UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
2014 MSPB 74
Docket No. CH-0752-10-0294-I-2
Damon J. Brown,
Appellant,
v.
Department of Defense,
Agency.
September 12, 2014
Andres Grajales, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.
Neil Bloede, Indianapolis, Indiana, for the agency.
BEFORE
Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
Mark A. Robbins, Member
OPINION AND ORDER
¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of an initial decision that
reversed the agency’s removal action. The appellant has filed a cross petition for
review of the initial decision’s finding that he did not prove harmful error. For
the following reasons, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review, DENY the
appellant’s cross petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision, and
SUSTAIN the appellant’s removal. 1
1
Except as otherwise noted in this decision, we have applied the Board’s regulations
that became effective November 13, 2012. We note, however, that the petition for
2
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant served in the non-critical sensitive position of Accounting
Technician with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). MSPB
Docket No. CH-0752-10-0294-I-2 (I-2), Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 7,
Tab 11 at 8. The agency removed the appellant based on a charge that the
Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) Consolidated Adjudications Facility
(CAF) had denied him eligibility to occupy a sensitive position. MSPB Docket
No. CH-0752-10-0294-I-1 (I-1), IAF, Tab 6, Subtabs 4c, 4f. During the 30-day
advance notice period for the removal action, the agency temporarily detailed the
appellant to a non-sensitive set of duties. Id., Subtab 4f.
¶3 Following a hearing, the administrative judge reversed the appellant’s
removal. I-2, IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID). Relying on Conyers v.
Department of Defense, 115 M.S.P.R. 572 (2010), and Northover v. Department
of Defense, 115 M.S.P.R. 451 (2010), the administrative judge found as follows:
(1) the Board’s review authority in a case like the present one, where the agency
removed the appellant for losing a qualification to hold his position, included the
authority to review the merits of the determination that the appellant lacked the
required qualification; (2) the agency did not prove that the appellant is ineligible
to hold a non-critical sensitive position; and (3) even if the agency proved its
charge, it did not prove that disciplining the appellant promoted the efficiency of
the service. ID at 7-11, 13-14. In response to the appellant’s contention that the
agency denied him minimum due process of law because the deciding official did
not have the discretion to weigh the factors set forth in Douglas v. Veterans
Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), or take any action but removal,
the administrative judge held that the deciding official did not have input into the
penalty determination and testified that she would not have removed the appellant
review in this case was filed before that date. Even if we considered the petition under
the previous version of the regulations, the outcome would be the same.
3
if given a choice. ID at 14-15. Thus, she found that the agency improperly
imposed the penalty of removal even if the agency had properly sustained the
charges. ID at 15. Finally, the administrative judge found that the appellant did
not prove his affirmative defense of harmful error. ID at 12-13.
¶4 On petition for review, the agency asserts that the administrative judge
should not have applied Conyers and Northover because those decisions were not
yet final and, in any event, the Board decided those cases incorrectly and should
give deference to its WHS CAF decision finding the appellant ineligible to
occupy a sensitive position. I-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-12.
The agency further argues that the administrative judge’s findings on the merits,
the efficiency of the service, and the penalty are incorrect. Id. at 12-20. The
appellant has filed an opposition to the agency’s petition for review and a cross
petition for review asserting that the administrative judge erred in finding that the
appellant did not prove harmful error. PFR File, Tab 4.
¶5 The Clerk of the Board thereafter issued an Order informing the parties that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Gargiulo v.
Department of Homeland Security, 727 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2013), may affect
the outcome of this case and inviting the parties to file briefs addressing the
possible application of Gargiulo to the appellant’s constitutional due process
claims. PFR File, Tab 6. The parties have filed responses to the Order issued by
the Clerk of the Board. Id., Tabs 7-8. 2
2
The appellant has filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental notice concerning the
application of Gargiulo to his constitutional due process claim. PFR File, Tab 11. The
appellant contends that there is a statement in a government brief in a separate U.S.
Supreme Court case that supports his arguments and that did not become available until
after the deadline for responding to the Order issued by the Clerk of the Board, that he
wishes to submit only legal argument, and that the agency would not be prejudiced if
the Board granted his motion. Id. at 2. We deny the motion upon finding that the
appellant has not shown that this evidence or argument is new and material and was not
readily available before the record closed. See Durr v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
119 M.S.P.R. 195, ¶ 23 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5), (k).
4
ANALYSIS
The Board’s review of the agency’s action is limited.
