J-S34005-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KISHA D. TAYLOR-DORSETT
Appellant No. 858 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 23, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013085-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2014
Kisha D. Taylor-Dorsett appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered April 23, 2013, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.
The trial court imposed a sentence of four days in a DUI-Alternative to Jail
program,1 and a concurrent six months’ probation for her conviction of two
counts of DUI-general impairment,2 and related summary traffic offenses.
On appeal, Taylor-Dorsett challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting her convictions of DUI. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
____________________________________________
1
The parties refer to this program as the “DUI Hotel.”
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
J-S34005-14
On July 20, 2011, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer William Meisel,
of the Brentwood Borough Police Department, initiated a traffic stop of the
vehicle Taylor-Dorsett was driving. The facts surrounding the traffic stop
and Taylor-Dorsett’s arrest are summarized by the trial court, in its opinion,
and we need not reiterate them in detail herein. See Trial Court Opinion,
2/6/2013, at 2-5.
As a result of the stop, Taylor-Dorsett was charged with two counts of
DUI-under the influence of alcohol, two counts of DUI-under the influence of
a controlled substance, and one count each of driving on right side of
roadway and driving on roadways laned for traffic.3 At the conclusion of a
bench trial on January 29, 2013, the trial court found Taylor-Dorsett not
guilty of the charges of DUI-under the influence of a controlled substance,
but guilty of the remaining charges.4 She was sentenced on April 23, 2013,
to a term of four days in a DUI-Alternative to Jail Program, and six months
____________________________________________
3
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) (two counts), 3802(d)(2), 3802(d)(3), 3301(a),
and 3309(1), respectively.
4
We note that Taylor-Dorsett’s trial testimony contradicted most of the
testimony of the arresting officer, Brentwood Borough Police Officer William
Meisel. Indeed, Taylor-Dorsett testified: (1) she was at a stop light when
the officer first activated his lights; (2) she never stopped in the center turn
lane; (3) she never told the officer she had smoked marijuana; and (4) she
completed the field sobriety tests properly. See N.T., 1/29/2013, at 25-27.
She stated twice during her testimony that Officer Meisel was lying. See id.
at 27, 28.
-2-
J-S34005-14
concurrent probation, for one count of DUI. No further penalty was imposed
on the remaining charges. This timely appeal followed.5
The sole issue raised by Taylor-Dorsett on appeal is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions of DUI. Specifically,
she argues the Commonwealth failed to prove she was under the influence
of alcohol to a degree that rendered her incapable of safe driving where she
was “stopped for minor traffic infractions, [was] able to follow the officer’s
instructions and drive to where she was told to, [was] able to comprehend
and perform a substantial portion of field sobriety tests, is physically effected
by a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, and [her] blood alcohol content is
unknown.” Taylor-Dorsett’s Brief at 13.
Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-
established:
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there
is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every
element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.
____________________________________________
5
On May 23, 2013, the trial court ordered Taylor-Dorsett to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
After requesting, and being granted, an extension of time, Taylor-Dorsett
complied with the court’s directive and filed a concise statement on July 18,
2013.
-3-
J-S34005-14
The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth's
burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any
doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact
finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 889-890 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
To secure a conviction of DUI-general impairment, the Commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving a
vehicle “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual
is rendered incapable of safely driving … the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802(a)(1).
The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer in a
subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not limited to,
the following: the offender’s actions and behavior, including
manner of driving and ability to pass field sobriety tests;
demeanor, including toward the investigating officer; physical
appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs
of intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood
alcohol level may be added to this list, although it is not
necessary[.] … The weight to be assigned these various types of
evidence presents a question for the fact-finder, who may rely
on his or her experience, common sense, and/or expert
testimony. Regardless of the type of evidence that the
Commonwealth proffers to support its case, the focus of
subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the individual
to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol-not on a particular
blood alcohol level.
Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa. 2009).
-4-
J-S34005-14
The trial court, which sat as fact finder in Taylor-Dorsett’s nonjury
trial, provides a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of the facts
supporting the guilty verdict in its opinion. In particular, the court found
that Taylor-Dorsett’s “failures on the [field sobriety tests] were not a result
of physical symptoms of MS, but rather manifested [Taylor-Dorsett’s]
inability to mentally process, comprehend and follow instructions, as well as
her inability to use basic sequential ordering.” Trial Court Opinion,
12/6/2013, at 7-8. Indeed, the trial court opined that Taylor-Dorsett’s
impairment was “more consistent” with alcohol consumption than MS. Id. at
8. Further, the court found that Taylor-Dorsett’s driving was sufficiently
“concerning” to the officer to justify the traffic stop, and her response to the
stop – pulling into the center turn lane of the highway – provided additional
justification for the officer’s concern. Id. at 10. The trial court opined:
When the totality of [Taylor-Dorsett’s] conduct is considered –
from drifting out of her lane of travel several times to driving
almost fully within the center turning lane to abruptly jerking her
vehicle to correct its path of travel to stopping her vehicle in the
middle of a highway – it becomes evident that [Taylor-Dorsett]
was impaired and unable to safely operate her vehicle.
Id. at 11.
Our independent review of the transcript reveals ample support for the
trial court’s findings. Significantly, with respect to the contradictions in the
testimony, the trial court, which sat as fact finder, “concluded that the
-5-
J-S34005-14
testimony of Officer Meisel was the most credible[,]”6 a finding we will not
disturb on appeal. See Mobley, supra. Therefore, we adopt the sound
reasoning of the Honorable Beth A. Lazzara as dispositive of Taylor-Dorsett’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction of DUI.
See Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/2013, at 7-11.
Because we find Taylor-Dorsett is not entitled to relief on the sole
issue she raises on appeal, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/27/2014
____________________________________________
6
Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/2013, at 9.
-6-
Circulated 08/14/2014 11:00 AM
Circulated 08/14/2014 11:00 AM
Circulated 08/14/2014 11:00 AM
Circulated 08/14/2014 11:00 AM
Circulated 08/14/2014 11:00 AM
Circulated 08/14/2014 11:00 AM