PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1294
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
VIRGINIA RICHARDS, widow of Arlie Richards; DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
BLACK LUNG LEGAL CLINIC,
Amicus Supporting Respondent.
No. 12-1978
PEABODY COAL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; MARY ELLEN MORGAN, Widow of Don
Morgan,
Respondents.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
BLACK LUNG LEGAL CLINIC,
Amicus Supporting Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review
Board. (11-0414-BLA, 11-0414-BLA-A, 10-5248-BLA, 11−0634-BLA)
Argued: March 21, 2013 Decided: July 5, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petitions for review denied by published opinion. Judge Diaz
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge
Davis joined.
ARGUED: Kathy Lynn Snyder, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC, Morgantown, West
Virginia; Mark Elliott Solomons, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Ryan Christopher Gilligan,
WOLFE, WILLIAMS, RUTHERFORD & REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia; Barry
H. Joyner, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondents. ON BRIEF: Amy Jo Holley, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC,
Morgantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner Union Carbide
Corporation. Laura Metcoff Klaus, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Petitioner Peabody Coal Company. M.
Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Rae Ellen James, Associate
Solicitor, Gary K. Stearman, Counsel for Appellate Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Federal
Respondent. Joseph E. Wolfe, WOLFE, WILLIAMS, RUTHERFORD &
REYNOLDS, Norton, Virginia, for Respondents Virginia Richards
and Mary Ellen Morgan. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Carney N.
Simpson, Student Caseworker, Gordon Jenkins, Student Caseworker,
Black Lung Legal Clinic, WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW, Lexington, Virginia, for Amicus Supporting Respondents.
2
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
These consolidated cases involve claims for survivors’
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq., filed by Respondents Virginia E. Richards and
Mary Ellen Morgan. In both cases, Department of Labor (“DOL”)
Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) awarded the survivors’
claims, and the DOL Benefits Review Board (the “Board”)
affirmed. Union Carbide Corporation and Peabody Coal Company,
the coal mine operators responsible for payment of Respondents’
benefits, petitioned for this court’s review. Petitioners
submit that principles of res judicata foreclose Respondents--
each of whom previously and unsuccessfully sought BLBA
survivors’ benefits--from relying on a recent amendment to the
BLBA to pursue benefits again through a so-called “subsequent
claim.” We disagree. Because the amendment created a new cause
of action that was unavailable to Respondents when they brought
their initial claims, res judicata does not bar their subsequent
claims. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s awards.
I.
In addition to lifetime disability benefits for coal
miners, the BLBA provides survivors’ benefits to certain of
their dependents. The statute has been substantially amended
over the years. Initially, a deceased miner’s qualifying
3
dependents could obtain survivors’ benefits either by showing
that the deceased miner’s death was caused by pneumoconiosis, 1 or
by showing that the miner was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis
at the time of his death. Survivors who proved their
entitlement under the latter method were automatically entitled
to benefits even if pneumoconiosis played no role in the
deceased miners’ deaths. See 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (1970).
This automatic “derivative benefits” scheme was reinforced in
the 1978 amendments to the BLBA, which enacted 30 U.S.C.
§ 932(l), providing: “In no case shall the eligible survivors of
a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits
under this title at the time of his or her death be required to
file a new claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate
the claim of such miner.” Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 7(h), 92 Stat.
95, 100 (1978).
In 1981, Congress scaled back benefits under the BLBA,
eliminating Section 932(l)’s provision of automatic derivative
survivors’ benefits. Consequently, a survivor filing a claim on
or after January 1, 1982, could establish entitlement only by
proving that the miner’s death was due at least in part to
1
The BLBA’s implementing regulations define
“pneumoconiosis” as “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its
sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments,
arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a).
4
pneumoconiosis. See Shuff v. Cedar Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977, 979
(4th Cir. 1992).
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) reinstated Section 932(l)’s automatic survivors’
benefits for claims filed after January 1, 2005, that were
pending on or after the ACA’s March 23, 2010, enactment date.
Pub. L. No. 111–148, sec. 1556, § 932 (“Section 1556”), 124
Stat. 119, 260 (2010); W. Va. CWP Fund v. Stacy, 671 F.3d 378,
381-82 (4th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, survivors whose claims
meet those temporal thresholds need no longer show that the
miner’s death was caused by pneumoconiosis; the claimant need
only show that the miner was determined to be eligible to
receive BLBA benefits at the time of his death. Section 1556 is
silent as to whether survivors whose previous claims were denied
may now receive benefits by filing “subsequent” claims under
amended Section 932(l).
