Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 17 2012, 9:14 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NANCY A. McCASLIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
McCaslin & McCaslin Attorney General of Indiana
Elkhart, Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
A.B., )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 20A03-1112-JV-540
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge
The Honorable Deborah A. Domine, Magistrate
Cause No. 20C01-1108-JD-312
May 17, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
Appellant-Petitioner A.B. challenges the trial court’s finding him to be a
delinquent child based upon the crime of Class A misdemeanor Battery if committed by
an adult.1 Upon appeal, A.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
adjudication. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 30, 2011 Elkhart Community Schools bus driver Betty Denman was
dropping children off near the area of Washington Gardens in Elkhart when she saw a
group of people arguing. Apparently A.Be., who was the mother of one of Denman’s
students, and a certain E.B. were in an argument regarding A.Be.’s testimony against
E.B. in an unrelated case. As A.Be. approached Denman’s school bus, an individual
described by Denman to be a young black male with braids in his hair, approached A.Be.
The male punched A.Be. three times with a closed fist, including on the bridge of her
nose. This knocked A.Be.’s glasses off and scraped her nose. A.Be. did not personally
know her attacker but, after receiving tips from others, identified him from a photograph
on her Facebook account as the person known by the community as “Pimp.” A.B.’s
Facebook account identifies him both as A.B. and as “Pimp.” A.B.’s date of birth is
November 27, 1994, and he was sixteen years old at the time of the incident.
On August 1, 2011, the State alleged A.B. to be a delinquent child based upon the
offense of Class A misdemeanor battery. At the November 4, 2011, fact-finding
hearing, A.Be. identified A.B. in court as her perpetrator. A.B. testified in his defense,
claiming on direct examination that he did not hit A.Be., that he did not have braids, and
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A) (2011).
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that he had never seen or met E.B. A.B. conceded on cross-examination, however, that
his nickname was “Pimp,” that he had attended at least two court hearings with E.B., and
that he would be willing to fight on E.B.’s behalf.
Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court entered a true finding against
A.B. based in part on its assessment of his credibility as “zero.” Tr. p. 53. The trial
court subsequently entered a dispositional order adjudicating A.B. to be a delinquent
child and placing him in the Elkhart County Juvenile Detention Center. This appeal
follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Upon appeal, A.B. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him to
be the perpetrator. A.B. claims that he was not in the area on the day A.Be. was injured,
that he did not see the fight between E.B. and A.Be., and that he did not have braids in
his hair.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support A.B.’s adjudication,
we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. D.W. v. State,
903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We look only to probative
evidence supporting the adjudication and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the
juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of
probative value to support the adjudication, it will not be set aside. Id. The
uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an
adjudication of delinquency on appeal. Id.
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A.B.’s argument is based upon his version of the events in question. But the trial
court did not believe A.B.’s testimony. In fact, it found A.B. totally lacked credibility.
We will defer to its assessment on this point. Further, the record contains ample evidence
linking A.B. to A.Be.’s battery. Most significantly, A.Be. identified him to be the
perpetrator, which is sufficient, by itself, to sustain A.B.’s adjudication. See id. In
addition, A.B. admitted that he would fight on E.B.’s behalf. At the time of the battery,
E.B. was fighting with A.Be., creating a situation in which A.B. was admittedly prepared
to assist E.B. A.B.’s challenge is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we
decline to do.
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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