FILED
Dec 07 2012, 10:37 am
FOR PUBLICATION
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
THOMAS C. ALLEN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
PHILLIP T. BILLINGSLEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A05-1204-CR-216
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge
Cause No. 02D04-1111-FD-1527
December 7, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Phillip T. Billingsley appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana, as a
Class D felony, following a bench trial. Billingsley raises three issues for our review,
which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
1. Whether the officer responding to a 9-1-1 call initiated an
investigatory stop of Billingsley or, instead, placed Billingsley under
arrest when the officer withdrew his firearm upon his arrival at the
scene; and
2. Whether the responding officer had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop of Billingsley.
We hold, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances available to the responding
officer at the time he detained Billingsley, that the responding officer initiated an
investigatory stop of Billingsley based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he
was engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted into evidence marijuana seized following the officer’s detention of
Billingsley, and we affirm his conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Around 2:34 a.m. on November 5, 2011, the 9-1-1 dispatch center of the Fort
Wayne Police Department (“FWPD”) received a call from a woman. The woman said
there was a “young man” at the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”) building who had
“held [her] hostage” a week or two before and that she “want[ed] the police to come up
here and lock him up.” Def.’s Ex. B. She then stated that he was “going to leave right
now” and that she did not “want him to leave because that’s the same dude who did the
shooting at Mookie’s nightclub.” Id. The caller stated that the man was currently armed,
2
though she could not specify the type of firearm; that his name was Phillip Billingsley;
and that he was sitting as a passenger in a “newer,” “tan-brown” or “tan-gray” Dodge
Durango with tinted windows. Id. She further stated that the man sitting in the driver’s
seat of the vehicle was also armed.
During her five-minute phone call with 9-1-1, the caller turned her attention away
from the dispatch operator to tell a third party that she was not “talking to the police I’m
talking to my brother.” Id. At the dispatch operator’s request, the caller then identified
herself as Renita Brown and said she was calling from a friend’s cell phone. The FWPD
dispatched Officer Nicholas Lichtsinn to the scene.
Officer Lichtsinn knew the VFW was “not the most friendly environment” and
also knew Billingsley from having personally arrested him on prior allegations of
possession of cocaine, resisting arrest, fleeing, and criminal trespass. Motion to Suppress
Hearing Transcript at 14, 19. Officer Lichtsinn further knew that Billingsley had also
been arrested for possession of a handgun by a felon and that Billingsley used to “hang
around with” two people who have since been convicted of murder. Id. at 29.
Upon arriving at the VFW, Officer Lichtsinn did not see a Dodge Durango but did
observe an SUV—a Chevrolet Trailblazer—that, “in the darker light . . . appear[ed] to be
brown[, but] when the sun’s out, it appear[ed] to be silver.” Id. at 40. Officer Lichtsinn
knew from his experiences as an officer that, “often when people call [9-1-1], colors [of
vehicles] are goofy and makes and models of vehicles are goofy.” Id. at 30. Officer
Lichtsinn then observed Billingsley in the passenger seat of the Trailblazer and parked
his patrol vehicle in front of the Trailblazer. Officer Lichtsinn called for backup and
3
exited his vehicle with his sidearm drawn. He ordered Billingsley to place his hands on
the roof of the SUV while they waited for backup to arrive, which Billingsley did.
Backup officers arrived shortly thereafter. Officer Lichtsinn then holstered his
weapon and ordered Billingsley to exit the vehicle. Officer Lichtsinn handcuffed
Billingsley and patted him down for weapons. While doing so, Officer Lichtsinn smelled
an “overpowering odor of [raw] marijuana,” which he recognized based on “[n]umerous”
prior arrests he had made involving marijuana. Id. at 18. Officer Lichtsinn then observed
“on the front passenger seat where [Billingsley] was sitting . . . a clear plastic baggie
containing . . . a green leafy plant substance that [Officer Lichtsinn] immediately
recognized . . . to be marijuana.” State’s Exh. 1. The substance field tested positive for
marijuana and was later measured at 229.7 grams. No firearm was found on or near
Billingsley.