DOL’s implementing regulations set forth the protocol for
treatment of these “subsequent” claims--defined as claims filed
“more than one year after the effective date of a final order
denying a claim previously filed by the claimant under this
part.” 2 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). The regulations provide:
2
These regulations, which became effective on January 19,
2001, implement the pre-ACA version of Section 932(l), and thus
still provide that survivors filing after 1981 may only recover
(Continued)
5
A subsequent claim shall be processed and adjudicated
in accordance with the provisions [that govern
original claims], except that the claim shall be
denied unless the claimant demonstrates that one of
the applicable conditions of entitlement . . . has
changed since the date upon which the order denying
the prior claim became final.
***
(3) If the applicable condition(s) of entitlement
relate to the miner’s physical condition, the
subsequent claim may be approved only if new evidence
submitted in connection with the subsequent claim
establishes at least one applicable condition of
entitlement. A subsequent claim filed by a surviving
spouse, child, parent, brother, or sister shall be
denied unless the applicable conditions of entitlement
in such claim include at least one condition unrelated
to the miner’s physical condition at the time of his
death.
20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).
Addressing the effect of res judicata on BLBA claims, a
1997 DOL comment to the proposed Section 725.309(d) observed
that “the principles of claim preclusion are applicable to
claims under the Act.” 62 Fed. Reg. 3352 (proposed Jan. 22,
1997) (citing Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 122-23
upon showing that a miner’s death was due to pneumoconiosis. 20
C.F.R. § 725.212, 725.218, 725.222. DOL has issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking, in which it proposes to revise its
regulations to reflect the ACA amendments. 77 Fed. Reg. 19468,
19478 (proposed Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts.
718, 725). Notably, and consistent with its litigation position
here, DOL proposes to revise Section 725.309(d) to provide for
automatic entitlement on survivors’ subsequent claims,
notwithstanding previous denials. Id. at 19468.
6
(1988)). In the context of subsequent claims, however, DOL
clarified that “claim preclusion bars only an attempt to
relitigate a cause of action that was previously resolved; it
has no effect on the litigation of a cause of action which did
not exist at the time of the initial adjudication.” Id. (citing
Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955)).
II.
A.
Arlie C. Richards worked as a coal miner for over thirty
years and was awarded BLBA benefits in 1987. Union Carbide paid
his BLBA benefits until his death in January 1994. Virginia
Richards, Arlie’s widow, filed her first claim for survivors’
benefits in February 1994. After protracted proceedings, an ALJ
ultimately denied her claim on May 6, 2006, because she failed
to prove that her husband’s death was due in part to
pneumoconiosis. Mrs. Richards did not appeal that denial, but
filed a second, subsequent claim for survivors’ benefits in May
2009. In October 2009, months before the ACA’s enactment, a DOL
district director denied that claim because it failed to
demonstrate a change in any condition of entitlement, as is
required of subsequent claims under Section 725.309(d)(3). Mrs.
Richards requested a hearing before an ALJ.
7
While that request was pending, Congress enacted the ACA,
restoring automatic derivative survivors’ benefits under Section
932(l). Upon a motion from the Director of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs (“Director,” the Federal
Respondent in these cases), the ALJ acknowledged the change in
law and issued a summary decision awarding benefits to Mrs.
Richards, since her husband had been receiving benefits at the
time of his death.
Union Carbide appealed to the Board, arguing--as it does in
its instant petition--that Mrs. Richards’s subsequent claim was
barred by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(3) and principles of res
judicata. In January 2012, the Board issued a split en banc
decision affirming the ALJ’s award of benefits. Richards v.
Union Carbide Corp., 25 Black Lung Rep. (Juris) 1-31 (Ben. Rev.
