In re H.R.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1277
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

H.R., A.G, C.Z.G., and C.G. Randolph County
Nos. 11 JT 92–95

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 22 August

2013 by Judge Jayrene R. Maness in Randolph County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 March 2014.

J. Tristan Routh for movant-appellee Randolph County
Department of Social Services.

Donna Taylor for guardian ad litem.

Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant mother.

HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.

Respondent-mother appeals from the district court’s order

terminating her parental rights as to juveniles H.R. (“Henry”),

A.G. (“Aron”), C.Z.G. (“Zeke”), and C.G. (“Carl”).1 Because

petitioner’s evidence and the court’s findings of fact are

1
The parties stipulated to the use of these pseudonyms to
protect the juveniles’ privacy.
 -2-

sufficient to establish grounds for termination based on neglect

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2013), we affirm.

I. Background

Henry was born in February 1998; Aron was born in November

2001; Zeke was born in October 2004; and Carl was born in

September 2006. Carl and Zeke have the same father (“Mr. G”).

Aron and Henry were fathered by two other men. The juveniles

resided with respondent prior to the institution of these

proceedings.2

On 3 and 5 May 2011, the Randolph County Department of

Social Services (“DSS”) filed petitions alleging the juveniles

were neglected and dependent. The petitions specifically

averred that the juveniles had excessive absences from school or

daycare, and that respondent failed to provide them with proper

supervision, had a history of substance abuse and violent

domestic relationships, used inappropriate discipline, and

exposed the juveniles to domestic violence in the home. The

petitions further charged respondent with violating the

provisions of two safety plans instituted by DSS by (1) allowing

Henry to distribute medication to his younger siblings and (2)

2
Henry was voluntarily placed outside respondent’s home in 2007,
after Aron disclosed that Henry had sexually abused him. Henry
returned to respondent’s home in 2008–09.
 -3-

allowing respondent’s boyfriend (“Mr. C”), who had an extensive

history of domestic violence, to have contact with the

juveniles. Finally, the petitions alleged that neither

respondent nor the juveniles’ fathers had identified an

appropriate alternative child care arrangement. DSS obtained

non-secure custody of all the juveniles on 4 and 5 May 2011.

The district court made adjudications of neglect and

dependency as to each juvenile on 22 February 2012. In addition

to the issues raised by the petitions, the court made the

following findings related to Henry’s sexual abuse of his

siblings:

In 2007, [Aron] alleged that [Henry] had
sexually abused him. [Respondent] had
[Henry] evaluated and he was placed out of
the home. In 2008–2009, [Henry] returned to
the home. Subsequent to his return, the
minor children reported that [Henry] was
sexually touching them again. [Respondent]
indicated that she was unaware of any
incidents. The only safety measure in place
was that [Henry] was provided a separate
bedroom. No other safety measures were put
in place.

We upheld the adjudications on appeal. In re H.R., A.G.,

C.Z.G., and C.G., __ N.C. App. __, 735 S.E.2d 452, 2012 WL

5864525 (2012) (unpublished).
 -4-

In a permanency planning order entered 25 July 2012, the

district court relieved DSS of any obligation to continue

efforts to reunify the juveniles with their fathers and

established a permanent plan of reunification with respondent.

The court ceased reunification efforts with respect to

respondent on 1 November 2012, and changed the permanent plan to

adoption. On 14 December 2012, as amended 14 February 2013, DSS

filed motions to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on

neglect, lack of reasonable progress in correcting the

conditions that led to the juveniles’ removal from her home,

failure to pay a reasonable portion of the juveniles’ cost of

care, and dependency under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2),

(3), and (6) (2013).

At the termination hearing, the district court heard

testimony from, among others, respondent; DSS caseworkers Tasha

Hall and Darnell Myrick; Laura Stockwell, director of the

Randolph County Family Crisis Center; and clinical psychologist

Dr. Christopher Schaeffer, who performed a psychological

evaluation of respondent in March 2012. The court found grounds

to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on neglect,

failure to make reasonable progress, and dependency under N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6). It also concluded
 -5-

that termination of parental rights was in the juveniles’ best

interests. Respondent filed timely notice of appeal from the

termination order.

II. Respondent’s Appeal

Respondent challenges the grounds for termination found by

the district court, claiming that they are unsupported by the

court’s findings of fact or by the evidence. She also contests

many of the court’s individual adjudicatory findings as

unsupported by the evidence.