The State charged Billingsley with possession of marijuana, as a Class D felony.
Billingsley moved to suppress the seized marijuana and, after a hearing, the trial court
denied Billingsley’s motion. Billingsley renewed his objections during the ensuing bench
trial, and the court overruled them. The court then found Billingsley guilty as charged
and sentenced him accordingly. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Billingsley contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the
seized marijuana into evidence because the State’s seizure of the marijuana from the front
passenger seat of the SUV violated his rights under the federal and Indiana constitutions.
A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and
4
we will reverse such a ruling only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Washington
v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). An abuse of discretion involves a
decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before
the court. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 885
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Issue One: Investigatory Stop or Arrest
The parties first dispute whether Officer Lichtsinn exiting his vehicle with his
firearm drawn upon his arrival at the VFW subjected Billingsley to an investigatory stop
or an arrest. An investigatory stop allows a police officer to “temporarily freeze the
situation in order to make an investigative inquiry.” Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426,
429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop when, based on a totality of the
circumstances, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot. Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2006). A Terry stop is a lesser
intrusion on the person than an arrest and may include a request to see identification and
inquiry necessary to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions. Id. (citing Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185-89 (2004)). Reasonable suspicion entails
some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop, something more than an
unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for
5
probable cause. Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
An arrest, on the other hand, occurs “when a police officer interrupts the freedom
of the accused and restricts his liberty of movement.” Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662,
667 (Ind. 1996). An arrest requires probable cause. See, e.g., Reinhart v. State, 930
N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). There is no question that “[h]olding a person at
gunpoint certainly restrains his liberty of movement” and may be an example of an arrest.
Taylor v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). But “there is no ‘bright
line’ for evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable” such that it has
been transformed into a full arrest. See Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind.
2001) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).
This court recently considered the fine line between an investigatory stop and an
arrest when the attending officer has drawn his firearm. In Willis v. State, 907 N.E.2d
541, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), we held that, based on the facts of that case, an
investigatory stop had occurred. In particular, we noted that “the police arrived at the
scene moments after a caller reported a man holding a handgun to another man’s head.”
Id. Upon arriving at the scene, the police immediately observed two individuals
matching the description provided by the caller. We held that under the totality of those
circumstances the police did not convert an investigatory stop into an arrest when they
immediately withdrew their firearms to investigate whether the suspect had a firearm.
Id.; accord United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
officers conducted a Terry stop and not an arrest even though the officers blockaded
6
Askew’s car and approached with guns drawn, based on the officers’ “reasonable
suspicion” that Askew was in the car and “the inherent danger in stopping those
suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are known tools of the trade”).
About a year after this court’s decision in Willis, we held on a different set of facts
that an officer’s withdrawal of his firearm from its holster placed the suspect citizen
under arrest. Specifically, in Reinhart, we held as follows:
Unlike in Willis, the facts presented here indicate that what may have
begun as a Terry investigatory stop was quickly converted to an arrest
requiring probable cause. “[A] seizure that is lawful at its inception can
violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably
infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Deputy Coney’s purported purpose in stopping
Reinhart’s vehicle was to investigate a possible drunk driver. While
Deputy Coney testified that, at the time of the stop, he was concerned with
his safety based upon Reinhart’s earlier behavior of pulling into the third
driveway and yelling out the window, there is no evidence suggesting that
Reinhart engaged in any behavior which could have led to a specific
reasonable inference that he was armed with a weapon. Therefore, under
the circumstances, Deputy Coney’s action of ordering Reinhart to exit the
vehicle at gunpoint was excessive.
