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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 13-13185
_____________________________
D.C. Docket No. LABR-0 : 12-0443 BLA
JIM WALTER RESOURCES, INC.,
Petitioner,
versus
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
VIOLA L. DAVIS,
o.b.o. Johnny E. Davis, deceased,
Respondents.
_____________________________
Petition for Review of Order of
the Benefits Review Board
_____________________________
(September 12, 2014)
Before JORDAN and BENAVIDES, * Circuit Judges, and RYSKAMP, ** District
Judge.
*
Honorable Fortunato P. Benavides, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Before the court is a petition for review of an award of survivor’s benefits
pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2012). Because
we conclude that the benefits were correctly awarded, we deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a widow whose husband had been awarded lifetime
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which affords compensatory payments
to certain miners suffering from pneumoconiosis. Where a miner has been
awarded lifetime benefits, the surviving spouse may be entitled to those benefit
payments after the miner’s death. Id. § 922(a)(2). Following the loss of her
husband, Viola Davis applied for these survivor’s benefits in April of 1993. Her
claim was denied because she could not prove that her husband’s death had been
caused by pneumoconiosis. She reapplied in 1998 and 2000, and was again denied
benefits. These decisions were final by the end of 2006.
In 2010, amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Act eliminated the
causation burden imposed on many claimants. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“the ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 260
(2010). Following these amendments, Davis filed a new claim for survivor’s
benefits on April 28, 2010, arguing that she is no longer required to demonstrate
causation. The administrative law judge agreed and granted her claim. The
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Review Board affirmed. The prospective benefits payor, Jim Walter Resources,
Inc. (“Petitioner”), seeks review of the decision.
STATUTORY CONTEXT
Because this case turns on the applicability of recent amendments to the
Black Lung Benefits Act, the historical context may be helpful. The statutory
scheme began with the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742. One of the objectives of this legislation was “to provide
benefits . . . to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to”
pneumoconiosis. Id. § 401, 83 Stat. at 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 901(a)). To that end, Congress provided, “In the case of death of a miner due to
pneumoconiosis or of a miner receiving benefits under this part, benefits shall be
paid to his widow . . . .” 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (1970). Congress later amended
the law, renaming the relevant statutory sections the Black Lung Benefits Act. See
Pub. L. No. 92-303, § a, 86 Stat. 150, 150 (1972).
A surviving spouse could originally obtain benefits simply by showing that
benefits were already being paid to the miner at the time of his death. 30 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (1970). Congress eventually emphasized this by explicitly stating that
“[i]n no case shall the eligible survivors of a miner who was determined to be
eligible to receive benefits under this title at the time of his or her death be required
to file a new claim for benefits, or otherwise revalidate the claim of such miner.”
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30 U.S.C. § 932(l) (1976 & Supp. II 1979). Thus, surviving spouses were
automatically entitled to these “derivative” benefits, regardless of whether the
survivor could prove pneumoconiosis as the cause of death.
But in 1981 Congress revisited the law, revising § 932(l) and imposing a
new causation burden on surviving dependents. See Black Lung Revenue Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635. Beginning in 1982, survivors could
receive benefits only after proving that pneumoconiosis was at least a
“substantially contributing cause or factor leading to the miner’s death.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.205(c)(2) (1984). The rule remained in place until 2010, and it was under
this standard that Davis’s first three claims were denied, as she could not prove that
pneumoconiosis had substantially contributed to her husband’s death.
Most recently, the Black Lung Benefits Act was amended by the ACA,
which eliminated the relevant causation requirement by reinstating 30 U.S.C.
