An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1408
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 17 June 2014
IN THE MATTER OF: Robeson County
Nos. 10 J 217-20
S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F.,
A.T.F.
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 19 September
2013 by Judge Herbert L. Richardson in Robeson County District
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May 2014.
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Robeson County
Department of Social Services.
Ryan McKaig for respondent-father.
Sandlin Family Law Group, by Debra A. Griffiths, for
guardian ad litem.
BRYANT, Judge.
Respondent-father appeals from a district court order
terminating his parental rights to S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., and
A.T.F. challenging only the trial court’s conclusion that it is
in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate respondent-
father’s parental rights. We affirm.
-2-
On 16 September 2010, the Robeson County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) obtained nonsecure custody of
respondent-father’s four children and filed juvenile petitions
alleging that the children were neglected. The petitions
alleged, inter alia, that respondent-father, his wife, and their
children had no place to live and that the parents had
inadequate kinship placements for the children. On 5 April
2011, DSS filed amended petitions alleging abuse. In an
adjudication order filed on 29 August 2011,1 the trial court
concluded that all four children were neglected and that S.T.F.
was abused. In a separate disposition order, the trial court
concluded that it was in the children’s best interests to remain
in DSS custody and continue with a permanent plan of
reunification with the parents.
On 20 June 2012, DSS filed petitions to terminate both
parents’ rights to the children. Following a hearing on 12
September 2013, the trial court entered an order in which it
found the existence of the following grounds for termination
against respondent-father: (1) failure to make reasonable
progress; and (2) dependency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1
The order was amended on 13 September 2011, but the amendment
made no substantive changes to the adjudication of neglect and
abuse.
-3-
1111(a)(2), (6) (2011). The trial court also concluded that
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. Respondent-father appeals.2
____________________________
It is well-established that termination of parental rights
proceedings involve a two-stage process: (1) the adjudication
stage, where the petitioner is required to prove the existence
of grounds for termination, and (2) the disposition stage, where
the court considers the best interest of the juvenile. N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1110, -1111 (2013); In re White, 81 N.C. App.
82, 85, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1986) (citation omitted). At the
adjudication stage, the burden is “upon the petitioner or movant
and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (f) (2013); see
also In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997)
(“At the adjudication stage, the party petitioning for the
termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights
exist.” (citation omitted)). On appeal, respondent-father does
not make any challenges to the adjudicatory stage of the
proceedings.
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the
mother, but she is not a party to this appeal.
-4-
Respondent-father challenges the trial court’s conclusion
that it is in the best interests of S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., and
A.T.F. to terminate his parental rights. Respondent-father
contends that in light of the progress he has made, the desire
he has expressed to be a good father, and the bond he has formed
with his children, the trial court erred in terminating his
parental rights. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s determination that a
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
juvenile for an abuse of discretion. In re Anderson, 151 N.C.
App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted).
While respondent-father’s desire to make progress in the
future is admirable, it is not dispositive at this stage of the
termination proceeding. At the disposition stage, the trial
court’s focus is on the best interests of the child, not the
circumstances surrounding the parents. See In re Montgomery,
311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984) (“[T]he
fundamental principle underlying North Carolina’s approach to
controversies involving child neglect and custody [is] that the
best interest of the child is the polar star.”). We have
previously stated “that the child[ren] and [their] best
interests are at issue here, not respondent’s hopes for the
-5-
future.” In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 614, 543 S.E.2d
906, 911 (2001) (citation omitted).
The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact in the
disposition of its order indicate that S.T.F., A.T.F., and
A.T.F. are in prospective adoptive placements and that DSS is
looking at a family that may be interested in adopting J.T.F.
Further, S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., and A.T.F. “are in a stable
environment which will allow them to grow up in a secure
environment and benefit emotionally, socially, and
educationally.”
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court
weighed the evidence and made a reasoned decision that
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the
best interests of the children. We find no abuse of discretion
in this determination and, therefore, affirm the order of the
trial court terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges STEPHENS and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).