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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JAMES A. SHOAF GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHELLE BUMGARNER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DAVID S. STOVER, )
)
Appellant- Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 03A01-1109-CR-398
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee- Plaintiff, )
APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kathleen T. Coriden, Judge
Cause No. 03D02-1102-CM-684
March 8, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issue
Following a bench trial, David Stover was convicted of criminal conversion, a
Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to one year, all suspended to probation. Stover
appeals, raising the sole issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Concluding the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 14, 2011, Stover went to a Wal-Mart store in Columbus, Indiana, to
return some merchandise. While in the store, he picked up two boxes of denture adhesive
from the health and beauty aisle and carried them to another part of the store. Asset
Protection employee Travis Forrest testified that he followed Stover as he walked away
from the health and beauty department. Forrest saw Stover open the boxes, conceal the
merchandise in his pockets, and put the empty boxes on a shelf. Forrest followed Stover
as he passed all points of purchase without paying for anything and left the store. Forrest
then stopped Stover outside the store and asked him to return inside. Stover refused, got
in his car, and left the parking lot. Forrest then called the Columbus Police Department
and he and another asset protection employee retrieved the empty boxes from where
Stover had put them.
Stover testified at his trial and conceded he had been in Wal-Mart on January 14,
2011, he had picked up two packages of denture adhesive, and he had left the boxes in a
place they did not belong. He testified that he did so because he realized he was going to
be late for work and needed to leave the store immediately. He denied taking anything
out of the boxes. He also testified that he was stopped by the Columbus Police as he
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drove from Wal-Mart to work, and that both he and his car were searched but no
merchandise was found.
The State charged Stover with criminal conversion, a Class A misdemeanor.
Following the bench trial, at which Forrest was the State’s sole witness and Stover
testified on his own behalf, the trial court found him guilty as charged:
. . . I think [the State] accurately summarizes the case when it [says it]
comes down to an issue of credibility. Here’s the Court’s observation and
findings on that. I find Mr. Stover to be very meticulous in his description.
I think he described what happens in Wal-Mart and where things are better
than Mr. Forrest knows where things are. I find his description of that to be
very meticulous. . . . [T]he Court finds [Stover] to contradict himself when
he says I don’t remember who stopped me when he remembers every other
single detail of the day. The Court further finds that it [to] be inconsistent
with his meticulous nature to tell Mr. Forrest that he wasn’t interested in
talking with him . . . . So the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
because parts of Mr. Stover’s story don’t fit his nature that he did commit
the crime of conversion.
Transcript at 39. Stover now appeals his conviction.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
Our standard of reviewing challenges to sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
criminal conviction is well-settled: we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness
credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). We consider only the
evidence that supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom. Id. We will affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative
value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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II. Criminal Conversion
One “who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of
another person commits criminal conversion.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a). To have
“unauthorized control over property of another” includes obtaining or taking property of
another without the other’s consent. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-1(a), (b)(1).
Stover contends the trial court erred in giving credence to Forrest’s account of
events while discounting his own version, especially when coupled with alleged
inconsistencies in Forrest’s testimony and the lack of physical evidence. Specifically,
Stover points to Forrest’s testimony that he saw Stover “as he entered,” tr. at 7, and “had
constant surveillance of him the entire time,” id. at 8, yet Forrest never recounts that
Stover went to the customer service desk to return merchandise, which is undisputed
given that the return receipt was entered into evidence. However, Forrest’s testimony is
that he was “walking around by the health and beauty section of the store” when he
noticed Stover “as he entered.” Id. at 7. It is reasonable to infer that Forrest saw Stover
as he entered the health and beauty department after making his return and had him under
surveillance from that point on.
Stover also points out the surveillance video that was shown at trial fails to depict
Stover taking merchandise out of the boxes or putting it in his pockets. Forrest
acknowledged that the surveillance video did not show Stover taking the merchandise out
of the box and putting it in his pockets. The video showed at trial was spliced together
from various surveillance cameras, and did not depict a continuous sequence of events.
Yet Forrest never wavered from his testimony that he had Stover in his sight from the
time he picked up the boxes until the time he walked out of the store, and personally
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witnessed him take the items from the boxes, put them in his pockets, and leave without
paying for them. This is not inconsistent with the video.
Finally, Stover notes that no merchandise was found when he and his car were
searched by the police. However, some amount of time had passed from when Stover
was confronted by Forrest outside the store to when he was stopped by police, and there
was ample opportunity for him to throw the items out. In short, there is no fatal
inconsistency in Forrest’s testimony, either internally or with the physical evidence. The
credibility of the witnesses was for the trial court to assess, and the trial court believed
Forrest’s testimony. Crediting the testimony favorable to the judgment, there is sufficient
evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stover exerted control over Wal-Mart’s
property without Wal-Mart’s consent and thereby committed criminal conversion.
Conclusion
Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain Stover’s conviction, and the
conviction is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
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