930 N.E.2d at 47 (alteration original).
Thus, whether an officer’s use of a firearm to detain a suspect is pursuant to an
investigatory stop or an arrest is dependent on whether the totality of the facts and
circumstances before the officer at that time demonstrated a specific and reasonable
belief that the suspect may be armed with a weapon. Here, Officer Lichtsinn was
responding to a call that Billingsley was armed at the VFW. Officer Lichtsinn knew the
VFW to be a dangerous area, knew Billingsley, knew Billingsley to be a convicted felon,
and knew Billingsley had a history of dangerous acquaintances. Upon his arrival at the
VFW, Officer Lichtsinn immediately observed Billingsley sitting in the passenger seat of
7
a brown-gray SUV, which corroborated the caller’s description of the scene. And Officer
Lichtsinn’s use of his firearm was limited. Namely, he had his firearm drawn only until
backup arrived at the scene, at which time Officer Lichtsinn holstered his firearm and
then further engaged Billingsley.
On these facts, Officer Lichtsinn withdrew his firearm only because he had a
specific and reasonable belief that Billingsley may have been armed. As in Willis, it
would have been unreasonable to expect Officer Lichtsinn to approach Billingsley
without his gun drawn because the risk to the officer’s safety was simply too great. 907
N.E.2d at 546. And Officer Lichtsinn’s limited use of his firearm temporarily froze the
situation until backup could arrive and he could complete his investigative inquiry in a
safer environment without his firearm. We conclude that the totality of these
circumstances describes an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio and not an arrest.
Issue Two: Reasonable Suspicion
Billingsley next asserts that, even under the standards for Terry stops, Officer
Lichtsinn did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Billingsley because
the caller, Renita Brown, did not give police any personally identifying information and
later was not located by either the State or Billingsley’s defense counsel.1 According to
Billingsley, because Brown could not later be found, her call to the police is equivalent to
an anonymous tip. We cannot agree.
As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with
1
The parties do not describe the measures taken in the attempts to locate Brown.
8
information that is different in quantity or content than that required to
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause. Adams v. Williams . . . demonstrates as much. We there
assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have
been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it
sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. 407 U.S.[ 143, 147 (1972).]
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.
Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417[] (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating whether
there is reasonable suspicion.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
The reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied where the facts known to the
officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from
such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has
occurred or is about to occur. Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000), trans. denied. Thus, reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing
by a preponderance of the evidence. Luster v. State, 578 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991). We review a trial court’s determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo.
Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Brown’s possible status as an anonymous caller presents an important question.
As our supreme court has explained:
Reliability of the professional informant or anonymous tipster generally
must be established by reference to underlying facts and circumstances
which indicate that the information is trustworthy. Our requirement for
corroboration is necessitated because this type of information may be
unreliable or self-serving, especially if given in return for favors such as
money or leniency in possible criminal prosecution. On the other hand, we
9
recognize a concerned citizen tip is different. This tip is made up of people
who may have been victims of crime or have witnessed a crime. These
individuals generally come forward with information out of a spirit of good
citizenship and a desire to help law enforcement. Some jurisdictions have
therefore held informants of this type are considered more reliable. In
Kellems [v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2006), rev’d on other grounds,
849 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. 2006)], we again reaffirmed our belief that there
“may well be great indicia of reliability in the report of the ‘concerned
citizen’ as distinguished from the ‘professional informant’—though again
the totality of the circumstances controls.” These concerned citizens are
usually one-time informants, and no basis exists from prior contacts to
determine their reliability . . . .
State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (distinguishing known informants from anonymous
informants); Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. 2006) (describing the degree of
corroboration necessary before law enforcement may rely on an anonymous tip).
Here, Billingsley’s argument for why Brown should have the status of an
anonymous caller is as follows:
The only identifying information the caller gave to the police when she
called was her name. She did not provide a birth date, a telephone number,
an address, or any other information which would allow the State to hold
her “responsible” if her allegations turned out to be fabricated. In fact, the
only information she gave which would have identified her turned out to be
false as both the State of Indiana and the defense attorney attempted to no
avail to locate her for purposes of having her testify at trial. . . . There was
[also] no evidence put forth that the [FWPD] had th[e] technological tools
available [to know the telephone number from which the call was placed].
Appellant’s Br. at 15-16 (citations omitted). Billingsley also suggests that, since the
caller identified him by name, the caller must have had a questionable motive for the 9-1-
1 call.
