NO. COA14-176
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 July 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Plaintiff,
v. Richmond County
No. 12 CRS 52607
SHANEEQUAH NICOLE WALL,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 9 October 2013 by
Judge Mark E. Klass in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 3 June 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Senior Deputy Attorney
General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
On 9 October 2013, a jury found Shaneequah Nicole Wall
(“defendant”) guilty of resisting a public officer. The trial
court sentenced defendant to 45 days imprisonment, suspended,
and placed her on supervised probation for 12 months. Defendant
gave notice of appeal in open court. We hold that the Richmond
County Superior Court lacked legal authority and, therefore, was
without subject matter jurisdiction to try defendant on the
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offense alleged in the misdemeanor statement of charges when
defendant was appealing from the judgment entered in district
court after a conviction on a magistrate’s order. We vacate
defendant’s conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
Based on the record evidence, which is conflicting on
occasion, the facts of this case are as follows: On 18
September 2012, the Richmond County Sheriff’s Office received a
warrant for the arrest of William Wall, Sr. (“Wall Sr.”) and an
emergency child custody order for William Wall, Jr. (“Jr.”),
Wall Sr.’s minor child, from the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office
in Florida. The child custody order was based on allegations of
abuse or neglect and indicated that Richmond County was to take
immediate custody of Jr., who was 20 months old. The custody
order stated that Jr. could be found at 127 Logan Park in the
city of Rockingham.
Deputy Cory Jones (“Deputy Jones”) with the Richmond County
Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to the Logan Park address. As
Deputy Jones entered Wall Sr.’s neighborhood, he spotted Wall
Sr. driving out. Deputy Jones stopped the truck and arrested
Wall Sr. Deputy Jones informed passenger Felicia Wall, (Wall
Sr.’s daughter) of the arrest warrant for her father and of the
child custody order for Jr. Felicia Wall drove Wall Sr.’s truck
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to the Logan Park residence as Deputy Jones followed in a marked
patrol car.
When he arrived at the residence, Deputy Jones stood in the
doorway and identified himself as a sheriff’s deputy to Rosa
Wall, Jr.’s paternal grandmother and the apparent home owner.
Deputy Jones informed Rosa Wall of the warrant and of the child
custody order. Meg Demayo with the Richmond County Department
of Social Services and Lieutenant Mike Burns (“Lieutenant
Burns”) met Deputy Jones at the residence. Defendant and
Felicia Wall were present as well.
Lieutenant Burns testified that there were two minor
children in the home. Lieutenant Burns asked Rosa Wall to
identify Jr. Initially, Rosa Wall said that Jr. was not in the
residence. However, she later confirmed that Jr. was in the
residence, that he was “fine,” and that he was “not going
nowhere.” The record discloses that defendant, Felicia Wall,
and Rosa Wall each refused to identify Jr. when asked to do so
by law enforcement. Pointing to the child later identified as
Jr., Deputy Jones specifically asked defendant; “Whose baby is
that?” Defendant responded; “His mama is on the way.”
Lieutenant Burns warned: “If I find out that either of these
two children in this home is in fact the child William Wall, Jr.
that I’m looking for, everybody in the residence will go to
jail.” After approximately two hours, Florida authorities
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transmitted a photograph of Jr. and the officers were able to
identify him and place him in DSS custody.
The video footage illustrates, and Deputy Jones admits,
that the officers never presented the emergency child custody
order to defendant, Rosa Wall, or Felicia Wall. Lieutenant
Burns testified that he had the emergency child custody order in
his possession; however, he stated that he did not feel it was
necessary to show it until one of the women affirmatively
identified Jr.
Defendant, Felicia Wall, and Rosa Wall were each arrested
based on their refusal to identify Jr. Lieutenant Burns told
the women; “We’re arresting you for resisting—for lying to us.”
On 6 December 2012, a magistrate’s order charged defendant with
resisting a public officer, § 14-223, and giving fictitious
information to a public officer, § 20-29, for the 18 September
2012 incident. Defendant was tried on the magistrate’s order
and found guilty of resisting a public officer on 6 December
2013. The fictitious information charge was dismissed.
Defendant appealed the district court judgment to Richmond
County Superior Court for a trial de novo. On 2 July 2013, the
State filed a misdemeanor statement of charges in superior
court. Defendant was tried on the misdemeanor statement of
charges and found guilty of resisting a public officer on 9
October 2013. Defendant now appeals.