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing an adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

1109(e) (2013), this Court must determine whether the district

court’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and

convincing evidence, and whether the findings, in turn, support

the court’s conclusions of law. In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App.

475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000). “If there is competent

evidence, the findings of the trial court are binding on

appeal[,]” In re McCabe, 157 N.C. App. 673, 679, 580 S.E.2d 69,

73 (2003), “even where some evidence supports contrary

findings.” In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672,

676 (1997). We are likewise bound by any unchallenged findings

of fact. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729,
 -6-

731 (1991). Moreover, “erroneous findings unnecessary to the

determination do not constitute reversible error” where the

adjudication is supported by sufficient additional findings

grounded in competent evidence. In re T.M., 180 N.C. App. 539,

547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006). We review the district court’s

conclusions of law de novo. In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151,

154, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006).

B. Adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)

Our Juvenile Code defines a neglected juvenile as one who,

inter alia, “does not receive proper care, supervision, or

discipline . . . ; or who is not provided necessary remedial

care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s

welfare.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013). In order to

support an adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1),

“[n]eglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing.”

In re C.W., 182 N.C. App. 214, 220, 641 S.E.2d 725, 729 (2007).

Where the juveniles have been placed outside the home for a

significant period of time, “a trial court may find that grounds

for termination exist upon a showing of a history of neglect by

the parent and the probability of a repetition of neglect.” In

re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 435, 621 S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The determination that
 -7-

a child is neglected is a conclusion of law. In re Helms, 127

N.C. App. at 510, 491 S.E.2d at 675–76.

The juveniles were adjudicated neglected on 22 February

2012, based on conditions arising under respondent’s care.

Therefore, in order to establish grounds for terminating

respondent’s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

1111(a)(1), the evidence and the court’s findings must

demonstrate the probability of a repetition of neglect if the

juveniles were returned to respondent. In re L.O.K., 174 N.C.

App. at 435, 621 S.E.2d at 242.

Initially, we note the district court expressly found that

respondent “has neglected the minor children . . . and that such

neglect is likely to repeat itself,” as required by N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). In support of this determination, the

court found, inter alia, that respondent had “[c]ontinued a

relationship with a domestic violence abuser,” Mr. C, and had

failed to “maintain stable and appropriate housing[,] . . .

grasp the concepts taught” in her domestic violence classes, or

“complete her recommended mental health counseling until

released by her therapist.”

The court made detailed evidentiary findings concerning

each of these issues. Specifically, findings 15mm–tt, 15zz,
 -8-

15aaa–nnn, 15rrr–sss, 15uuu–bbbb, and 15eeee address

respondent’s continued involvement with Mr. C, despite repeated

incidents of domestic violence, as well as her previous

experience of domestic violence dating back to 2001 in her

relationship with Mr. G. Findings 15eeee, 15llll, 27, 31, 34,

36, 43, and 46–47 depict the traumatic effects of the juveniles’

exposure to domestic violence in respondent’s care, the impact

of which persisted at the time of the hearing.

Findings 15rr, 15nnnn–pppp, 15rrrr, and 48 describe

respondent’s housing instability and failure to obtain suitable

housing for the juveniles despite having the financial means to

do so. Portions of findings 15gggg, 15kkkk, 15nnnn–15pppp, and

15rrrr show that respondent made no changes to her residence to

protect the younger children from further sexual abuse by Henry,

despite being told of the need to do so.

Regarding her compliance with court-ordered remedial

services, findings 15zz, 15eee–fff, 15iii, 15lll, 15www–zzz, and

15aaaa–bbbb reflect respondent’s completion of two sessions of

domestic violence classes and her failure to benefit therefrom,

as evidenced by her persistent involvement with Mr. C and her

refusal to acknowledge the attendant risks posed to her and her

children. Finally, findings 15vv–yy detail respondent’s failure
 -9-

to complete individualized mental health counseling, as ordered

by the court.

Having reviewed the court’s findings in full, we conclude

that they are more than adequate to demonstrate a probability of

a repetition of neglect if the juveniles were returned to

respondent’s care. See generally In re K.D., 178 N.C. App. 322,

329, 631 S.E.2d 150, 155 (2006) (affirming adjudication of

neglect based on the respondent-mother’s “struggles with

parenting skills, domestic violence, and anger management, as

well as her unstable housing situation”). Because respondent

has not challenged the majority of the findings listed above, we

deem them to be supported by competent evidence. Koufman, 330

N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731. We will address her exceptions

to the court’s findings in Subsection C, infra.

