FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 8, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LINDSEY K. SPRINGER,
individually and as the Co-Trustee of
the S.L.C.A. Family Trust,
No. 14-5012
Defendant - Appellant, (D.C. No. 4:08–CV–00278–TCK–PJC)
(N.D. Okla.)
and
REGINA M. CARLSON, as Co-
Trustee of the S.L.C.A. Family Trust;
MARTHA F. MOORE, individually
and as Trustee of the W.T. Moore and
Martha F. Moore Revocable Trust
dated June 12, 2002; JANETH S.
SMITH; W. T. SMITH,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The district court entered a judgment ordering Lindsey Springer to pay
unpaid taxes. Four years and as many appeals later, Mr. Springer moved to undo
the judgment, arguing that the government’s attorneys lacked any authority to
litigate the case. The district court denied the motion. Mr. Springer then moved
to disqualify the presiding judge but the court denied this motion too. Mr.
Springer now asks us to overturn both rulings.
Taking the first one first, Mr. Springer argues that he is entitled to relief
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) because the government lawyers who won the
judgment against him were not statutorily empowered to do so. We cannot agree.
Department of Justice attorney James C. Strong had litigating authority properly
passed down to him from the Attorney General. The Attorney General has
delegated civil litigation authority for actions arising under internal revenue laws
to the Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 510. In
turn, the Assistant Attorney General has delegated that authority to the Chiefs of
the Civil Trial Sections of the Tax Division. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.13(b); Dep’t of
Justice Tax Div. Directives 110, 143. And the Chief of the Civil Trial Section for
the Central Region, the Region covering Oklahoma, assigned Mr. Strong to
litigate Mr. Springer’s case.
Because the Attorney General properly delegated authority to Mr. Strong to
pursue this case, we have no need to resolve Mr. Springer’s separate but related
challenge to Thomas Scott Woodward’s authority as acting and interim U.S.
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Attorney. Mr. Strong at all times possessed authority to litigate on the
government’s behalf — authority not dependent on Mr. Woodward’s appointment.
See United States v. Suescun, 237 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (“An
appointment of a United States Attorney that is not made as provided by the
Appointments Clause does not affect the Government’s power to prosecute.”);
United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 1999), partially overruled on
other grounds by United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2008).
Neither did the district judge abuse his discretion in denying Mr. Springer’s
disqualification motion. Mr. Springer argues that the judge acquired improper
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts through three pleadings and
should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). But § 455(b)(1)
requires recusal when the judge gains knowledge about the case from sources
outside the litigation, not when he learns about the case from pleadings in the
litigation. See In re Grand Jury 95-1, 118 F.3d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr.
Springer’s further contention that the presiding judge was involved in the
disputed appointment has no basis in the record.
We deny Mr. Springer’s several remaining motions as without merit. By
way of example, Mr. Springer seeks from this court a show-cause order requiring
the attorneys who signed the government’s appellate brief to explain their
authority to do so. But the government is entitled to a presumption that the
lawyers it identifies as working for it are acting within the powers granted them
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by law, and Mr. Springer has not rebutted that presumption when it comes to the
lawyers appearing in this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 517; U.S. Postal Service v.
Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001); Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC v. Jones, Nos. 13-
2054, 13-2055, 2014 WL 3703825, at *12 n.16 (10th Cir. 2014).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Springer’s motion to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is denied. He is reminded that he must pay
the filing fee in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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