An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-740
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 7 January 2014
DIANNE BETHEA,
Employee/Plaintiff,
v. From N.C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 381629
US AIRWAYS, INC.,
Employer,
and
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Carrier, Defendants.
Appeal by defendant from Opinion and Award entered 14 March
2013 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 20 November 2013.
THE SUMWALT LAW FIRM, by Vernon Sumwalt, for plaintiff.
BROOKS, STEVENS & POPE, P.A., by Frances M. Clement and
Daniel C. Pope, Jr., for defendant.
Elmore, Judge.
US Airways, Inc. (defendant) appeals from the North
Carolina Industrial Commission’s (the Commission) Opinion and
Award requiring defendant to pay disability compensation to
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Dianne Bethea (plaintiff) in the amount of $111.17. After
careful review, the Opinion and Award of the Commission is
affirmed.
I. Facts
On 12 October 2003, plaintiff sustained a neck injury
during the course of her employment as a flight attendant for
defendant. Plaintiff underwent cervical fusion surgery and did
not return to work until 28 September 2006. Plaintiff received
workers’ compensation and social security disability benefits
for three years while she was out of work. After plaintiff
resumed employment, she returned to work earning her pre-injury
average weekly wage. On 7 July 2010, the Commission approved a
Form 26A for a 21.5 percent permanent partial disability rating
to plaintiff’s neck.
After the Form 26A was approved, symptoms related to her
neck injury intensified and included daily headaches resulting
in nausea and blurred vision, decreased range of motion of her
cervical spine, numbness, increased ostephyte (bone spur), and
pain in her right arm. As a result, plaintiff worked fewer
hours. Moreover, plaintiff was unable to work on 6 and 7 March
2011 due to her headaches. She did not receive workers’
compensation for those days, but instead the missed time “came
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out of [her] sick time” or “personal care leave[.]” On 6 June
2011, plaintiff filed an Amended Form 18 alleging a change of
condition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-47. After a hearing
on the matter, Deputy Commissioner Philip A. Baddour, III, filed
an Opinion and Award on 15 August 2012 in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff appealed to the Commission on 17 August 2012.
Thereafter, the Commission filed an Opinion and Award on 14
March 2013 for plaintiff, concluding that she demonstrated a
change of condition from the permanent partial disability award
approved on 7 July 2010. Defendant filed timely notice of
appeal on 9 April 2013 to this Court.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues that the Commission erred in concluding
that plaintiff proved a change of condition under the Workers’
Compensation Act. We disagree.
Review of an Opinion and Award of the Commission “is
limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports
the Commission’s findings of fact and whether the findings
support the Commission’s conclusions of law. This ‘court’s duty
goes no further than to determine whether the record contains
any evidence tending to support the finding.’” Richardson v.
Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d
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582, 584 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln
Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)).
Upon review of the Commission’s finding as to a claimant’s
disability, “we are required to determine whether the record
contains any [competent] evidence tending to support the
finding.” Davis v. Hospice & Palliative Care of Winston-Salem,
202 N.C. App. 660, 670, 692 S.E.2d 631, 638 (2010) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). However, whether the facts
presented establish a change of condition is a question of law
subject to de novo review. West v. J. P. Stevens Co., 12 N.C.
App. 456, 460, 183 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1971) (citation omitted).
Upon the motion of an interested party claiming a change of
condition, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-47 allows the Commission to
“review any award, and on such review may make an award ending,
diminishing, or increasing the compensation previously
awarded[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-47 (2011). A change of
condition “refers to conditions different from those existent
when the award was made[.]” Weaver v. Swedish Imports Maint.,
Inc., 319 N.C. 243, 247-48, 354 S.E.2d 477, 480 (1987) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). The moving party must
show that “a new condition exists and that it is causally
related to the injury upon which the award is based.”
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Shingleton v. Kobacker Grp., 148 N.C. App. 667, 670, 559 S.E.2d
277, 280 (2002) (citation and quotation omitted).
The primary factor in determining whether a change of
condition has occurred is whether the alleged change of
condition affects the employee’s “physical capacity to earn
wages[.]” Grantham v. R. G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529,
534, 491 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1997) (citation and quotation omitted)
(emphasis in original). A change of condition can be a change
in any one of the following: 1.) “the claimant’s physical
condition that impacts his earning capacity,” 2.) “the
claimant’s earning capacity even though claimant’s physical
condition remains unchanged,” or 3.) “the degree of disability
even though claimant’s physical condition remains unchanged.”
