Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Apr 02 2014, 8:13 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TEHLYNN TROTTER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1308-CR-421
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable David M. Hooper, Commissioner
Cause No. 49F08-1301-CM-2184
April 2, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Tehlynn Trotter appeals her conviction for class A misdemeanor battery with bodily
injury. Finding the evidence sufficient to support her conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
From July 2012 to January 2013, Trotter rented a duplex from Jacqueline Massela.
During her tenancy, Trotter was verbally abusive with the property manager/maintenance
man, Kimble Phillips. Massela terminated Trotter’s lease around January 8 or 9, 2013. On
January 9, 2013, Phillips responded to a call from Trotter’s next-door neighbor reporting a
break-in. Police arrived, took statements, and left, and Phillips began cleaning up broken
glass at the rear of the property. Shortly thereafter, Trotter and her son Scooter arrived and
approached Phillips. Trotter accused Phillips of stealing her property, and Scooter moved
close to Phillips. Trotter yelled, “hit him, hit him” and “[j]ust wail him.” Tr. at 9, 14.
Scooter struck Phillips, and Phillips fell down the back steps. When he got up, Scooter
repeatedly struck him. Eventually, Phillips was able to hold Scooter at bay. Then Trotter
joined the fracas, striking Phillips three times on the side of his head and causing him to
suffer “three goose eggs.” Id. at 10, 14-15. At that point, Phillips ran to his vehicle. Scooter
pursued him and struck him in the back of the head, causing him to lose consciousness. As a
result of the attack, Phillips suffered head pain that left him bedridden for three days. He
also suffered ear pain and a stiff neck.
The State charged Trotter with class A misdemeanor battery, and the trial court
convicted her as charged. She now appeals.
2
Discussion and Decision
Trotter challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her battery conviction.
When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness
credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Rather, we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment and will affirm the
conviction “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 147.
Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A) states, “A person who knowingly or
intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery ….
a Class A misdemeanor if … it results in bodily injury to any other person.” “A person who
knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense
commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. See also Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443, 449-
50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The individual who aids another person in committing a crime is as
guilty as the actual perpetrator.”), trans. denied (2005).
Trotter claims that she neither struck Phillips nor induced Scooter to do so. Instead,
she claims that she came in contact with Phillips only in an attempt to pull her son away and
break up the altercation. The evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Trotter
initiated the verbal confrontation by yelling and accusing Phillips. She then encouraged
Scooter to “hit him, hit him” and “[j]ust wail him.” Tr. at 9, 14. Scooter obliged, and after
Phillips held him at bay, Trotter repeatedly struck Phillips on the side of the head. These
3
repeated strikes to the head belie Trotter’s claim that she merely attempted to break up the
fight. To the extent that she now characterizes her conduct as legally justifiable because she
was merely acting in defense of another, we note that she never raised this affirmative
defense at trial and therefore has failed to preserve it for consideration on appeal. See
Shelton v. State, 679 N.E.2d 499, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasizing that defendant bears
the burden of placing her affirmative defense in issue at trial).
In sum, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Trotter encouraged
Scooter to batter Phillips and then directly battered Phillips by repeatedly striking him on the
side of his head, causing bodily injury. Her arguments amount to invitations to reweigh
evidence and judge witness credibility, which we may not do. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
4