandria, Virginia; Gretchen L. Taylor, TAYLOR LAW COMPANY,
Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, C. Alexandria Bogle, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Julia K. Martinez, Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Younis El Sayedri (“El Sayedri”)
and Runeen Sabar (“Sabar”), were convicted of one count of
conspiracy to commit immigration document fraud and aiding and
abetting such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2
(2012). El Sayedri was also convicted of one count of passport
forgery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2012), and one count
of making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2012). We affirm.
The appellants contend that the district court erred
in denying their motion for a judgment of acquittal. We review
de novo the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion. United
States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011). “If there
is substantial evidence to support the verdict, after viewing
all of the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the Government, the court must affirm.”
United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is
that evidence which a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Al Sabahi,
719 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 464 (2013). The court does
not “review the credibility of the witnesses and assume[s] that
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the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor
of the government.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245
(4th Cir. 2007).
To support a conviction for conspiracy to commit
immigration document fraud, the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was an agreement between two or more
persons to commit immigration document fraud, by agreeing to
present an application or document required by immigration laws
that will contain a false statement of a material fact and that
at least one of the conspirators engaged in an overt act in
furtherance of that agreement. United States v. Archer, 671
F.3d 149, 154 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2011).
We have reviewed the appellants’ claims and conclude
they are without merit. Although the appellants contend that no
conduct relating to the charge began in 2000, as the indictment
alleged, the beginning date of the conspiracy is not an element
of the offense. United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 999 (4th
Cir. 1997) (factfinder may find that the conspiracy started at
anytime within the alleged time frame). Also, after reviewing
the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support the conspiracy charge. Likewise, regarding El Sayedri’s
other two convictions, we conclude that both are supported by
sufficient evidence.
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The appellants also challenge the district court’s
denial of a motion for a mistrial, which we review for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th
Cir. 2008) (discussing motion for mistrial). The district
court’s denial “will be disturbed only under the most
extraordinary of circumstances.” United States v. Dorlouis, 107
F.3d 248, 257 (4th Cir. 1997). We conclude that the appellants’
challenge to the district court’s denial of their motion for a
mistrial after a third defendant was dismissed from the case is
wholly without merit.
We also conclude that the charges were properly joined
and that the district court did not err in denying the
appellants’ motion for a severance, as the charges were
logically related to each other. See United States v. Cardwell,
433 F.3d 378, 385 (4th Cir. 2005). Finally, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion
for a mistrial after it granted a judgment of acquittal as to
some, but not all of the charges. See United States v. Hornsby,
666 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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