§ 932(l) as it had existed before the 1981 amendments. See § 1556(b), 124 Stat. at
260. The ACA amendments “apply with respect to claims filed . . . after January 1,
2005, that [were] pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act,” which was
March 23, 2010. Id. § 1556(c), 124 Stat. at 260. The question raised by the
present case is whether a survivor who was denied benefits under the pre-ACA
statutory scheme can submit a subsequent claim for consideration under the
amended version of the statute. The administrative law judge and Benefits Review
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Board answered this question in the affirmative. We review this legal conclusion
de novo. U.S. Steel Mining Co., LLC v. Dir., OWCP, 719 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
After reviewing the statutory language and the parties’ submissions, we
conclude that Davis’s claim benefits from the ACA amendments. We find
unpersuasive Petitioner’s argument that a claim must have been pending on March
23, 2010, for the amendments to apply. That argument is belied by the text of the
statute itself, which indicates that the section affects claims “that are pending on or
after the date of enactment of this Act,” which was March 23, 2010. See §
1556(c), 124 Stat. at 260 (emphasis added). Because it was filed in April of 2010,
Davis’s claim was indeed pending “on or after” the date of enactment. The post-
ACA version of the statute therefore applies to her claim.
Petitioner objects to such an interpretation, noting that this construction
necessarily implies that all subsequent claims filed by previously denied survivors
will benefit from the amendments. Petitioner is correct, but we find no indication
that Congress intended otherwise. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534
(2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it
according to its terms.”).
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Nor is there any merit to the argument that the amendments apply only to
first-time claims. With respect to applications filed after January, 1, 2005, we have
already rejected the assertion that the ACA amendments apply to some claims but
not others. In U.S. Steel Mining, which the parties refer to as “Starks,” this court
considered a widow’s claim for survivor’s benefits. See generally 719 F.3d 1275.
The petitioner argued that the amendment “refers to miners’ claims, not surviving
spouses’ claims.” Id. at 1279. In rejecting the argument, we explained:
The text of § 1556(c) refutes U.S. Steel’s argument. Section 1556(c)
applies the “amendments made by this section . . . to claims filed
under [the benefits provisions] . . . after January 1, 2005, that are
pending on or after” March 23, 2010. The “amendments made by this
section” are the amendment to § 932(l) and an amendment to §
921(c)(4), a provision that creates an evidentiary presumption that
applies in both miners’ claims and survivors’ claims. Section 1556(c)
does not distinguish between miners’ claims and survivors’ claims.
The plain meaning of § 1556(c) is that anyone—miner or survivor—
who filed a claim for benefits after January 1, 2005, that remained
pending on March 23, 2010,1 can receive the benefit of the
amendments.
Id. at 1285 (statutory alteration in original) (emphasis added). By the same token,
the fact that the statute does not distinguish between first-time claims and
subsequent claims suggests that a claimant like Davis can reapply and benefit from
the ACA amendments. See Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 726 F.3d 387, 392
(3d Cir. 2013). Petitioner also relies on Senator Byrd’s post-enactment comments,
1
The statute reads “on or after” March 23, 2010. See § 1556(c), 124 Stat. at 260.
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but we have already held that they do “not constitute legitimate legislative history.”
U.S. Steel Mining, 719 F.3d at 1283 n.9.
Petitioner nevertheless contends that we cannot recognize the survivor’s
application as a “claim” under ACA § 1556(c) because § 932(l) clearly indicates
that eligible survivors shall not “be required to file new claims” when they request
derivative benefits. To paraphrase the argument, Petitioner poses the question:
How can a widow’s application be a claim for the purposes of establishing a filing
date when the express language of the statute indicates that the widow is not
“required to file a new claim”? The Starks court was also faced with this
question, and rejected the argument in this manner:
That argument fails. Section 1556(c) applies the amended § 932(l) to
all claims filed between January 1, 2005, and March 23, 2010. During
that period, both miners and survivors were required to file claims to
receive benefits. Section 1556(c) therefore applies the amended
§ 932(l) to survivors’ claims as well as miners’ claims. Just because
the application of the amended § 932(l) to a claim operates to
eliminate the need for that claim does not render its application
illogical or unworkable.
719 F.3d at 1285. In other words, at the time Mrs. Starks filed her application for
derivative benefits—in April of 2006—the ACA had not yet been enacted and thus
the statutory scheme still required survivors to file “claims.” But because her
claim was filed after January 1, 2005, it benefited from the retroactive nature of the
ACA amendments, notwithstanding the fact that the same amendments also served
to eventually obviate the need for derivative claims like Mrs. Starks’s.
