Rel: 08/29/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2014
_________________________
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Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Ex parte Joel Patrick Moyers
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Joel Patrick Moyers))
(Limestone Circuit Court, CV-13-900357;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0093)
MAIN, Justice.
This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals'
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unpublished order directing the Limestone Circuit Court to set
bail for Joel Patrick Moyers. Ex parte Moyers (No. CR-13-
0093, Dec. 20, 2013), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2013)
(table). The issue before that court, and before us, is
whether a defendant who is charged with a capital offense is
entitled to bail if the State does not intend to seek the
death penalty. First, the State argues that the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision in this case conflicts with Ex
parte Bynum, 294 Ala. 78, 312 So. 2d 52 (1975), in which this
Court held that bail can be constitutionally denied in a
capital-offense case even if the death penalty will not be
imposed. Alternatively, the State argues that the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision raises a material question of first
impression that requires decision by this Court. For the
reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In September 2012, Moyers was arrested and charged with
reckless murder and shooting into an occupied vehicle. Bail
was set at $260,000. In December 2012, Moyers was indicted
for capital murder, reckless murder, and two counts of
shooting into an occupied vehicle. In January 2013, the State
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filed a notice of its intent not to seek the death penalty.
In February 2013, Moyers applied for bail, but after a hearing
the trial court denied bail.
In June 2013, after the trial court dismissed the
capital-murder charge in the indictment because it did not
contain specific-intent language, a new indictment was
returned against Moyers charging capital murder, reckless
murder, and two counts of shooting into an occupied vehicle.
Moyers again applied for bail, but after a hearing the trial
court denied it. In August 2013, Moyers filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, requesting that
the trial court set bail. On September 24, 2013, the trial
court denied Moyers's petition.
Moyers then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
with the Court of Criminal Appeals, requesting that it direct
the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his habeas
corpus petition or, in the alternative, to set bail. The
Court of Criminal Appeals granted Moyers's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus and, by an unpublished order, directed the
trial court to set bail. The State petitioned this Court for
a writ of certiorari on the grounds that whether bail should
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be available to a defendant charged with a capital offense if
that defendant is not facing the death penalty is a question
of first impression and that the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals. We granted the State's petition.
II. Standard of Review
"'"This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo."'" Ex parte Shabazz, 989 So. 2d 524, 525 (Ala.
2008)(quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala.
2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059
(Ala. 2003)).
Further, "'[u]nder the ore tenus standard of review, we
must assume the trial court's factual finding ... was correct,
and thus we must uphold the order based on that finding unless
the court had before it no credible evidence to support that
finding.' W.D. Williams, Inc. v. Ivey, 777 So. 2d 94, 98
(Ala. 2000)." Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75, 77 (Ala. 2009).
III. Analysis
In granting Moyers's petition for a writ for a habeas
corpus and directing the trial court to set bail, the Court of
Criminal Appeals relied on Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532
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(Ala. 2003), and said that in Ex parte Patel this Court
"appears to have departed from its earlier interpretation in
[Ex parte] Bynum." In Ex parte Bynum, this Court retained the
classification of capital offenses even though Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), had declared the death penalty,
as it was then implemented, unconstitutional. In Ex parte
Bynum, this Court followed the view of the majority of states
that offenses that were classified as capital offenses before
Furman were still capital offenses and that bail can
constitutionally be denied in those cases. 294 Ala. at 81,
312 So. 2d at 55. We explained:
"The rationale of these decisions indicates that the
gravity of the offense is the distinguishing feature
and not the penalty which may be imposed. Following
this interpretation, certain crimes for purposes of
bail are still classified as capital regardless of
whether the death penalty may be invoked."
294 Ala. at 81, 312 So. 2d at 54. In Ex parte Patel, this
Court said:
"Article I, § 16, of the Alabama Constitution of
1901 provides: 'That all persons shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, when the proof is
evident or the presumption great; and that excessive
bail shall not in any case be required.' That
constitutional provision allows a court to deny bail
for a defendant charged with an offense defined by
statute as capital. Ex parte Landers, 690 So. 2d
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537, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). This court has
established three prerequisites to the denial of
bail in a capital case: 'The evidence must be clear
and strong, that it would lead a well-guarded and
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that (1)
the offense has been committed; (2) the accused is
the guilty agent; and (3) he would probably be
punished capitally if the law is administered.'
Trammell v. State, 284 Ala. 31, 32, 221 So. 2d 390,
390 (1969). The State has the burden of proving
that the crime was committed and showing 'facts that
would convince the judge that upon final trial the
judge would sustain a verdict pronouncing the
defendant guilty and imposing the death penalty.'
Roan v. State, 24 Ala. App. 517, 517, 137 So. 320,
321 (1931). A safe rule for a trial court to follow
'is to deny bail if the court could sustain a
capital conviction by a jury based on the same
evidence taken at the hearing seeking bail; and to
allow bail if the evidence is not so efficacious.'
