FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 11 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS J. DIBIASI, No. 12-35583
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00276-LRS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STARBUCKS CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
And
SPOKANE COUNTY WASHINGTON; et
al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 25, 2014
Seattle, Washington
Before: NOONAN, HAWKINS, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Douglas DiBiasi (“DiBiasi”) appeals the amount of the district court’s award
of attorney’s fees and expenses to Starbucks Corp. (“Starbucks”), Leslie Ruff
(“Ruff”), and Heidi Parr (“Parr”) (collectively, “Appellees”). The facts are known
to the parties and will not be repeated here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a grant of attorney’s fees, and we review
de novo any statutory interpretation. Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir, 631 F.3d 1299,
1302 (9th Cir. 2011). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding $156,797.62 in attorney’s fees and $18,319.79 in costs
under Washington State’s anti-SLAPP statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.510, and
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Appellees did not unnecessarily prolong the litigation
because they repeatedly sought to dismiss the case on the theory that they were
immune from suit under Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.510. Further, we conclude that
this defense was not a pure question of law. Under the circumstances of this case,
in order to establish the defense it was necessary for Appellees to conduct
discovery and then move for summary judgment to obtain a ruling that Appellees’
report to the police was made in good faith and was of the type that was
“reasonably of concern to that agency.” See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.510. Thus,
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we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees and costs.
We also conclude that the district court properly determined that Appellees’
itemization of fees and costs adequately documented their recoverable fees and
expenses. The district court relied upon the declaration from Appellees’ counsel,
and awarded those reasonable fees and costs necessary to establish the immunity
defense and to defend Parr against 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. In so doing, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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