Billingsley’s argument misapplies our legal standards. Indeed, the crux of
Billingsley’s legal position is that a caller who identifies herself by name can nonetheless
10
become anonymous after the fact when legal counsel fails to locate her. But “[t]hat ex
post inquiry . . . is not our focus.” United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1174
(9th Cir. 2004). What matters is whether the facts known to Officer Lichtsinn at the
moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from those facts,
would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or
is about to occur. See Lyons, 735 N.E.2d at 1183-84. This is not to say that a caller who
identifies herself by name can per se create reasonable suspicion. Again, whether
reasonable suspicion exists requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances
known to Officer Lichtsinn at the time of the stop. See id.
Moreover, Brown was not an anonymous caller but a concerned citizen. In her 9-
1-1 call, she claimed both to have been a recent victim of Billingsley’s criminal activity
and to be witnessing his ongoing criminal activity. As an apparent concerned citizen, she
was entitled to a degree of reliability despite the fact that “no basis exist[ed] from prior
contacts to determine [her] reliability.” Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1147; see also Kellems,
842 N.E.2d at 356-57 (holding that a caller who had reported an intoxicated driver was
not an anonymous caller but a concerned citizen because she had provided her name,
even though her identity could not later be verified).
On these facts, we conclude that Officer Lichtsinn had reasonable suspicion to
briefly detain Billingsley. At the time he stopped Billingsley, Officer Lichtsinn had been
informed by a 9-1-1 caller identified by name that a known felon had a firearm, contrary
to Indiana Code Section 35-47-2-23(c)(2)(B), in a dangerous area at about 2:30 in the
morning. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Lichtsinn immediately observed Billingsley
11
in the passenger seat of a brown-gray SUV, which he reasonably believed to be
consistent with Brown’s description of the scene.
Billingsley notes that Brown’s description of the scene was based on information
generally available to the public and was therefore not quality information on which to
support a finding of reasonable suspicion. But Brown’s specific identification of
Billingsley lends her description of the scene greater credibility than that of the general
public.
Further, because Officer Lichtsinn reasonably believed that the caller was a
concerned citizen, one reasonable inference is that he believed Brown could later be
located and held accountable for false reporting. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270. Stated
another way, it is reasonable for the police to believe that a 9-1-1 caller has provided her
real name. See Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1147; Kellems, 842 N.E.2d 356-57. As the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
We acknowledge that any given caller reporting an emergency to [9-1-1]
could provide a false name. . . . We decline to impose a duty on the police
to confirm the identity of every [9-1-1] caller who provides his or her name
or to know the universe of names in the United States and their endless
variants.
Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d at 1175. Accordingly, Brown’s 9-1-1 call “was not anonymous
and therefore was entitled to greater reliability.” Id. at 1174; see Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at
1147.
Finally, the fact that Brown called 9-1-1 rather than a police station entitles the
call to a degree of reliability. Calls to 9-1-1 are “entitled to greater reliability than a tip
concerning general criminality because the police must take [9-1-1] emergency calls
12
seriously and respond with dispatch.” Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d at 1176 (discussing United
States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161
(2003)). Calls to 9-1-1
involve exigent situations that may limit the police’s ability to gather
identifying information. Police delay while attempting to verify an identity
or seek corroboration of a reported emergency may prove costly to public
safety and undermine the [9-1-1] system’s usefulness. We do not believe
that the Constitution requires that result. The touchstone of our search and
seizure jurisprudence remains the Fourth Amendment’s textual requirement
that any search be “reasonable,” a determination we make by weighing the
competing interests of individual security and privacy with the need to
promote legitimate governmental interests. Having weighed those interests,
we conclude that it is reasonable to accommodate the public’s need for a
prompt police response. The Fourth Amendment does not require the
police to conduct further pre-response verification of a [9-1-1] caller’s
identity where the caller reports an emergency. Accordingly, an emergency
[9-1-1] call is entitled to greater reliability than an anonymous tip
concerning general criminality.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 356-57 (holding that the exigent
circumstances described by a concerned citizen were “particularly relevant” to justifying
the need for a Terry stop).