Webb v. State, 35 Ala. App. 575, 576, 50 So. 2d 451,
452 (1951); Roddam v. State, 33 Ala. App. 356, 33
So. 2d 384 (1948)."
879 So. 2d at 533-34. Relying on Ex parte Patel, the Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that, because Moyers will not face
the death penalty, the State failed to establish the
prerequisites for denying bail in this case and directed the
trial court to set bail.
Based on Ex parte Bynum, the State contends that to be
punished capitally does not mean only that the death penalty
be imposed and argues that the question in this case is
whether the offense is classified as a capital offense by
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statute, not whether Moyers will be sentenced to death. The
State maintains that, if a defendant is charged with an
offense made capital under § 13A-5-40, Ala. Code 1975, and
that defendant is convicted of that offense, there are two
possible punishments, both of which are "capital"--a sentence
of death or a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. We thus consider whether a defendant
who is charged with a capital offense is entitled to bail if
the State does not intend to seek the death penalty for the
offense.
Alabama has a constitutional qualification on the
presumptive right to bail for capital offenses. See Ala.
Const. 1901, Art. I, § 16 (excepting from bailable offenses
capital crimes when the proof is evident or the presumption
great); and Ex parte Bynum. Ex parte Bynum explained that it
is the gravity of the offense, not the sentence that could be
imposed, that is to be considered in determining whether the
defendant has a right to bail. Thus, "certain crimes for
purposes of bail are still classified as capital regardless of
whether the death penalty may be invoked." 294 Ala. at 81,
312 So. 2d at 54. The legislature has classified certain
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murders as capital in § 13A–5–40. A capital offense is
defined in § 13A–5–39(1), Ala. Code. 1975, as "[a]n offense
for which a defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death
or life imprisonment without parole according to the
provisions of this article." Ex parte Patel further explained
the proof required for determining whether bail is warranted
as follows:
"Alabama appellate courts have stated that
'where bail has been refused by the primary
magistrate on oral evidence, the appellate court
will not interfere, unless such denial appears from
the record to have been manifestly erroneous.' Roan
[v. State], 24 Ala. App. [517,] 517, 137 So. [320,]
321 [(1931)]. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
has recognized a presumption of guilt '"'[w]here one
is imprisoned [for a capital offense] by virtue of
an indictment.'"' [Ex parte] Landers, 690 So. 2d
[537,] 538 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1987)] (quoting Burks
v. State, 600 So. 2d 374, 381 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991), quoting in turn Livingston v. State, 40 Ala.
App. 376, 377, 116 So. 2d 396, 397 (1959)). To be
entitled to bail as of right, a defendant must
overcome this presumption by proof. Landers, 690
So. 2d at 538."
879 So. 2d at 534 (footnote omitted). Patel had not been
indicted when the trial court held a hearing on her request
for bail. Therefore, this Court found that no presumption of
her guilt existed and, after reviewing the evidence presented
to the trial court, held that the State had presented
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insufficient evidence upon which the trial court could have
based a decision to deny bail. Id. Here, Moyers was
indicted, and the trial court, after a hearing at which the
court heard and considered evidence presented ore tenus,
denied Moyers bail. Ex parte Patel, therefore, is factually
distinguishable from this case.
Based on the plain meaning of the statutory and
constitutional provisions and the development of the caselaw
in this area, we hold that a "capital offense" within the
meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions relating to
bail is an offense that is punishable by death or by life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Therefore,
when a defendant who is charged with a capital offense
requests a trial court to set bail, under Ex parte Bynum the
court can deny that request for bail even if the State will
not seek the death penalty. In order for the trial court to
deny a request for bail from a defendant charged with a
capital offense, however, the State must prove the three
prerequisites noted in Ex parte Patel: "'The evidence must be
clear and strong, that it would lead a well-guarded and
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that (1) the offense
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has been committed; (2) the accused is the guilty agent; and
(3) he would probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.'" Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d at 533 (quoting
Trammell v. State, 284 Ala. 31, 32, 221 So. 2d 390, 390
(1969)). Moreover, Ex parte Patel holds that if a defendant
has been indicted for a capital offense, that defendant is
presumed guilty for purposes of setting bail, and the
defendant has the burden to overcome that presumption before
he or she is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Id. In
sum, our decision in this case synthesizes the constitutional
and statutory provisions with the caselaw.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., and Shaw, J., concur specially.
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MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
All accused are entitled to preconviction bail "except
for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the
presumption great." Art. I, § 16, Ala. Const. 1901. Because
"the gravity of the offense is the distinguishing feature and
not the penalty which may be imposed," this Court has held
that bail may be constitutionally denied in a capital case
even though the death penalty is not available. Ex parte
Bynum, 294 Ala. 78, 81, 312 So. 2d 52, 54 (1975). Thus, under
Ex parte Bynum, the trial court may deny Joel Patrick Moyers
bail if the constitutional conditions are satisfied.