Because we uphold the adjudication of neglect under N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we need not address the additional

grounds for termination found by the district court under N.C.

Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2) and (6). In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App.

1, 9, 618 S.E.2d 241, 246 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C.

360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006). Accordingly, we now turn to

respondent’s various objections to the court’s fact-finding.
 -10-

C. Findings of Fact

1. Domestic Violence by Mr. C

Respondent first claims the district court’s findings of

fact “exaggerate the domestic violence between [her] and Mr.

[C].” Specifically, she argues that the court overstated the

number of domestic violence incidents between her and Mr. C and

erroneously found that they had a physical altercation in

November 2012.

Finding 15 includes the following subparts addressing this

issue:

mm. On April 14, 2011, Ms. Hall observed a
very verbal altercation between
[respondent] and Mr. [C]. On May 23,
2011, [respondent] and [Mr. C] had a
physical altercation. On May 20, 2011,
[respondent] went to the hospital in
reference to injuries that Mr. [C] had
caused.

nn. On the night of June 1, 2011,
[respondent] and Mr. [C] were involved
in an altercation, and Mr. [C] hit
[respondent] with a stool on her head
and back. He took her cell phone and
forced her to go to the store on June 2,
2011. Ms. Hall observed injuries from
this incident when [respondent] had a
visit with the minor child shortly
thereafter. [Respondent] had a gash in
her head that was approximately 1 inch
to 1 ½ inches long.
 -11-

oo. On August 22, 2011, [respondent] and Mr.
[C] had a heated argument. She left the
residence then subsequently resumed her
relationship with him the next day.

pp. [Respondent] filed a 50B Domestic
Violence Protective Order in Davidson
County against Mr. [C] and Court was
scheduled for June 22, 2011, but
[respondent] subsequently dismissed the
50B. She did reside for a period of
time at the Family Crisis Center but
subsequently resumed her relationship
with Mr. [C].

qq. On July 16, 2012, [respondent] contacted
Ms. Hall about 10:30 p.m. . . . [and]
reported that she and Mr. [C] had been
in a physical altercation and that they
had both been drinking. Mr. [C] wrapped
his arm around her and hurt her, and she
subsequently bit him during the
altercation.

rr. . . . [F]rom May 20, 2011, until July
2012, [respondent] reported 13 changes
in housing status. In June 2011,
[respondent] was evicted from Section 8
housing and resided at the Family Crisis
Center because of domestic violence
between herself and Mr. [C].

. . . .

tt. Mr. [C] has two (2) convictions of
assault on a female and also had a
pending charge at the time of these
incidents. [Respondent] was aware of
Mr. [C]’s domestic violence history but
continued her relationship with him
despite having this information.

. . . .
 -12-

zz. [Respondent] has completed two (2) sets
of domestic violence classes. She took
the first set of classes in 2011 through
2012, but during that time period, she
was in a relationship with Mr. [C] and
had repeated incidences of domestic
violence and physical altercations
during that time.

. . . .

ddd. [Respondent] reported to Ms. Stockwell
that in June 2011, Mr. [C] and she had a
verbal altercation. . . . Mr. [C] threw
a stool and [respondent] was struck
receiving injuries to her head and back.
[Respondent] received medical treatment
for these injuries. The Court allowed
into evidence without objection . . . a
collection of photos of injuries
[respondent] suffered from this incident
and which Ms. Stockwell personally
observed while taking the photos. . . .
[Respondent] reported to Ms. Stockwell
that there were continuing verbal
disputes, controlling behaviors by Mr.
[C], and use of controlled substances
during their relationship.

eee. [Respondent] completed domestic violence
classes on November 28, 2011, and she
completed a 2nd set of classes on
January 8, 2013, but between the first
and second sessions, she resumed her
relationship with Mr. [C]. Due to
continuing domestic violence incidents,
Ms. Stockwell recommended that
[respondent] participate in the 2nd
round of domestic violence classes.
[Respondent] and Mr. [C] had been in an
off-and-on relationship while [she] took
those classes.
 -13-

. . . .

