An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-23
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 17 June 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
T.L.F. Wilkes County
M.D.F. Nos. 12 JT 88-89
Appeal by respondent-mother by writ of certiorari from
order entered 26 September 2013 by Judge Michael D. Duncan in
Wilkes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29
May 2014.
Paul W. Freeman, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County
Department of Social Services.
Mark Hayes, for respondent-appellant mother.
Ivey, McClellan, Gatton & Talcott, L.L.P., by Charles
(Chuck) M. Ivey, IV, for guardian ad litem.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals by writ of
certiorari from the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to the juveniles T.L.F. and M.D.F. (collectively “the
-2-
juveniles”). The juveniles’ father is not a party to this
appeal. We affirm.
The Wilkes County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
first became involved with the family after reports of domestic
violence and substance abuse. In July 2012, DSS filed juvenile
petitions alleging the juveniles were abused, neglected, and
dependent. The juveniles were adjudicated abused, neglected,
and dependent in February 2013. After a permanency planning
hearing, the trial court changed the juveniles’ permanent plan
from reunification to adoption.
In March 2013, DSS filed petitions to terminate
respondent’s parental rights to the juveniles. DSS alleged,
inter alia, that both children were neglected and that
respondent willfully abandoned them for at least six consecutive
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In
addition, respondent had committed a felony assault on another
child who resided in the home. See N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 7B-
1111(a)(1), (7)-(8) (2013). After a hearing, the trial court
entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate
respondent’s parental rights based on neglect, abandonment, and
felony assault on another child. The trial court determined
-3-
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the
juveniles’ best interests. Respondent appeals.
On 6 February 2014, respondent filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, acknowledging defects in her notice of appeal. When
the record indicates that the parent desired to appeal and
cooperated with counsel’s efforts to give proper notice of
appeal, this Court may exercise its discretion and issue a writ
of certiorari to review orders terminating parental rights
pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). In re I.T.P-L., 194 N.C.
App. 453, 460, 670 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2008), disc. review denied,
363 N.C. 581, 681 S.E.2d 783 (2009). Because it appears from
the record that respondent expressed her desire to appeal and
cooperated with counsel’s efforts to enter notice of appeal, we
allow respondent’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Respondent’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief pursuant to
North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(d) stating that,
after thoroughly reviewing the trial record and transcript, he
has concluded there is no meritorious argument on which to base
an appeal. He requests this Court conduct an independent
examination of the case. Counsel directs this Court’s attention
to potential issues regarding the trial court’s consideration of
the bond between the juveniles and their maternal grandmother as
-4-
well as the trial court’s consideration of the maternal
grandmother as a possible placement. However, counsel
ultimately concedes that “the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating [respondent’s] parental rights.”
Respondent has not filed her own written arguments.
After reviewing the transcript and record, we are unable to
find any possible prejudicial error in the trial court’s order.
The trial court’s findings of fact support at least one ground
for termination, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that termination is in the juveniles’
best interests. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1110, 7B-1111 (2013).
Therefore, we affirm the order terminating respondent’s parental
rights.
Affirmed.
Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).