However, in Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Roan v. State, 24 Ala. App. 517, 517, 137 So. 320,
321 (1931)), this Court said that bail could be denied in a
capital case if the trial judge was convinced that on a
finding of guilt the death penalty would be imposed. Id. at
533-34. The Court of Criminal Appeals read Ex parte Patel as
saying that where the death penalty was waived the
constitutional entitlement to bail was automatically revived.
Thus, it ordered the trial court to set bail for Moyers.
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However, as Justice Houston explained in his concurrence
in Ex parte Patel, and as Justice Shaw points out in his
special concurrence here, Roan was decided before life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole was an
alternative punishment in a capital case. See § 13A-5-39(1),
Ala. Code 1975 (stating that a capital offense is one
punishable "by a sentence of death or life imprisonment
without parole"). By relying on Ex parte Patel without taking
cognizance of Justice Houston's observation about its
potentially misleading quotation from Roan, the Court of
Criminal Appeals misinterpreted Art. I, § 16.
Article I, § 16, grants a trial court the discretion,
upon a proper finding, to deny bail for any capital offense,
not merely one in which the death penalty might be imposed.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).
As the main opinion notes, Art. I, § 16, of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901, provides that, under the specified
circumstances, bail may be denied in capital cases. Prior
caselaw has held that "certain crimes for purposes of bail are
still classified as capital regardless of whether the death
penalty may be invoked." Ex parte Bynum, 294 Ala. 78, 81, 312
So.2d 52, 54 (1975). Thus, under certain circumstances, one
charged with a capital crime may be denied bail, even if the
death penalty is not an option as punishment.
In Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532, 533 (Ala. 2003), this
Court discussed the factors to consider in determining whether
bail is appropriate in a capital case:
"This Court has established three prerequisites to
the denial of bail in a capital case: 'The evidence
must be clear and strong, that it would lead a
well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the
conclusion that (1) the offense has been committed;
(2) the accused is the guilty agent; and (3) he
would probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.' Trammell v. State, 284 Ala. 31, 32,
221 So. 2d 390, 390 (1969)."
The Court then noted:
"The State has the burden of proving that the crime
was committed and showing 'facts that would convince
the judge that upon final trial the judge would
sustain a verdict pronouncing the defendant guilty
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and imposing the death penalty.' Roan v. State, 24
Ala. App. 517, 517, 137 So. 320, 321 (1931)."
879 So. 2d at 533 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the Court of Criminal Appeals
believed that Ex parte Patel, in quoting the sentence above
from Roan v. State, 24 Ala. App. 517, 137 So. 320 (1931),
"appear[ed] to have departed from [this Court's] earlier
interpretation in Bynum," and, thus, that in order to properly
deny bail the trial court must be convinced that the death
penalty would be imposed, which was not an option in Joel
Patrick Moyers's case.
The main opinion holds that Ex parte Patel is factually
distinguishable from this case; I agree, but I do not believe
that that is the only reason Ex parte Patel does not require
the result reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Specifically, the issue in Ex parte Patel involved whether the
evidence was sufficient to justify the denial of bail. The
quotation of Roan in Ex parte Patel should be viewed only as
discussing the quantum of evidence to be produced to the trial
court and not a definition of crimes constituting capital
offenses for purposes of determining whether a defendant has
a right to bail. Roan's discussion, as quoted in Ex parte
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Patel, is pertinent as to how much evidence is to be produced,
not what constitutes a capital offense. In fact, the
definition of what constituted a capital offense changed after
Roan. As Justice Houston stated in his special writing on
application for rehearing in Ex parte Patel: "[A]fter [the
Court of Appeals] decided Roan v. State, 24 Ala. App. 517, 137
So. 320 (1931), quoted in the original opinion, the definition
of 'capital offense' was revised to include an offense
punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–39." Ex
parte Patel, 879 So. 2d at 535 (Houston, J., concurring
specially).1 The issue in Ex parte Patel was whether the
1
Justice Houston called for the Court to clarify the
decision in Ex parte Patel:
"I would revise the portion of the opinion in which
we quote from Roan in order to clarify that, under
the circumstances presented here, the State has the
burden of proving that the crime was committed and
showing 'facts that would convince the judge that
upon final trial the judge would sustain a verdict
pronouncing the defendant guilty and imposing the
death penalty [or a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole].' Roan, 24 Ala. App. at 517, 137 So.
at 321."
Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d at 535 (Houston, J., concurring
specially). For whatever reason, the Court apparently declined
to do so.
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trial court had sufficient evidence on which to deny bail, and
its citation of Roan was to show what must be demonstrated to
the trial court to constitute sufficient evidence; there was
no dispute whether the charged crime was a capital offense.
For that reason, Ex parte Patel did not mandate the decision
by the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case.
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