Bd. 2012) (en banc). The Board made four principal
determinations. First, it held that the plain text of Section
932(l), as amended by Section 1556, authorizes its application
to subsequent claims. Second, it held that Mrs. Richards had
demonstrated a change in a condition of entitlement unrelated to
her husband’s physical condition, thus satisfying
Section 725.309(d)(3). Third, the Board concluded that res
judicata did not bar Mrs. Richards’s subsequent claim because a
determination of entitlement under Section 932(l) did not
require relitigation of the prior finding that Mr. Richards’s
8
death was unrelated to pneumoconiosis. Finally, the Board
modified the benefit accrual date, clarifying that benefits for
successful subsequent claims are payable from the month
following the prior denial. Union Carbide timely petitioned for
this court’s review.
B.
Don Morgan worked as a coal miner for nineteen years and
filed a claim for lifetime disability benefits in 1987. An ALJ
approved his claim in 1991, and after more than a decade of
proceedings, we affirmed Mr. Morgan’s award of benefits in June
2004. Peabody Coal Co. v. Morgan, 98 F. App’x 966 (4th Cir.
2004). Mr. Morgan died months before that decision, in January
2004.
In May 2004, Mary Ellen Morgan, Don’s widow, filed a claim
for survivors’ benefits. The district director initially
approved her claim, but an ALJ denied benefits after determining
that Mrs. Morgan had failed to prove that her husband’s death
was due to pneumoconiosis. Mrs. Morgan appealed, but the Board
affirmed the denial in October 2008. Mrs. Morgan took no
further action on her 2004 claim, and the Board’s decision
became final.
After Congress amended the BLBA via ACA Section 1556, Mrs.
Morgan filed a second, subsequent claim. As he did in Richards,
the Director moved for a summary decision awarding benefits.
9
Acknowledging the change in law, the ALJ granted the motion.
Peabody, Mr. Morgan’s former employer, appealed to the Board,
arguing that Mrs. Morgan’s subsequent claim was barred by 20
C.F.R. § 725.309(d) and principles of res judicata. 3
The Board affirmed the award, relying on its decision in
Richards. Morgan v. Peabody Coal Co., BRB No. 11-0634, 2012 WL
2860525 (Ben. Rev. Bd. June 15, 2012) (unpublished). Peabody
timely petitioned for this court’s review.
III.
The central issue before us is whether, in light of the ACA
amendments to Section 932(l) of the BLBA, a final decision
denying benefits on a prior claim bars a survivor from receiving
benefits through a subsequent claim. We consider this question
of law de novo. Stacy, 671 F.3d at 388.
A.
3
Peabody also contended that Section 1556 created an
impermissible irrebuttable presumption that a miner’s death was
due to pneumoconiosis. Peabody briefly raises this argument,
which the Board rejected, on appeal. We too reject it because
the amendment does not raise the presumption Peabody alleges.
As the Third Circuit recently explained, a miner’s death is not
presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis under amended Section
932(l); indeed, the cause of the miner’s death is irrelevant in
the context of automatic survivors’ entitlements. See B & G
Constr. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 662 F.3d 233, 254 (3d Cir. 2011).
10
Petitioners argue that Mrs. Morgan and Mrs. Richards are
ineligible for automatic derivative survivors’ benefits under
amended Section 932(l). Because, unlike past amendments to the
BLBA, Section 1556 does not expressly authorize departure from
the traditional principles of res judicata, Petitioners believe
that Respondents’ previously denied claims should preclude them
from bringing subsequent claims under amended Section 932(l).
According to Petitioners, Section 1556 did not create a new
cause of action, but rather merely created a new theory or
method by which survivors may demonstrate entitlement. This
change in law, Petitioners insist, does not negate the
preclusive effect of Respondents’ previously denied claims,
particularly because the record evidence remains unchanged since
the denial of the Respondents’ initial claims.
Relatedly, Petitioners say that the Board erred in
determining that Respondents’ subsequent claims were not barred
by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(3), which requires that a subsequent
claim be denied unless the survivor can show a change in the
conditions of entitlement unrelated to the decedent’s physical
condition.
Petitioners also contend that the Board’s decision in these
cases renders meaningless Congress’s requirement that the claims
be filed “after January 1, 2005” and pending on or after the
ACA’s March 23, 2010 enactment date. See Section 1556(c). By
11
allowing previously denied claimants to file subsequent claims
under amended Section 932(l), Petitioners say the Board has
created an end-run around Section 1556(c)’s filing limitations,
which Congress imposed to mitigate the financial burden of
Section 1556 on coal mine operators.
