Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Aug 08 2012, 8:59 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the CLERK
case. of the supreme court,
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APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JUSTIN C. WOODHOUSE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
NICOLE M. SCHUSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JUSTIN C. WOODHOUSE, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 08A05-1111-PC-614
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Kurtis G. Fouts, Special Judge
Cause No. 08C01-1103-PC-2
August 8, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Justin Woodhouse appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Woodhouse presents two issues for our review, which we restate as one: whether
the post-conviction court erred by denying Woodhouse’s petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2000, Woodhouse pleaded guilty to one count of theft as a Class D felony
pursuant to a plea agreement in the Carroll County Circuit Court. See Ind. Code § 35-43-
4-2 (1985). Woodhouse was sentenced to three years with all but six months suspended
and was placed on probation for the remainder of the three-year sentence.
On July 19, 2002, a petition to revoke Woodhouse’s probation was filed. The
petition was served on Woodhouse on July 29, 2002 while he was in the Newton County
jail on unrelated charges. Woodhouse first appeared in court on the pending petition to
revoke probation over seven years later on November 20, 2009. A second petition to
revoke probation was filed on December 2, 2009. On June 11, 2010, a third petition to
revoke Woodhouse’s probation was filed.
On August 13, 2010, Woodhouse admitted to violating the conditions of his
probation as charged in the first and second petitions to revoke; no admission was made
on the third petition to revoke. The trial court revoked two years of Woodhouse’s
previously-suspended sentence, terminated his probation as unsuccessful, and gave him
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thirteen days of jail time credit. Woodhouse later sent a letter to the court requesting that
the court grant him additional credit for the time he served prior to the disposition of his
petitions to revoke. The court treated Woodhouse’s correspondence as a motion to
modify/reconsider the court’s disposition, which it denied.
On March 21, 2011, Woodhouse filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
Following a hearing, the court denied his petition. It is from this denial that Woodhouse
now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Woodhouse contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claims
that he was entitled to additional jail time credit for the time he was incarcerated while
his probation violation was pending and that his right to a timely revocation hearing was
violated.
A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of establishing the grounds for relief
by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1(5); West v. State, 938
N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. To the extent the post-conviction
court has denied relief, the petitioner appeals from a negative judgment and faces the
rigorous burden of showing that the evidence, as a whole, leads unerringly and
unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Harris
v. State, 762 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. A post-conviction
court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that
which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Kistler
v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
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Post-conviction proceedings provide defendants with the opportunity to raise
issues that either were not available on direct appeal or were not known at the time of the
original proceeding. State v. Hernandez, 910 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. 2009). Thus, not all
issues are available in a post-conviction proceeding, and post-conviction proceedings
must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Id.; See Ind. Post-
Conviction Rule 1(1). Post-conviction proceedings neither provide a substitute for an
appeal nor afford petitioner a “super-appeal.” Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind.
2006).
Woodhouse’s claims are not properly raised in a petition for post-conviction relief.
His claim that he should have received additional jail time credit toward his sentence for
violating his probation is a claim that was known at the time of sentencing for his
probation violation and was available for direct appeal. Further, his claim that his right to
a timely revocation hearing was violated is not a proper claim for post-conviction
proceedings because it was known and available from the time of his first hearing in
November 2009 and certainly at the time he was sentenced on his probation violations in
August 2010. Therefore, these claims are not appropriate claims for post-conviction
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The court properly denied Woodhouse’s request for post-conviction relief.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
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