jjj. In late November 2012, [respondent]
reported to Ms. Stockwell and Ms. Myrick
that there was a physical confrontation
involving shoving between her and Mr.
[C]. The [p]olice were called and have
been called on several occasions.

kkk. Following the domestic violence incident
. . . in November 2012, [respondent]
went to stay at the Family Crisis Center
where she remained until early January
2013. Ms. Stockwell . . . recorded a
telephone conversation between
[respondent] and Mr. [C] in December
2012, while [respondent] was staying at
the Crisis Center. . . . Mr. [C] made
various threats to [respondent], stating
that if she did not come back or if she
left that he would destroy her
belongings. [Respondent] indicated . .
. she did not wish to continue the
discussion with Mr. [C], but he insisted
he would continue the discussion with
her and that they would be together
whether [respondent] liked it or not.

Insofar as these findings are unchallenged, we are bound

thereby.

Much of respondent’s argument stems from an implicit

dispute about the meaning of the term “domestic violence.”

While respondent views the term as referring solely to physical

conflict, DSS’s witnesses and the court construed “domestic
 -14-

violence” to include verbally abusive and aggressive or

threatening behavior by Mr. C, in addition to physical assaults.

Stockwell testified that Mr. C’s striking of respondent

with the stool in June 2011 was “the only physical incident that

I know of from [respondent] stating explicitly to me that this

is what has occurred.” Nonetheless, Stockwell averred that

respondent described “several” additional domestic violence

incidents with Mr. C, which were primarily “verbal disputes.”

In early 2012, for example, respondent and Mr. C had some sort

of “confrontation [for] which the police were called on several

occasions during that time.” Likewise, Stockwell referred to

“an incident of domestic violence that occurred in November of

2012 between [respondent] and Mr. [C],” but clarified that

respondent did not report any physical violence during this

incident.

Hall also testified that, of “the multiple incidents of

domestic violence between [respondent] and Mr. [C], . . . two of

these were violent, and violent enough that [respondent] ended

up at the hospital.” Though aware of just two physically

violent episodes, on 20 May 2011 and 1 June 2011, Hall averred

that respondent reported thirteen changes in her housing status

between May 2011 and July 2012, and that “most of these
 -15-

incidents were because of domestic violence between [her] and

Mr. [C].”

Finally, the court’s reference in finding 15zz to “repeated

incidences of domestic violence and physical altercations”

between respondent and Mr. C in 2011 and 2012 reflected that it

construed the term “domestic violence” to include more than

physical assaults. (Emphasis added). Insofar as respondent

challenges the court’s fact-finding based on her semantic

disagreement with DSS and the court, we find no merit to her

claim.

Contrary to respondent’s assertion, finding 15rr does not

attribute her loss of federally subsidized housing in June 2011

to domestic violence by Mr. C. Evidence supports the court’s

actual finding that respondent “was evicted from Section 8

housing” in June 2011 for failure to pay her utility bills.3 We

agree with respondent that the evidence does not support the

finding in 15rr that, “[i]n June 2011, . . . [she] resided at

the Family Crisis Center because of domestic violence between

herself and Mr. [C].” Although Mr. C assaulted respondent with

a kitchen stool on 1 June 2011, there is an indication that she

3
The 22 February 2012 adjudication order includes a finding that
respondent “was evicted from her housing due to her failure to
comply with the guidelines of the section 8 housing program.”
 -16-

moved into the shelter to escape Mr. C prior in August 2011.

However, we find this error to be harmless.

We also agree with respondent that the evidence does not

support finding 15jjj’s depiction of “a physical confrontation

involving shoving between her and Mr. [C]” in November 2012.

Concerning this incident, respondent testified that she and Mr.

C “got in a fight and that led [her] to go to the women’s

shelter,” but characterized it as an “argument” or “domestic

dispute” rather than a physical conflict. Myrick testified that

“[o]n or about November 25 of 2012, . . . [respondent] reported

that she and Mr. [C] had a domestic dispute, and she left the

home at that time and went to the women’s shelter.” Respondent

told Myrick that she and Mr. C had “an argument and that she was

attempting to leave the home and that he was causing problems

and she did require the assistance of law enforcement at that

time.” Stockwell likewise attested to “an incident of domestic

violence that occurred in November of 2012 between [respondent]

and Mr. [C],” but was not aware of any physical assault.