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Returning to the case at hand, Davis’s most recent claim was filed on April
28, 2010, such that the Starks reasoning is not directly on point. By the time she
filed this application, the ACA was already in effect, ostensibly obviating the need
for a “claim.” Thus, the Starks discussion does not fully dispose of Petitioner’s
argument. Yet neither does Starks foreclose Davis’s eligibility. Starks ultimately
concluded that 932(l) merely “operates to eliminate the need for [a survivor’s]
claim.” Id. (emphasis added). We did not suggest that the ACA eliminates the
application procedure itself, or that it in any way prevents previously denied
claimants from benefiting from the ACA amendments. As a sister circuit
observed, “Although amended § 932(l) states that a survivor is not required to file
a new claim for benefits, the conclusion petitioner draws from this language—that
the operative date for determining eligibility cannot be the date the survivor’s
claim was filed—simply does not follow.” W. Va. CWP Fund v. Stacy, 671 F.3d
378, 388–89 (4th Cir. 2011).
Petitioner, however, further contends that Starks itself forecloses Davis’s
award. Yet the argument relies on a mischaracterization of our holding in that
case. Petitioner argues that “this Court [in Starks] rejected any interpretation that
concluded that the administrative filing required for survivor’s [sic] to receive
benefits post-ACA could be considered a ‘claim’ for purposes of the ACA.” In
support of this assertion, Petitioner points to our statement that “[i]t is true that
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some submission of information is required,” but “this submission must fall short
of a ‘claim’—otherwise, § 932(l) would have no effect whatsoever.” 719 F.3d at
1284. Yet in relying on this language, Petitioner neglects the fact that we
expressly declined to rest our decision on this semantic foundation. Indeed, we
were “not persuaded by this position, which amounts to nothing more than a
proposal to change the nominal designation of the filing required of surviving
spouses.” Id. at 1282. So Starks does not stand for the proposition that a
survivor’s application for benefits is not a “claim” for the purposes of the ACA
amendments.
Finally, Petitioner contends that the regulations in effect at the filing of
Davis’s 2010 claim undermine any statutory interpretation that might otherwise
allow for the award at issue here. The argument is without merit. Those
regulations require the denial of a subsequent claim filed more than a year after the
effective date of the previous denial “unless the claimant demonstrates that one of
the applicable conditions of entitlement . . . has changed.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)
(2010). “For purposes of this section, the applicable conditions of entitlement shall
be limited to those conditions upon which the prior denial was based.” Id. § (d)(2).
Significantly, “[a] subsequent claim filed by a [survivor] shall be denied unless the
applicable conditions of entitlement in such claim include at least one condition
unrelated to the miner’s physical condition at the time of his death.” Id. § (d)(3).
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Petitioner argues that Davis’s claim is subject to these rules and therefore must be
denied. Yet the regulatory language indicates otherwise. The ACA amendments
revised the application requirements, and therefore changed “one of the applicable
conditions of entitlement.” Id. § (d). Moreover, the change involved the causation
requirement, which was the very condition “upon which the prior denial was
based.” Id. § (d)(2). Therefore, as the Fourth Circuit has explained, Davis “easily
satisf[ies] 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(3)’s requirement of showing a change in the
conditions of entitlement unrelated to the decedent’s physical condition.” Union
Carbide Corp. v. Richards, 721 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2013). Because Davis
prevails under this regulation, we need not consider any argument that newer
administrative guidance provides additional support for her case.2
CONCLUSION
After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and the relevant law, we find nothing
that precludes a new benefits claim by a survivor whose previous application was
denied under the pre-ACA version of the Black Lung Benefits Act. We therefore
hold that a survivor who filed a claim before January 1, 2005, may submit a new
claim that must be adjudicated under the post-ACA statutory provisions.
2
In addition, we note that the Petitioner has withdrawn any argument rooted in principles of res
judicata. Although such an argument was presented to the district court, Petitioner has now
expressly abandoned that reasoning.
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Accordingly, the administrative law judge and Benefits Review Board correctly
awarded benefits to Viola Davis. Petition DENIED.
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