An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1109
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Burke County
v.
No. 10 CRS 52989
RANDAL EUGENE POWELL
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 March 2013 by
Judge Sharon Tracey Barrett in Burke County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 February 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Harriet F. Worley, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for Defendant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant Randal Eugene Powell appeals from a judgment
sentencing him to a term of 300 to 369 months imprisonment based
upon his conviction for first degree statutory sex offense in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a). On appeal,
Defendant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter judgment against him in this case on the grounds that the
indictment that had been returned against him was fatally
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defective. After careful consideration of Defendant’s challenge
to the trial court’s judgment in light of the record and the
applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment
should remain undisturbed.
I. Factual Background
A. Substantive Facts
B.W. and T.W. were ages 14 and 12, respectively, at the
time of trial.1 The two girls had lived with their mother and
Defendant, who was their mother’s live-in boyfriend and who was
over the age of eighteen, at all relevant times.
According to Bethany and Tonya, Defendant sexually abused
both girls over an extended period of time, with this abuse
invariably having occurred while their mother was at work.
During the course of these episodes, Defendant would engage in
vaginal intercourse with Bethany while the other children were
bathing or watching television. Although Defendant rubbed his
penis in the vicinity of Tonya’s vagina and inserted his penis
into her anal opening, he never penetrated her vagina with his
penis. According to Tonya, the same things that happened to her
happened to Bethany. The children never told anyone about the
abuse because they were afraid. Although Bethany attempted to
1
B.W. and T.W. will be referred to as Bethany and Tonya,
respectively, throughout the remainder of this opinion, with
those names being pseudonyms utilized for ease of reading and to
protect the minors’ privacy.
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write a letter to her mother in which she detailed what
Defendant was doing to her, Defendant intercepted the letter and
ripped it apart before she could deliver it to her mother.2
As a result of conduct unrelated to this case, the
Department of Social Services removed the children from their
mother’s care and placed them in the home of their maternal
grandmother in September of 2010. In approximately November of
2010, Bethany and Tonya informed their grandmother that
Defendant had “raped” them. Although these actions had been
going on for years, Bethany finally came forward out of fear
that she would become pregnant and get in more trouble. After
learning of the children’s allegations, their grandmother called
the police.
On 15 November 2010, the children were taken for a physical
evaluation. According to the information developed during that
evaluation, Tonya had a “significant” healed fissure in her
buttocks that could have been caused by a large bowel movement
or some other trauma. Similarly, some of the tissue associated
with Bethany’s hymen was missing.
B. Procedural History
2
In addition, Bethany testified that she had attempted to
tell her mother about Defendant’s activities on one other
occasion. However, Bethany’s mother refused to listen to her at
that time.
-4-
On 30 December 2010, a warrant for arrest charging
Defendant with first degree statutory rape was issued. On 7
February 2011, the Burke County grand jury returned a bill of
indictment charging Defendant with two counts of first degree
statutory sexual offense. Prior to trial, the prosecutor
extended a negotiated plea offer to Defendant under which, in
return for Defendant’s pleas of guilty to the offenses charged
in the indictment, the State would agree that the charges that
had been lodged against Defendant would be consolidated for
judgment and that the sentence imposed upon Defendant would be
selected from the presumptive range. Defendant failed to accept
the proffered plea offer before it expired on 15 March 2013.
The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the
trial court and a jury at the 18 March 2013 criminal session of
the Burke County Superior Court. On that date, the prosecutor
offered, in return for Defendant’s plea of guilty to both
offenses charged in the indictment, to agree that Defendant’s
convictions would be consolidated for judgment and that
Defendant would be sentenced at the top of the presumptive
range. At the time that this proposed negotiated plea was
discussed on the record, the trial court informed Defendant
that, assuming that he was sentenced as a Level II offender, the
bottom of the presumptive range would involve a 221 to 275 month
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term of imprisonment and the top of the presumptive range would
involve a 276 to 341 month term of imprisonment. After
discussing the proposed plea with his trial counsel, Defendant
rejected the State’s offer and elected to exercise his right to
trial by jury instead.
As the parties engaged in the jury selection process, the
trial court informed them that it had reviewed the indictment in
light of the relevant statutory provisions and determined that
Defendant had been charged with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.4A(a) rather than N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) and that,
if convicted, Defendant faced a mandatory minimum term of 300
months imprisonment. In response, Defendant’s trial counsel
indicated that he had understood that Defendant had been charged
with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) rather than N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a). At that point, the prosecutor offered
to allow Defendant to enter pleas of guilty to the lesser-
included offenses. Although the trial court reiterated its
belief that the charges alleged in the indictment returned
against Defendant rested upon alleged violations of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.4A and that a conviction would require the
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of 300 months
imprisonment, Defendant rejected the State’s renewed plea offer.