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II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the superior court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to try her on a misdemeanor statement of
charges filed in superior court for an alleged 18 September 2012
violation of § 14-223 because defendant was tried and convicted
on a magistrate’s order in district court. We agree.
A “statement of charges” is governed, in relevant part, by
the following provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-922 (2013):
(d) Statement of Charges upon Determination
of Prosecutor.--The prosecutor may file a
statement of charges upon his own
determination at any time prior to
arraignment in the district court. It may
charge the same offenses as the citation,
criminal summons, warrant for arrest, or
magistrate’s order or additional or
different offenses.
(e) Objection to Sufficiency of Criminal
Summons; Warrant for Arrest or Magistrate’s
Order as Pleading.--If the defendant by
appropriate motion objects to the
sufficiency of a criminal summons, warrant
for arrest, or magistrate’s order as a
pleading, at the time of or after
arraignment in the district court or upon
trial de novo in the superior court, and the
judge rules that the pleading is
insufficient, the prosecutor may file a
statement of charges, but a statement of
charges filed pursuant to this authorization
may not change the nature of the offense.
(f) Amendment of Pleadings prior to or after
Final Judgment.--A statement of charges,
criminal summons, warrant for arrest,
citation, or magistrate’s order may be
amended at any time prior to or after final
judgment when the amendment does not change
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the nature of the offense charged.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-922 (2013).
The crux of defendant’s issue is that the State’s filing of
the misdemeanor statement of charges was untimely and therefore
impermissible. We agree. Subsection (d) of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-922 clearly provides that “[t]he prosecutor may file a
statement of charges upon his own determination at any time
prior to arraignment in the district court.” After arraignment,
the State may only file a statement of charges when the
defendant (1) objects to the sufficiency of the criminal summons
and (2) the trial court rules that the pleading is in fact
insufficient. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-922(e). While subsection
(f) allows the charging instrument to be amended prior to or
after a final judgment is entered, this does not grant the State
authority to change the form of the charging instrument; i.e.,
the State cannot “amend” a magistrate’s order by filing a
misdemeanor statement of charges. Doing so would change the
nature of the original pleading entirely. Accordingly, the State
has a limited window in which it may file a statement of charges
on its own accord, and that is prior to arraignment.
To further illustrate this point, we look to State v.
Killian, 61 N.C. App. 155, 158, 300 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1983), a
case in which the State similarly filed a statement of charges
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in superior court after the defendant was tried and convicted on
a warrant in district court. On appeal, this Court vacated the
superior court’s judgment for want of jurisdiction on the basis
that the statement of charges alleged a separate statutory
violation than that charged in the warrant. Id. at 158, 300
S.E.2d at 259. However, assuming arguendo that the statement of
charges did not change the nature of the offense charged, this
Court opined that the State’s filing in superior court was
nevertheless “untimely and thereby without legal authorization.”
Id. at 157, 300 S.E.2d at 259. We noted that the record
contained no motion by the defendant objecting to the
sufficiency of the original warrant and held, “[t]he statement
of charges was filed by the prosecutor ‘upon his own
determination’; and that could only be done ‘prior to
arraignment in the district court,’ not upon trial de novo on
appeal to superior court.” Id.
Here, the State did not file the statement of charges prior
to defendant’s arraignment in district court. As in Killian,
the record similarly discloses that no motion was made by
defendant objecting to the sufficiency of the magistrate’s
order. Thus, the trial court was not afforded the opportunity
to rule on whether the magistrate’s order was sufficient.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor “upon his own determination” filed
the misdemeanor statement of charges seven months after
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defendant appealed the district court judgment to superior
court. This filing was “untimely and thereby without legal
authorization.” Thus, the superior court had no jurisdiction to
try defendant for the new offense alleged in the statement of
charges. Defendant’s conviction must be vacated. Defendant’s
remaining issues on appeal are moot.
Vacated.
Judges McGEE and HUNTER, Robert C., concur.