Respondent told Stockwell of “ongoing disputes [with Mr. C],

that he was continuing to use substances and that she was

fearful.” Although she did not report any physical violence in
 -17-

November 2012,4 respondent told Stockwell that she moved into the

emergency shelter to “get away from Mr. [C]” on 26 November

2012, and remained there until 10 January 2013.

In view of the overall history of domestic violence between

respondent and Mr. C, including physical assaults occurring in

May and June of 2011 and July of 2012, we conclude that the

court’s mistaken reference to a shoving episode in November 2012

was immaterial. In all other respects, respondent’s challenge

to the findings regarding her domestic violence history with Mr.

C is without merit.

We further find no merit in respondent’s objection to

findings 15aaaa and 15bbbb, which state that “she has failed to

grasp the concepts taught” in the domestic violence classes she

completed in November 2011 and January 2013, “as evidenced by

her continued relationship with a domestic violence abuser,” Mr.

C.5 Respondent acknowledged that she continued her relationship

4
Respondent did tell Stockwell about an incident of “physical
violence” between her and Mr. G in November 2010, which had
occurred in front of the juveniles.
5
Finding 15bbbb cited respondent’s ongoing relationships with
individuals who were abusive to her in prior relationships,
including Mr. G, as evidence that her “domestic violence
counseling . . . has not had an effect on her ability to grasp
those concepts taught.” The 22 February 2012 adjudication order
includes findings that respondent “has a history of being
 -18-

with Mr. C despite being advised that her children would be

removed from her custody if she did so, and that she “indicated

to DSS that [she] did not find him to be a threat to the minor

children.” Moreover, after completing her first series of

domestic violence classes, respondent “went back to Mr. [C].”

After the second series of classes, she continued to “have

communication” with Mr. C and allowed him to come to her home,

purportedly to remodel it.

Stockwell testified that Mr. C’s phone call to respondent

at the emergency shelter in January 2013 made it “apparent that

he was continuing those controlling behaviors, the threatening

behaviors, despite his participation in classes that should have

taught him otherwise.” Asked whether respondent had benefited

from her domestic violence classes, Stockwell testified, “I

don’t believe she did show that she had actually put the

information [from the domestic violence classes] to use.”

Stockwell told the court that there were many “things that make

[Mr. C] very unpredictable and make [respondent] being around

involved with relationships that contain domestic violence,” and
that she and Mr. G had “an extensive history of engaging in
incidents of domestic violence in the presence of the minor
children.” In March 2011, respondent told DSS of “[o]n again,
off again” domestic violence involving Mr. G dating back to
2001.
 -19-

him very unstable for her and potentially for children being in

that environment.”

Myrick testified that she had visited respondent’s

residence on the night of 23 January 2013, after respondent

moved out of the shelter. At the front door, Myrick heard Mr. C

and respondent discussing a television show. When Myrick

“knocked on the door, it got quiet. [Respondent] came to the

door . . . in her nightgown[.]” Myrick saw Mr. C’s reflection

in a mirror “going down the hallway.” He was shirtless. When

Myrick asked respondent about her claim that she and Mr. C were

no longer together, respondent replied that “[h]e was helping

her move her things in and to take his things out.” In the

bedroom, however, Myrick observed Mr. C’s wallet on the dresser.

Men’s pants and folded clothing were underneath respondent’s

clothing on the dresser. “In the bathroom area, [Myrick]

observed male aftershave, male shaving cream and a male razor,

and three toothbrushes.” When Myrick asked Mr. C about the

situation, he stated that “it is what it is.” Respondent then

said, “I thought it would be okay since he was going to go to

jail.” Respondent later told Myrick that she visited Mr. C in

prison on 2, 6, 13, and 20 April 2013. At the time of the
 -20-

hearing, respondent did not know how long Mr. C would be

incarcerated.

Respondent’s own testimony showed that she continued to

downplay the risk posed to her and her children by Mr. C.

Recounting the June 2011 assault, respondent stated that “there

was a stool thrown, and it bounced and it got me on the back of

the head.” Asked directly whether Mr. C had thrown the stool at

her, she replied, “I guess, yeah.” Respondent explained that

she left Mr. C and moved into the crisis shelter in August 2011

because she “was tired of hearing his mouth,” but that she

“wasn’t afraid” of him. She moved back in with Mr. C when she

left the shelter. After giving birth to Mr. C’s daughter in

March 2012, respondent left him again in May. She testified

that Mr. C had “started drinking again” and was yelling, “[b]ut

no, he wasn’t hitting [her].” She remained in contact with Mr.