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At the conclusion of the State’s case, the trial court
dismissed the first degree statutory sexual offense charge
relating to the accusations involving Bethany for insufficiency
of the evidence. During the jury instruction conference, the
trial court informed counsel for the parties that the jury would
be allowed to consider the issue of whether Defendant had
committed the offense specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a)
stemming from the accusations involving Tonya given that the
language of the indictment alleged that Defendant had committed
the offense defined in that statutory provision. On 21 March
2013, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of
first degree statutory sexual offense stemming from the
accusations involving Tonya. At the conclusion of the ensuing
sentencing hearing, the trial court entered a judgment
sentencing Defendant to a term of 300 to 369 months
imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the
trial court’s judgment.
II. Legal Analysis
In his sole challenge to the trial court’s judgment,
Defendant contends that the indictment that had been returned
against him was fatally defective, a fact that deprived the
trial court of jurisdiction over this case. More specifically,
Defendant contends that the language in which the indictment was
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couched, when coupled with the allegations delineating the
statute that Defendant was accused of having violated, resulted
in a fundamental ambiguity in the indictment in question
sufficient to render it fatally defective. We do not find
Defendant’s contention persuasive.
The indictment returned against Defendant alleged that:
on or about the date of offense shown above
[Fall 2010] and in the county indicated
above [Burke] the defendant named above
[Randal Eugene Powell] unlawfully,
willfully, and feloniously did engage in a
sexual offense with [Tonya], a child under
the age of 13 years. At the time of the
offense the defendant was 26 years of age,
and over the age of 18.
The indictment specified that Defendant was charged with having
committed the offense set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A. On
the other hand, the indictment alleged in both the caption and
in the headings placed before each count set out in that
charging instrument that Defendant was being charged with “FIRST
DEGREE SEX OFFENSE.”
“A valid bill of indictment is essential to the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court to try an accused for a
felony and have the jury determine his guilt or innocence, ‘and
to give authority to the court to render a valid judgment.’”
State v. Moses, 154 N.C. App. 332, 334, 572 S.E.2d 223, 226
(2002) (quoting State v. Ray, 274 N.C. 556, 562, 164 S.E.2d 457,
-8-
461 (1968)). As a general proposition, an “indictment or
criminal charge is constitutionally sufficient if it apprises
the defendant of the charge against him with enough certainty to
enable him to prepare his defense and to protect him from
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” State v. Coker,
312 N.C. 432, 434, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984). “An indictment
charging a statutory offense must allege all of the essential
elements of the offense.” State v. Snyder, 343 N.C. 61, 65, 468
S.E.2d 221, 224 (1996); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5)
(providing that a valid indictment must contain “[a] plain and
concise factual statement in each count which, without
allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting
every element of a criminal offense and the defendant’s
commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise
the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject
of the accusation”). For that reason, an “[a]n indictment is
sufficient in form for all intents and purposes if it expresses
the charge in a plain, intelligible and explicit manner.”
Coker, 312 N.C. at 435, 323 S.E.2d at 346. A challenge to the
validity of an indictment is evaluated on appeal utilizing a de
novo standard of review. State v. Marshall, 188 N.C. App. 748,
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656 S.E.2d 709, 715, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 368, 661
S.E.2d 890 (2008).3
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a), which is
entitled “Sexual offense with a child; adult offender,” “[a]
person is guilty of sexual offense with a child if the person is
at least 18 years of age and engages in a sexual act with a
victim who is a child under the age of 13 years.” “A person
convicted of violating [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a)] is guilty
of a Class B1 felony and . . . in no case shall the person
receive an active punishment of less than 300 months.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(b). On the other hand, N.C. Gen. Stat. §
3
The general principles applicable to the validity of
indictments in rape and sexual offense cases have been altered,
to some extent, by the enactment of statutory provisions
authorizing the use of “short form” indictments in such cases.
E.g. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.1 (authorizing the use of “short
form” Indictments in rape cases) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2
(authorizing the use of “short form” indictments in sexual
offense cases). Although the General Assembly has created a
number of additional criminal offenses involving rape and sexual
offense since the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15-144.1 and
15-144.2, including, but not limited to, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.4A, this Court has allowed the use of “short form”
indictments in charging the commission of violations of those
more recently enacted statutory provisions. E.g., State v.
Daniels, 164 N.C. App. 558, 564-65, 596 S.E.2d 256, 260, disc.
review denied, 359 N.C. 71, 604 S.E.2d 918 (2004) (upholding the
use of a “short form” indictment to charge a violation of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A, which makes vaginal intercourse or
another sexual act committed against a child aged 13, 14, or 15
a crime); State v. Bradley, 179 N.C. App. 551, 558-59, 634
S.E.2d 258, 263 (2006) (same). As a result, as Defendant
implicitly concedes, the fact that a “short form” indictment was
utilized in this case has no bearing upon a proper resolution of
Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s judgment.
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14-27.4(a)(1), which is entitled “First-degree sexual offense,”
provides that “[a] person is guilty of a sexual offense in the
first degree if the person engages in a sexual act” with “a
victim who is a child under the age of 13 years and the
defendant is at least 12 years old and is at least four years
older than the victim.” “Any person who [violates N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1)] is guilty of a Class B1 felony.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(b). The essential difference between the
offense delineated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a) and the
offense delineated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) is that
proof of guilt of the offense specified in the former, but not
the latter, of these two statutory provisions requires proof
that the defendant was at least 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense.