Defending the Board’s holding, Respondents say that the
plain language of Section 1556 and amended Section 932(l)
permits awards on survivors’ subsequent claims, since Section
1556 states, without qualification, that the amendment
“appl[ies] with respect to claims filed” within Section
1556(c)’s time limitations. Fed. Resp’t’s Br. at 21 (quoting
Section 1556(c)) (emphasis added by Federal Respondent).
Respondents rely on our recent decision in Stacy, where we
affirmed the applicability of amended Section 932(l) to a
survivor’s original claim. 671 F.3d at 388-89. In holding that
amended Section 932(l) applies not only to miners’ claims but
also to those of survivors, we observed that “the plain language
of that section requires that amended § 932(l) apply to all
claims [that satisfy Section 1556(c)’s time limitations].” Id.
at 388. Accordingly, since survivors may file subsequent
“claims” under the BLBA, Respondents insist that their instant
claims are encompassed by Section 1556.
Countering Petitioners’ res judicata arguments, Respondents
contend that Section 1556 did not merely change the process by
12
which survivors could prove their entitlement, but instead
created a new, previously unavailable cause of action. Although
Respondents acknowledge that they presented no new evidence
since the denial of their initial claims, they maintain that
their subsequent claims rely on facts different from the initial
claims, thus rendering res judicata inappropriate. To wit,
whereas Respondents’ initial claims turned on whether
pneumoconiosis caused the miners’ deaths, Respondents point out
that that fact is irrelevant to their subsequent claims under
amended Section 932(l), which concern only whether the miners
were eligible to receive benefits at the time of their deaths.
Finally, Respondents argue that their reading does not
defeat the burden-mitigating time limitations in Section
1556(c), which they believe are still effectuated by the
judicially implied requirement that claimants take some
affirmative action to initiate the administrative application of
Section 932(l) after January 1, 2005. Fed. Resp’t’s Br. at 24
(citing Stacy, 671 F.3d at 388-89). Thus, rather than being
required to pay all previously denied survivors’ claims where
the miner died while receiving benefits, coal operators must pay
only those where a surviving spouse has taken pains to submit a
subsequent claim.
B.
13
Looking first to the text of Section 1556, we reject
Petitioners’ contention that the amendment does not apply to
survivors’ subsequent claims. As we explained in Stacy, “the
plain language of [Section 1556] requires that amended § 932(l)
apply to all claims [that satisfy Section 1556(c)’s time
limitations].” 671 F.3d at 388. “Because Congress used the
term ‘claims’ without any qualifying language,” id., and because
survivors whose claims were previously denied may file
subsequent “claims” under the BLBA, see 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d),
the statutory text supports Respondents’ position that amended
Section 932(l) applies to all claims that comply with Section
1556(c)’s time limitations, including subsequent claims.
Petitioners are correct that, in contrast to previous BLBA
amendments, Section 1556 does not explicitly indicate an intent
to override the res judicata effect of previously denied claims.
Compare Section 1556, with Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 11, 92 Stat.
95, 101 (Mar. 1, 1978) (directing the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, upon a claimant’s request, to review and
apply amendments to previously denied claims), and Pub, L. No.
92-303, § 6, 86 Stat. 150, 156 (May 19, 1972) (same, only
without the need for a claimant’s request). But application of
Section 1556 to subsequent claims does not require us to run
roughshod over res judicata. Rather, res judicata is not
implicated by Respondents’ subsequent claims since entitlement
14
under Section 932(l), as revived by Section 1556, does not
require relitigation of the prior findings that the miners’
deaths were not due to pneumoconiosis.
In this case, Respondents easily satisfy 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.309(d)(3)’s requirement of showing a change in the
conditions of entitlement unrelated to the decedent’s physical
condition. By restoring the derivative entitlement provisions
of Section 932(l), Congress has effectively created a “change”
establishing a new condition of entitlement unrelated to whether
the miner died due to pneumoconiosis.
And just as Congress created a new condition of entitlement
for purposes of Section 725.309(d), so too it created a new
cause of action for purposes of res judicata.