C and moved back in with him after a meeting with DSS. At the

time of the termination hearing, respondent was working for Mr.

C’s sister at Days Inn, against the advice of Stockwell.

Where “different inference[s] may be drawn from the

evidence, [the trial court] alone determines which inferences to

draw and which to reject.” In re Hughes, 74 N.C. App. 751, 759,

330 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985). The inference drawn in findings
 -21-

15aaaa and 15bbbb regarding respondent’s failure to benefit from

domestic violence courses is amply supported by the evidence.

As discussed below, the court’s findings are also consistent

with the conclusions of respondent’s psychological evaluation in

March 2012.

2. Respondent’s Psychological Evaluation

Respondent next challenges multiple findings regarding the

testimony of Dr. Shaeffer, the clinical psychologist who

evaluated her on 6 March 2012. Respondent asserts that the

court mischaracterized Dr. Shaeffer’s findings about her

domestic violence history and his opinion of her amenability to

treatment. She insists that his testimony and report are “far

more equivocal than reflected in the court’s findings.” We

disagree.

Dr. Shaeffer contrasted two types of individuals who remain

in a domestic violence relationship. The first type consists of

persons who “are unable to leave that relationship” for

practical reasons, “but . . . their understanding of the

negative effects of that relationship is such that they will at

least try to minimize the negative impact on children.” The

second type “minimizes” or “denies the domestic violence”

because they are “so highly invested in the relationship.”
 -22-

Although Dr. Shaeffer averred that both groups were “likely to

repeat domestic violence relationships,” he described the second

group as in “a much worse position in terms of taking care of

themselves and children” because they do not see “a need to

protect the children from the domestic violence.” Moreover,

while any person involved in at least two violent relationships

has a “greater than fifty percent” chance of having future

relationships with domestic violence, individuals in the first

group—who acknowledge the gravity of their situation—have “a

much better prognosis” for improving their circumstances.

According to Dr. Shaeffer, respondent did not acknowledge

the nature of the domestic violence between her and Mr. C “and

the effects that it could have on her and her children.”

Respondent “said she does not view Mr. [C] as a threat to the

children” despite “having been apprised of Mr. [C]’s criminal

history, including domestic violence, and subsequent to taking

out a protection plan and subsequently violating that protection

plan and allowing [him] to have contact with the children.” It

appeared to Dr. Shaeffer “that [respondent] was putting her

relationship with Mr. [C] as a priority above her protection and

safety of her children.”
 -23-

Respondent further conveyed to Dr. Shaeffer “that she . . .

did not perceive herself as having any particular problems that

needed to be addressed.” In the absence of such recognition and

a concomitant desire for change, Dr. Shaeffer observed, “it’s

extremely unlikely that an individual is going to make any

changes in their life because they don’t see a need to, and even

if it’s imposed by others, it requires more effort than they are

willing to sustain.” “[F]rom a practical standpoint,” Dr.

Shaeffer opined, “therapy or counseling with individuals who

don’t have any sense of crisis or sense of a need to change

something about themselves is . . . pretty much a waste of

time.” Based on his evaluation of respondent, he concluded that

“a therapy/counseling relationship was unlikely to be helpful

for her” at that time.

Respondent emphasizes Dr. Shaeffer’s statement that he did

not accept “as gospel” DSS’s representations regarding domestic

violence incidents. He went on to explain, however, that he

“also had information from the emergency department and from

[the prior adjudication] order and various other documentation

that did not originate from [DSS].”

As summarized above, we find Dr. Shaeffer’s hearing

testimony to be ample competent evidence to support findings
 -24-

15xxx, 15yyy, and 15zzz. Although respondent’s brief to this

Court also lists findings 15sss and 15uuu as objectionable

renderings of Dr. Shaeffer’s testimony, she offers no argument

concerning them. Finding 15sss states that his evaluation of

respondent “indicated a substantial history of domestic violence

with not only Mr. [C] but previous partners, specifically Mr.

[G].” It further states that Dr. Shaeffer noted, based on his

interview with respondent and information provided by DSS, “that

there had been numerous incidents of physical altercations

between [respondent], Mr. [G], [respondent’s] father, and

various boyfriends, including Mr. [C].” These findings are

supported by the hearing transcript. Dr. Shaeffer’s testimony

likewise supports finding 15uuu, which recounts additional

information he received from DSS and respondent regarding her

domestic violence history.