Blair v. Am. Television & Commc'ns Corp., 124 N.C. App. 420,
423, 477 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1996) (citations omitted). Thus,
under prong one delineated in Blair, an impact on earning
capacity is necessary in addition to a change in physical
condition to establish a change of condition under the law.
Under prong three, disability is defined as the “impairment of
the injured employee’s earning capacity and not physical
disablement.” Campos-Brizuela v. Rocha Masonry, L.L.C., ___
N.C. App. ___, ___, 716 S.E.2d 427, 436 (2011) appeal dismissed,
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review denied, 366 N.C. 398, 732 S.E.2d 579 (2012) (citation and
quotation omitted). A claimant can show increased disability
(decreased earning capacity) by “the production of medical
evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a consequence of
the work related injury, incapable of work in any employment[.]”
Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993) (internal citation omitted).
Here, the Commission concluded that plaintiff demonstrated
a change of condition based solely on a “(1) a physical change
in her injury-related condition and (2) a change in disability.”
Even though the Commission found two separate grounds for
concluding that a change of condition occurred, only one is
necessary under the law. See Blair, supra. The language in (1)
is insufficient as a matter of law to support a change of
condition because it does not take into account how plaintiff’s
physical change impacted her earning capacity.
However, the Commission’s determination of a change in
disability supports its conclusion that plaintiff had a change
of condition. In order to conclude whether a change in
disability occurred from the Commission’s permanent partial
disability award on 7 July 2010, we must first determine
whether plaintiff was disabled on 6 and 7 March 2011.
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Plaintiff sought to establish disability (decreased earning
capacity) through “the production of medical evidence that [s]he
[was] physically or mentally, as a consequence of the work
related injury, incapable of work in any employment[.]” Id.
Although plaintiff experienced some headaches before 7 July
2010, the “intensity and frequency” of those headaches had
“changed for the worse” since that date. It is undisputed that
plaintiff “call[ed] in sick” and did not attend work on 6 and 7
March 2011. Dr. Bruce Jaufmann testified that on 13 May 2011,
he met with plaintiff and documented “headaches . . . in her
occipital area” related to her original neck injury. Dr.
Jaufmann filled out an FMLA form indicating that plaintiff’s
“condition [will] result in intermittent flare ups [that will]
require time off from work[.]” Plaintiff told Dr. Jaufmann
that “she called out sick on several occasions because of the
bad headaches.” During another appointment on 22 August 2011,
Dr. Jaufmann noted that “over the previous six months,
[plaintiff] only missed work once or twice due to her neck pain
and her headaches.” Thus, there is competent evidence that
plaintiff was unable to earn wages and work due to her
compensable injury-related headaches on 6 and 7 March 2011.
Accordingly, the Commission did not err in finding that
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plaintiff was temporarily and “totally disabled from her
cervical injury and its consequences” on those days. See
Shingleton, 148 N.C. App. at 673, 559 S.E.2d at 282 (re-
emphasizing that in “proving an inability to work in any
employment due to a physical or mental condition in the context
of asserting a substantial change in condition, a plaintiff must
produce medical evidence that she is no longer capable of any
employment”).
The Commission’s award of temporary total disability is a
change from the permanent partial disability award on 7 July
2010. Such a change in disability is sufficient to support a
change of condition under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-47. See Weaver,
319 N.C. at 248-49, 354 S.E.2d at 481 (finding a change of
condition where “claimant’s condition changed from temporary
total disability . . . to total and permanent disability[.]”);
see also Hubbard v. Burlington Indus., 76 N.C. App. 313, 316,
332 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1985)(“When [the Commission] finds on one
occasion that a person is permanently partially disabled and on
a later occasion finds based on additional evidence that the
person is totally disabled this supports a finding of a change
in condition.”).
III. Conclusion
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In sum, the Commission did not err in concluding that
plaintiff proved a change of condition under the Workers’
Compensation Act. Thus, we affirm the Commission’s Opinion and
Award of temporary total disability benefits to plaintiff for 6
and 7 March 2011.
Affirmed.
Judges MCCULLOUGH and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).