By “precluding parties from contesting matters that they
have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” the doctrine
of res judicata minimizes “the expense and vexation attending
multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and foster[s]
reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent decisions.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892
(2008) (internal quotations omitted). “However, res judicata
does not bar claims that did not exist at the time of the prior
litigation.” Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054,
1057 (4th Cir. 1991). A party invoking res judicata must
establish three elements: (1) a previous final judgment on the
15
merits, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the
earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or
their privies in the two suits. Id.
Identity of the cause of action--the only prong presently
in dispute--exists if two claims “arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions or the same core of
operative facts.” Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 355
(4th Cir. 2004). While typically it is a new factual
development that gives rise to a fresh cause of action, see,
e.g., Lawlor, 349 U.S. at 328, changes in law can also have that
effect. For instance, “on rare occasions, when a new statute
provides an independent basis for relief which did not exist at
the time of the prior action, a second action on the new statute
may be justified.” 4 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal
Practice, ¶ 131.22[3] (3d ed. 2013); see also Clodfelter v.
Republic of Sudan, No. 11-2118, 2013 WL 3069775, at *9 (4th Cir.
June 20, 2013); Maldonado v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 664 F.3d 1369,
1379 (11th Cir. 2011).
Like Respondents, we recognize that the record evidence has
not changed since the denial of the original claims and that the
4
By contrast to a statutory change, a change in precedent
generally provides no relief from res judicata, since it merely
reflects an error in the prior decision. See Federated Dep’t
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
16
only relevant change is one of law. Nevertheless, we conclude
that the instant subsequent claims arise from operative facts
that are separate and distinct from those underlying
Respondents’ initial claims, and therefore constitute new causes
of action. Whereas Respondents’ initial claims turned on
whether the deceased miners died due to pneumoconiosis, these
subsequent claims concern only whether the miners were
determined to be eligible to receive black lung benefits at the
time of their deaths--an entirely unrelated factual issue.
Meanwhile, the statutory change in law provides a
previously unavailable basis for relief that justifies the
instant claims, since res judicata does not bar claims that the
parties have not had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate.”
Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892. On this point, Petitioners cite the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sebben, 488 U.S. 105. Sebben
involved the 1977 amendments to the BLBA, which imposed higher
evidentiary standards on miners attempting to receive benefits,
but which also required DOL to reopen and readjudicate certain
pending and denied claims using the previously applicable, less
restrictive standards. 488 U.S. at 110-11. DOL reopened these
claims as required, but the claimants alleged that the agency
failed to readjudicate them under the previously applicable,
more lenient standards, as mandated by the amendment. Id.
17
Two classes of claimants brought suit in Sebben: the first
had timely appealed the administrative denials of their reopened
claims, while the second had not appealed and were seeking to
reopen their finally determined claims for a third time. Id. at
112-13. Thus, to succeed, the second class needed to establish
“not only a duty to apply less restrictive criteria than those
[applied by DOL], but also a duty to reopen the final
determinations.” Id. at 122. Ultimately, although the Court
agreed that DOL had improperly applied the more restrictive
standards during their initial readjudications, it held that res
judicata nevertheless barred the second class of claimants from
reopening their finally (though wrongly) determined claims. Id.
Sebben does establish that res judicata can serve as a bar
to BLBA claims, but it is inapposite here, where Respondents
have not had any prior opportunity to litigate the cause of
action giving rise to their subsequent claims. Unlike
Respondents, who bring their derivative entitlement claims for
the first time under amended Section 932(l), the second class of
Sebben claimants had already received (albeit under the wrong
evidentiary standard) the reopening and readjudication to which
they were entitled under the 1977 amendments. Thus, the Supreme
Court’s refusal to grant the Sebben claimants a third bite at
the apple merely reflects the well-settled principle that res
judicata precludes relitigation of a final judgment on the
18
merits even if that judgment was wrong. See Moitie, 452 U.S. at
398. And in contrast to Sebben, where relitigation would have
risked upsetting previously adjudicated claims and creating
inconsistent judgments, litigation of Respondents’ subsequent
claims seeking benefits under amended Section 932(l)’s newly
revived cause of action runs no such risk, since these claims
were never previously adjudicated.
C.
Petitioners attempt to divine congressional intent to
exclude subsequent claims from the amendment’s ambit by parsing
a single post-enactment statement of the late Senator Robert C.