3. Respondent’s Housing

Respondent next challenges several findings regarding her

housing instability and lack of progress in obtaining stable,

suitable housing for her children. We again find no merit in

her claims.

Consistent with the court’s findings, respondent concedes

on appeal that her two-bedroom mobile home was unsuitable for
 -25-

the juveniles and that she had made no improvements at the time

of the hearing to accommodate them. She contends, however, that

she “testified about a plan to do so,” and that “[h]er father .

. . has priced the addition and has agreed to perform the work.”

The court’s findings 15nnnn, 15oooo, and 15pppp fully account

for these representations, noting that respondent had

“repeatedly testified of her father’s intention to assist her

physically and monetarily in doing that work” but had adduced no

evidence “that they have done anything to make [respondent’s]

housing adequate for the minor children” as of 17 July 2012.

Indeed, respondent acknowledged during her testimony that the

juveniles were removed from her custody in May 2011 and that, as

of June 2013, she “still [did not] have appropriate housing for

them . . . [o]r enough bedrooms for them.” Although her father

had agreed to add on to her residence to accommodate the

juveniles, she averred that “nothing has been started due to the

fact that if we start all of this work on the trailer and . . .

then the boys still don’t come, then all of that is going to go

to waste.” Therefore, insofar as respondent takes exception to

findings 15nnnn–rrrr, her argument is overruled.

Respondent claims that finding 15rr erroneously states that

she “reported thirteen different residences” to DSS. The court
 -26-

in fact found that she “reported 13 changes in housing status”

during the period “from May 20, 2011, until July 2012.” The

finding is fully supported by Hall’s testimony that, “from May

2011 to July of 2012, . . . [respondent] reported thirteen

different changes to her housing status.” When asked whether

these changes in housing were “the result of the domestic

violence incidents and arguments with Mr. [C],” Hall replied,

“[p]robably twelve of them.” Accordingly, respondent’s

assertion is groundless.

4. Respondent’s Progress Toward Reunification

Respondent also contests multiple findings related to her

progress in complying with her DSS case plan and the orders of

the district court. Respondent lists numerous findings by

number but appears to challenge the evidentiary support for only

two of them. As for the other listed findings, she claims

vaguely that they “minimized [her] substantial compliance with

the court’s directives.” We decline to engage in an independent

review of multiple paragraphs contained in the district court’s

fact-finding based merely on respondent’s citation to them by

number in her appellant’s brief. Absent a particularized

objection supported by argument, we deem the court’s findings
 -27-

supported by the evidence and binding on appeal. See Koufman,

330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731.

The primary bases for respondent’s objections appear in

findings 15vv and 15xx:

vv. In reference to individual counseling,
[respondent] went to one (1) appointment at
DayMark between June or July of 2011 and
June 2012. [DSS] made a 2nd referral to
Mental Health Services for [respondent] in
August 2012. [Respondent] went to two (2)
appointments for Mental Health in July 2012.

. . . .

xx. [DSS] recommended that [respondent]
receive individual counseling in reference
to co-dependency, anxiety and compulsive
disorder. She was previously diagnosed with
some of these conditions, but DayMark did
not offer the individual counseling that had
been recommended. Subsequently, [DSS] made
a referral for counseling for [respondent]
elsewhere so she could receive individual
counseling. [Respondent] did not begin to
comply with these services until the latter
part of 2012 and has not been released from
Mental Health Counseling as of today’s date.

Respondent insists there was no evidence that she had any

previous psychological diagnoses as stated in finding 15xx.

Respondent casts the court’s findings regarding her

individualized mental health counseling as “inaccurate and

misleading” as well as internally inconsistent. While she

concedes that she “had not completed therapy as of trial,” she
 -28-

objects to the implication that she chose to discontinue her

individual therapy in May 2011, instead claiming that she could

not afford it.

With regard to the finding that respondent had been

“previously diagnosed with some of these conditions,” we note

Hall’s testimony that she and respondent’s then-therapist at

Carolina Counseling, Sue McKendry, referred respondent to

DayMark for individualized counseling in May of 2011 “for

codependency and issues regarding anxiety and

obsessive/compulsive disorder.” We find this testimony

sufficient to support the contested portion of finding 15xx.