Although an “indictment must[, as Defendant contends,] ‘so
plainly, intelligibly and explicitly set forth every essential
element of the offense as to leave no doubt in the mind of the
accused and the court as to the offense intended to be
charged,’” State v. Nicholson, 78 N.C. App. 398, 401, 337 S.E.2d
654, 656-57 (1985) (quoting State v. Coleman, 253 N.C. 799, 801,
117 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1961)), the extent to which any particular
indictment complies with this principle necessarily hinges on an
analysis of the text of the indictment rather than upon the
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caption or similar components of the relevant charging
instrument. As this Court held in State v. Mueller, “although
an indictment may cite to the wrong statute, when the body of
the indictment is sufficient to properly charge defendant with
an offense, the indictment remains valid and the incorrect
statutory reference does not constitute a fatal defect.” 184
N.C. App. 553, 574, 647 S.E.2d 440, 455 (citing State v. Jones,
110 N.C. App. 289, 290-91, 429 S.E.2d 410, 411-12 (1993), and
State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 498, 199 S.E.2d 139, 140
(1973)), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 91, 657 S.E.2d 24 (2007). As a
result, any confusion arising from the caption, the statutory
citations, or other information contained in an indictment aside
from the language in which the offense allegedly committed by
the defendant is described is insufficient to render the
indictment in question fatally defective.
A careful examination of the language contained in the
relevant count of the indictment returned against Defendant
clearly indicates that the grand jury had charged Defendant with
violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a) rather than N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1). As we have previously noted, the count
in question alleges that Defendant “did engage in a sexual
offense with [Tonya], a child under the age of 13 years. At the
time of the offense the defendant was 26 years of age, and over
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the age of 18.” As Defendant concedes, the count in question
“asserts facts supporting every element” of the offense defined
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a). Although the language set out
in the relevant count of the indictment returned against
Defendant might suffice to allege the commission of an act made
punishable by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1), the allegation to
the effect that Defendant was “over the age of 18,” which is not
an element of the offense specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
27.4(a)(1) and is an element of the offense specified in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a), provides a clear indication that the
grand jury intended to charge Defendant with violating N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.4A(a) rather than N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1).
Thus, as the trial court recognized, a careful review of the
language in which the relevant count of the indictment is
couched clearly indicates that Defendant had ample notice that
he had been charged with committing the offense defined in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a) rather than the offense defined in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1).
In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result,
Defendant points to the fact that the indictment indicates that
Defendant had been charged with committing a “First Degree
Sexual Offense,” the fact that the language of the indictment
would have supported a conviction for committing the offense
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described in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) as well as the
offense described in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a), and the fact
that Defendant and his trial counsel were initially confused
about the exact nature of the offense that he was charged with
committing. We do not find any of these arguments persuasive.
According to the principle enunciated in Mueller, the fact that
the indictment might have labelled the offense that Defendant
was charged with committing erroneously does not invalidate the
indictment in question as long as the underlying offense is
clearly alleged in the language of the pertinent count set out
in that criminal pleading. Similarly, given that an indictment
suffices to support a conviction for both a principal offense
and any lesser included offenses, see State v. Yelverton, 334
N.C. 532, 544, 434 S.E.2d 183, 190 (1993) (citing State v.
Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 591, 386 S.E.2d 555, 559 (1989)) (holding
that “[i]nvoluntary manslaughter and second-degree murder are
lesser-included offenses supported by an indictment charging
murder in the first degree”), the fact that an indictment could
be read to charge multiple offenses does not render that
indictment fatally defective. Moreover, the fact that the
allegations contained in the indictment returned against
Defendant, if established, would have supported the return of a
verdict convicting Defendant of violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
-14-
27.4(a)(1) does not compel the conclusion that the indictment in
question is invalid given the inclusion of a reference to the
fact that Defendant was more than 18 years old, an allegation
that would have been unnecessary in the event that the grand
jury was attempting to charge Defendant with violating N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) and was essential in the event that the
grand jury was attempting to charge Defendant with violating
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a). Finally, the fact that
Defendant, his trial counsel, and, perhaps, others may have
understood that the indictment charged Defendant with violating
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) rather than N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-27.4A(a) does not render the indictment at issue here invalid
given that the allegations of the relevant count of the
indictment clearly charged Defendant with violating N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-27.4A(a). As a result, given our conclusion that the
indictment returned against Defendant clearly indicated that he
had been charged with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A(a)
and our conclusion that none of the arguments that Defendant has
advanced in an effort to persuade us that the indictment
underlying the trial court’s judgment was fatally defective have
any merit, Defendant has not shown that he is entitled to relief
from the trial court’s judgment.
III. Conclusion
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Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
Defendant’s sole challenge to the trial court’s judgment lacks
merit. As a result, the trial court’s judgment should, and
hereby does, remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR.
Judges MCGEE and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).