Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BRIAN J. MAY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Oct 31 2012, 9:27 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
STEVEN HOOK, SR., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A04-1204-CR-203
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jane Woodward Miller, Judge
Cause No. 71D01-1109-FC-207
October 31, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Steven Hook, Sr., appeals his conviction for Class C felony battery with a deadly
weapon.1 We affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to support Hook,
Sr.’s, conviction.
Facts
The evidence most favorable to the conviction is that on the evening of September
4, 2011, Hook, Sr., was at Murphy’s Bar in South Bend with his son, Steven Hook, Jr.
(“Steven”), and Steven’s then-girlfriend, Kayla Kerr. Also at the bar that evening were
Brian Putz and Chris Jakubowicz. At some point, Kerr began talking to Putz and
Jakubowicz and asked them to give her a ride home, and Putz and Jakubowicz agreed to
do so.
After leaving the bar, Jakubowicz drove Putz and Kerr in Putz’s truck to a nearby
7-Eleven convenience store to buy some snack foods. Hook, Sr., and Steven also drove
to the 7-Eleven in their truck. Steven followed Jakubowicz into the store and yelled
obscenities at him. Jakubowicz said he did not want any trouble, made his purchases, and
1
The charging information and abstract of judgment state that Hook, Sr., was charged with and convicted
of “aiding battery.” There is no such offense. Hook, Sr., was charged with and convicted as an
accomplice in committing Class C felony battery, but there is no difference between the liability of an
accomplice and principal under Indiana law and the statute governing accomplice liability—Indiana Code
Section 35-41-2-4—does not establish it as a separate crime. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 333 (Ind.
2006).
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returned to Putz’s truck. Steven approached the truck and reached through its windows,
attempting to punch Putz and Jakubowicz. Kerr, meanwhile, had left the vehicle.
Finally, Jakubowicz started to drive away from the 7-Eleven. However, he and
Putz noticed that their cell phones, which had been placed in the truck’s open center
console, were missing. Suspecting that Steven had taken them, Jakubowicz returned to
the 7-Eleven, where they saw Steven holding up a cell phone and saying, “I got your
phone.” Tr. p. 57. Putz got out of the truck, asked for his and Jakubowicz’s phones back,
and Steven immediately approached Putz and punched him in the face. The two men
began wrestling in the 7-Eleven parking lot, during which Hook, Sr., went to his truck,
retrieved a baseball bat, and gave it to Steven. Steven then repeatedly struck Putz with
the bat. As the fight was ending, a nearby onlooker managed to flag down a passing
police officer.
The State charged Hook, Sr., with Class C felony battery with a deadly weapon,
specifically alleging that he had aided Steven in committing battery by providing him
with the baseball bat. After a jury trial on March 5-6, 2012, Hook, Sr., was convicted as
charged. He now appeals.
Analysis
Hook, Sr.’s, sole argument is that there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, because this is the
exclusive province of the fact finder. Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012).
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We consider only the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable
and logical inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Id. If a reasonable finder
of fact could have found from the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, we will uphold the conviction. Id.
Hook, Sr., essentially concedes that there is sufficient eyewitness evidence that he
retrieved a baseball bat from his truck and gave it to his son while he was fighting with
Putz. Regardless, he contends there is insufficient evidence that he intended to aid
Steven in the commission of battery.2 The accomplice liability statute provides that “[a]
person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit
an offense commits that offense . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. In assessing whether there
is sufficient evidence that a person aided another in the commission of a crime, we
consider the following four factors: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2)
companionship with another engaged in criminal activity; (3) failure to oppose the crime;
and (4) a defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime.
Woods v. State, 963 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Hook, Sr., notes there is no evidence that he verbally encouraged his son to beat
Putz with the bat and that he advised his son to submit to the police officer when he
arrived on the scene immediately after the fight was over. Regardless, Hook, Sr.,
supplied the deadly weapon—the bat—to his son when he was in the middle of a fight
2
Hook, Sr., does argue that he gave the bat to his son to protect him from either Putz or Jakubowicz
brandishing a beer bottle. However, the only testimony that either Putz or Jakubowicz was “armed” with
a beer bottle was from Kerr, who testified for the defense. The jury was not required to believe her
testimony.
4
with Putz and did not nothing to discourage Steven from using it. We readily conclude
that the jury reasonably could have inferred that Hook, Sr., fully knew and expected that
Steven would use the bat against Putz. Given the relationship of the parties, Hook, Sr.’s,
conduct, and the lack of evidence that Hook, Sr., discouraged his son from using the bat
against Putz, there is sufficient evidence of Hook, Sr.’s, accomplice liability for Class C
felony battery with a deadly weapon.
Conclusion
There is sufficient evidence to support Hook, Sr.’s, conviction. We affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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