In sum, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances known to Officer
Lichtsinn at the time he detained Billingsley, we conclude that Officer Lichtsinn had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that Billingsley may have been involved in criminal
activity. Officer Lichtsinn had been informed, by a concerned citizen who had called 9-
1-1, of a known felon with a firearm at a location known to be dangerous. Accordingly,
Officer Lichtsinn’s Terry stop of Billingsley did not violate Billinglsey’s Fourth
Amendment rights. For the same reasons, Billingsley’s claim under Article I, Section 11
13
of the Indiana Constitution must fail.2 E.g., Sowers v. State, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591-92
(Ind. 2000).
Conclusion
Officer Lichtsinn lawfully detained Billingsley during an investigatory stop.
Accordingly, the State lawfully seized the discovered marijuana and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence against Billingsley. Thus, we affirm
Billingsley’s conviction.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, J., dissents with separate opinion.
2
In reviewing claims under Article I, Section 11, we balance three factors to determine the
reasonableness of a search or seizure: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation
has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary
activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.
2005). The State asserts, and we agree, that Billingsley’s argument fails to address the second and third
prongs under Article I, Section 11.
14
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
PHILLIP T. BILLINGSLEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A05-1204-CR-216
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
KIRSCH, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
To conduct an investigatory stop, a police officer must have a reasonably
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). To
determine whether a citizen’s constitutional rights are violated by such a stop, the
Supreme Courts of the United States and of Indiana have directed reviewing courts to
look at the “‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining
officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” U.S.
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002), State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 2004).
Both courts have also held as a general matter that “an anonymous tip alone is not
likely to constitute the reasonable suspicion necessary for a valid Terry stop.” Lampkins
15
v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-
30 (1990)). The concern about uncorroborated anonymous tips arises because “[i]f any
anonymous caller’s allegation, uncorroborated by anything beyond public knowledge,
could justify a search, every citizen’s home [and car for that matter] would be fair game
for a variety of innocent and not so innocent intrusions.” Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d
180, 183 (Ind. 1997).
For an officer to have a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal
wrongdoing, significant aspects of the tip must be corroborated by the police.”
Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1271. The corroboration requirement will be satisfied if the
anonymous tip gives the police something more than details readily obtainable by the
general public. See Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ind. 1995) (holding that
anonymous tip that provided only information easily obtainable by members of general
public was insufficiently reliable to constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct
investigatory stop). In addition, to constitute reasonable suspicion for an investigatory
stop, an anonymous tip must also demonstrate an intimate familiarity with the suspect’s
affairs and be able to predict future behavior. See id. at 118.
Here, the police received a tip from a 9-1-1 caller who, in response to police
questioning, gave her name as “Renita Brown.” She was neither asked for, nor provided,
any other information about her identity such as her age, address, or Social Security
Number. The caller could not be located by either the State or the defense, and it is not
known whether the caller was, in fact, “Renita Brown” or whether the caller provided a
16
false name. Nothing known to the police officer, nor provided to this court, allow us to
determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the identification information.
In regard to the other information provided in the 9-1-1 call, the only information
that was accurate was that Phillip Billingsley was in the passenger seat of an SUV in the
parking lot of the Fort Wayne VFW and that the SUV could appear to be brown when
viewed “in a darker light.” Other than Billingsley’s name, there was no information that
provided details that would not be known to the general public, there was no information
that demonstrated “an intimate familiarity” with Billingsley’s affairs, and there was no
information that demonstrated an ability to predict future behavior. None of the other
information provided during the call was verified by the officer before conducting the
investigatory stop. Indeed, none of such information was ever shown to be accurate.
Because there was no supporting information or any other indicia of reliability for
the name provided, I do not believe that the mere providing of a name by a 9-1-1 caller
removes this case from the category of an anonymous caller. I also do not believe that
the information known to the investigating officer was sufficient to satisfy the standards
established by our Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States for
investigatory stops. Accordingly, I would reverse Billingsley’s conviction.
17