Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Aug 22 2014, 6:24 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID T.A. MATTINGLY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Mattingly Legal, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EDDIE T. CRIDER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1401-CR-11
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge
Cause No. 79D01-1304-FA-7
August 22, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Eddie Crider appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The State filed a ten-count information against Crider after he sold cocaine to an
undercover police officer within one thousand feet of a youth program center in Tippecanoe
County. A jury trial was scheduled for August 6, 2013. On the day of the scheduled trial,
Crider informed his counsel that he wished to plead guilty. The trial court held a guilty plea
hearing during which Crider pled guilty to class A felony dealing in cocaine and to being a
habitual substance offender. Prior to accepting the guilty plea, the trial court advised Crider
of his rights and the penalty range for his crimes. Crider stated that he understood his rights,
that he was not forced or threatened by anyone to enter his guilty plea, and that his plea was
his own “free choice and decision.” Tr. at 10.
Thereafter, on October 4, 23, and 30, 2013, Crider filed motions to withdraw his guilty
plea.1 Crider stated his reasons as follows:
4. Defendant had time to reflect on the plea of guilty and desires to withdraw
the plea and go to trial in the above-entitled cause for the following fair and
just reasons:
1
Although the chronological case summary indicates that Crider filed a motion to withdraw on all
three of those dates, Crider’s appendix does not include a copy of the motion filed October 30, 2013.
2
a. Defendant has informed his counsel that he has read various
law books and does not believe he is eligible for the habitual
substance offender enhancement.
b. The Defendant believes that he was not properly advised by
counsel of his legal situation.
5. The State has not been substantially prejudiced by any reliance on the
plea.
6. The withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice.
7. At the time of the guilty plea, Eddie Crider was under extreme emotional
distress.
Appellant’s App. at 48-49, 53. 2
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw on November 1, 2013.
Crider testified that he was “under distress” on the morning of trial and that his attorney and
the public defender investigator on his case had threatened and coerced him to plead guilty.
Tr. at 23. The trial court continued the hearing to November 22, 2013, so that the State could
call Crider’s attorney, Thomas O’Brien, and the investigator, William Lindblom, as witnesses
to refute Crider’s claim of coercion. O’Brien subsequently withdrew his appearance and the
court appointed a special public defender to appear on Crider’s behalf. At the continued
hearing, both O’Brien and Lindblom testified that they neither threatened nor coerced Crider
to plead guilty. O’Brien testified that, on the morning of trial, he repeatedly informed Crider
that he was prepared to proceed to trial but that Crider insisted that he wanted to plead guilty.
O’Brien stated that Crider “started yelling” across the courtroom to the deputy prosecutor
2
Crider’s second motion to withdraw added paragraph seven. Because Crider’s third motion to
withdraw was not included in the appendix, we are unaware of how the third motion differs, if at all, from the
other two motions.
3
indicating that he wanted “a deal.” Id. at 38. The trial court entered its order denying
Crider’s motion to withdraw on December 6, 2013. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced
Crider to a fifty-two-year aggregate executed sentence. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
After entry of a plea of guilty, but before imposition of sentence, a trial court “may”
allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea “for any fair and just reason.” Ind. Code
§ 35-35-1-4(b). The trial court “shall” allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea where
the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a “manifest
injustice.” Id. However, the trial court “must deny” a motion to withdraw a guilty plea if
the withdrawal would result in “substantial prejudice” to the State. Coomer v. State, 652
N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995) (citing Ind. Code §35-35-1-4(b)). “Manifest injustice” and
“substantial prejudice” are “necessarily imprecise standards” and “[e]xcept under these polar
circumstances, disposition of the petition is at the discretion of the [trial] court.” Id.
Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw guilty plea arrives in the
appellate court with a presumption in favor of the ruling. Id. “One who appeals an adverse
decision on a motion to withdraw must therefore prove the trial court abused its discretion by
a preponderance of the evidence.” Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2000). We
will not disturb the trial court’s ruling where it was based on conflicting evidence. Id.
Under the facts presented here, Crider has not demonstrated that withdrawal of his
plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. As our supreme court has stated,
“concerns about injustice carry greater weight when accompanied by credible evidence of
4
involuntariness, or when the circumstances of the plea reveal that the rights of the accused
were violated.” Coomer, 652 N.E.2d at 62. Thus, in determining whether the trial court has
abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw, “we examine the statements made by
the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered ‘freely and
knowingly.’” Peel v. State, 951 N.E.2d 269, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Brightman v.
State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001)). Our review of Crider’s guilty plea hearing reveals that
his plea was offered freely and knowingly, and contrary to his assertion on appeal, we discern
no credible evidence that he was coerced or induced to plead guilty or that his plea was
otherwise involuntary.3 Crider has failed to overcome the presumption in favor of the trial
court’s ruling. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Crider’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
3
Crider maintains that the “the prospect of losing liberty for such a long period of time would cause
any criminal defendant to be under extreme stress” and that such stress could render a “decision to plead guilty
involuntary.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Crider concedes that there is no authority for this proposition but invites
this Court to “expand the scope of the current state of case law” and conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw. We decline the invitation.
5