As for the timeline of respondent’s mental health

counseling, Hall testified that respondent attended just one

session at DayMark in May of 2011 and offered no explanation for

discontinuing this treatment. Respondent never told Hall that

DayMark did not provide individual counseling, as she stated at

the hearing. Nor did respondent notify Hall between June 2011

and June 2012 that she needed another referral or that she was

not receiving the necessary mental health treatment. In her own

testimony, respondent conceded that she received no mental

health counseling between June 2011 and June 2012. Findings

15xx and 15vv are thus consistent with the hearing evidence.
 -29-

Respondent also claims that “Hall’s testimony contradicts

the court’s finding [in 15vv] that [she] had attended only

limited [counseling] sessions in the summer of 2012.” Hall

testified that she referred respondent to the Center for

Behavioral Health Services in June 2012, and that respondent

attended “at least two to three appointments from the time she

was referred in June” until Hall’s departure from DSS on 17

August 2012. Inasmuch as Hall’s testimony does not contradict

the court’s actual finding that respondent “went to two (2)

appointments for Mental Health in July 2012,” this assertion is

without merit.

Finding 15vv may be at technical variance from the evidence

insofar as the court found that DSS’s second referral for mental

health counseling occurred in August 2012 rather than June 2012.

However, we find this discrepancy to be immaterial. The

uncontested findings show that respondent obtained no mental

health counseling for the year-long period between June 2011 and

2012, that she resumed counseling in July of 2012, and that she

had not been released from treatment at the time of the hearing.

We are likewise unmoved by respondent’s objection to the court’s

characterization of July as “the latter part of 2012” in finding

15xx.
 -30-

Respondent next objects to the court’s failure to find that

she completed parenting classes and cooperated with her service

providers. She further faults the court for ignoring her

positive employment record, regular visitation with the

juveniles, and payment of child support.

As respondent observes, the termination order lacks a

finding reflecting respondent’s completion of parenting classes,

as confirmed by Stockwell. The court did find that it had

previously ordered respondent to “demonstrate skills learned

from her parenting classes” and “[s]uccessfully complete

individualized parenting instruction.” Although the court did

not explicitly order respondent to visit the juveniles, it did

decree the scope and terms of her visitation. Therefore, at

least in regard to assessing her reasonable progress under N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), we agree with respondent that the

court’s findings should have addressed the issues of parenting

classes and visitation.6

“However, to obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must not

only show error, but that . . . the error was material and

6
The sole reference to parenting classes appears in finding
15gggg, which refers to respondent’s “six (6) sessions of parent
training” with Dr. Craig Smith to address Henry’s sexual abuse
upon his siblings.
 -31-

prejudicial, amounting to denial of a substantial right that

will likely affect the outcome of an action.” Starco, Inc. v.

AMG Bonding and Ins. Servs., 124 N.C. App. 332, 335, 477 S.E.2d

211, 214 (1996); cf. In re Estate of Mullins, 182 N.C. App. 667,

670-71, 643 S.E.2d 599, 601 (2007) (“In a non-jury trial, where

there are sufficient findings of fact based on competent

evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions of law, the

judgment will not be disturbed because of other erroneous

findings which do not affect the conclusions.”) (quotation marks

and citation omitted). We conclude that any omitted findings

were not prejudicial. The district court did not base its

adjudications under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) on respondent’s

failure to attend parenting classes or visitation, to cooperate

with her service providers, or to pay child support. Moreover,

none of these factors militates against the affirmative reasons

for the adjudications, specifically the adjudication of neglect

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The court emphasized

respondent’s protracted refusal to extricate herself from a

relationship with Mr. C, which was fraught with domestic

violence, notwithstanding the clear risks posed to the juveniles

and the significance of this refusal in light of respondent’s

history of violent relationships. The court further relied on
 -32-

respondent’s failure to make any progress toward obtaining

housing that would be fit for the juveniles or would ensure that

Henry’s siblings could be protected from his sexual abuse.

Because respondent has not shown prejudicial error, her argument

is overruled.

III. Conclusion

Respondent has failed to show any prejudicial error in the

district court’s findings of fact. Moreover, the court’s

findings are sufficient to support its adjudication of grounds

to terminate respondent’s parental rights for neglect under N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The termination order is hereby

affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).