Byrd, sponsor of Section 1556, who commented: “It is clear that
[Section 1556] will apply to all claims that will be filed
henceforth, including many claims filed by miners whose prior
claims were denied, or by widows who never filed for benefits
following the death of a husband.” 156 Cong. Rec. S2083 (daily
ed. March 25, 2010). As the Supreme Court has observed,
“[p]ost-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms)
is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.”
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081 (2011). In any
case, although Senator Byrd’s statement may imply that the
amendment excludes those widows who did file prior claims for
benefits, it does not explicitly state as much. Meanwhile, his
observation that the amendment applies to “all claims that will
19
be filed henceforth” can be read to encompass subsequent claims,
and his description of the scope of the statute as “including”
certain types of claims connotes that his selected examples were
intended to be illustrative of the amendment’s reach, not
exhaustive. In short, any inference drawn from Senator Byrd’s
ambiguous post-enactment statement cannot overcome the plain
text of the amendment, which indicates its application to “all
claims,” without qualification.
Finally, we address the concern that allowing Respondents’
subsequent claims to proceed would remove the burden-mitigating
time limitations Congress placed in Section 1556(c). As we
observed in rejecting a due process challenge to Section 1556 in
Stacy, the retroactive time limitations in Section 1556
represent Congress’s “measured approach” to reinstating the
automatic survivorship entitlements of Section 932(l). 671 F.3d
at 384. Recognizing the potential financial burden the
amendment might place on operators, “Congress mitigated the
retroactive impact of Section 1556 by limiting its application
to ‘claims filed . . . after January 1, 2005, that are pending
on or after’ March 23, 2010--the date the [ACA] was enacted.
Consequently, operators must only pay automatic survivors’
benefits for claims filed in or after 2005.” Id. (quoting
Section 1556(c)) (citation omitted).
20
These limitations are not rendered meaningless by our
holding here, since claimants seeking automatic entitlements
must still take steps to assert their derivative rights.
Claimants whose initial claims were denied before the ACA’s
January 2005 cutoff must affirmatively file a subsequent claim
with the agency; meanwhile, the second limitation--requiring
that the claims be pending on or after the ACA’s March 2010
enactment--prevents DOL from having to sua sponte reopen claims
filed after 2005 but denied before the amendment’s enactment.
The Director attests to the practical effect of this
regime, noting that only approximately 130 of the 1,040 eligible
survivors have so far filed claims under the amended entitlement
provisions. Fed. Resp’t’s Br. at 27 n.14. Thus, by requiring
that DOL award the automatic entitlement only on claims
(subsequent or otherwise) that have been filed since January 1,
2005, and are pending on or after March 23, 2010, the
limitations continue to meaningfully mitigate the coal mine
operators’ financial burden. 5
5
As Respondents point out, the amendment’s financial burden
is further allayed by the Board’s determination that automatic
survivors’ benefits on a subsequent claim are payable only from
the month following the prior denial, rather than from the month
of the miner’s death. This decision represents an attempt to
reconcile 20 C.F.R. § 725.503(c), which instructs that benefits
are payable to an entitled survivor “beginning with the month of
the miner’s death,” with 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d)(5), which
clarifies that “[i]n any case in which a subsequent claim is
(Continued)
21
IV.
Under the plain language of Section 1556 and principles of
res judicata, Mrs. Richards and Mrs. Morgan are entitled to
survivors’ benefits. In compliance with Section 1556(c)’s time
limitations, Respondents filed their instant subsequent claims
after January 1, 2005, and their claims were pending on and
after March 23, 2010. Their deceased husbands were both
determined to be eligible to receive BLBA benefits at the time
of their deaths, and Petitioners do not deny that Mrs. Richards
and Mrs. Morgan meet the dependency and relationship criteria
for eligible survivors. Meanwhile, res judicata does not bar
their claims, since Section 1556 created a new cause of action
not available to them at the time they brought their initial
claims. Respondents are therefore entitled to automatic
derivative benefits under 30 U.S.C. § 932(l), and we accordingly
deny Union Carbide’s and Peabody’s petitions for review.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.
awarded, no benefits may be paid for any period prior to the
date upon which the order denying the prior claim became final.”
Reading those provisions together, the Board reasonably chose an
accrual date that would provide successful subsequent claimants
with meaningful benefits yet which, at the same time, would
mitigate the burden to the operator and respect the validity of
the earlier denial.
22