¶6 In Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶ 13, and Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. 451,
¶ 13, the Board held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of the Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), limited Board review of an otherwise appealable
action only if that action was based upon a denial, revocation, or suspension of a
“security clearance,” i.e., a denial of access to classified information or eligibility
for such access. Accordingly, the Board found in Conyers and Northover that an
adverse action that was based on the agency’s decision that an employee was not
eligible to occupy a non-critical sensitive position was subject to the same review
as other actions under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, including review of the merits of the
agency’s decision on eligibility. See Conyers, 115 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶¶ 13, 32-34;
Northover, 115 M.S.P.R. 451, ¶¶ 13, 30-33.
¶7 A divided Federal Circuit panel reversed the Board’s decisions in Conyers
and Northover, holding that the Board cannot review the merits of an agency’s
national security determinations regarding an employee’s eligibility to occupy a
sensitive position that implicates national security. Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d
1223, 1225, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court later vacated the above panel
decision and granted rehearing en banc. Berry v. Conyers, 497 F. App’x 64
(Fed. Cir. 2013). The court then issued an en banc decision in which a majority
of the court reversed and remanded the Board’s decision in Northover and
dismissed the appeal in Conyers for lack of jurisdiction. Kaplan v. Conyers,
733 F.3d 1148, 1150-52, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, Northover v.
Archuleta, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014). In its en banc decision in Conyers, 733 F.3d
at 1158-60, the Federal Circuit held that Egan prohibits Board review of
Department of Defense (DOD) national security determinations concerning the
eligibility of an individual to occupy a “sensitive” position, regardless of whether
the position requires access to classified information. In support of this holding,
the court found that “there is no meaningful difference in substance between a
5
designation that a position is ‘sensitive’ and a designation that a position requires
‘access to classified information.’ Rather, what matters is that both designations
concern national security.” Id. at 1160. Accordingly, under the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Conyers, the limited scope of review set forth in Egan applies to
appeals such as this one, where an adverse action is based on the decision that an
employee is not eligible to occupy a non-critical sensitive position. See id.
at 1158-60; Ingram v. Department of Defense, 120 M.S.P.R. 420, ¶ 9 (2013).
¶8 In Egan, the Supreme Court held that the Board does not have authority to
review the substance of a security clearance determination, contrary to what is
required generally in other adverse action appeals. Egan, 484 U.S. at 530-31.
The Court held that, in an appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7513 based on the denial of a
security clearance, the Board has authority to review only whether: (1) an
executive branch employer determined that the employee’s position required a
security clearance; (2) the clearance was denied or revoked; (3) the employee was
provided with the procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513; and
(4) transfer to a non-sensitive position was feasible when another source, such as
a statute or regulation, provides the employee a substantive right to such
reassignment. See Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1151 (citing Egan, 484 U.S. at 530);
Griffin v. Defense Mapping Agency, 864 F.2d 1579, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Buelna v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 14 n.5 (2014).
The Court ruled that “[n]othing in the [statute enacting 5 U.S.C. § 7513] . . .
direct[ed] or empower[ed] the Board to go further.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 530. Our
review is therefore limited to the issues set forth in Egan.
¶9 In applying the limited scope of review under Egan, we must affirm the
agency’s removal action. See Ingram, 120 M.S.P.R. 420, ¶¶ 12-13. The
appellant’s position of Accounting Technician required that he maintain
eligibility to occupy a non-critical sensitive position. I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtabs
4k, 4l, 4m; I-2, IAF, Tab 10 at 7; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 10, 58.
Furthermore, the WHS CAF issued a letter denying the appellant eligibility for
6
access to classified information and/or occupancy of a sensitive position. I-1,
IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4g; I-2, IAF, Tab 10 at 9. 3 In addition, the agency complied
with the procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513 in removing the
appellant from his position. Specifically, the agency provided the appellant with
30 days’ advance written notice of the proposed removal, reasons for the
proposed action, and a reasonable opportunity to reply. I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtab
4f; see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1)-(2). The agency notified the appellant of his right
to be represented by an attorney and provided him with a written decision letter.
I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtabs 4c, 4f; see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(3)-(4). Therefore, the
agency complied with the requirements set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 7513 in removing
the appellant. There is no indication in the record that the agency was required to
consider transferring the appellant to a non-sensitive position. See I-1, IAF, Tab
6, Subtab 1 at 11-12.
The appellant has not proven that the agency violated his due process rights.
¶10 In its response to the Order issued by the Clerk of the Board, the agency
asserts that the court’s holding in Gargiulo—that due process is not required in
the suspension or revocation of a security clearance—should apply in this case to
the revocation of eligibility to occupy a sensitive position. PFR File, Tab 7 at
8-10. The agency therefore contends that the Board “need not consider whether
the [a]ppellant was given due process procedures before a decision maker that
3
The appellant asserts on review that, while the cross petition for review in this case
was pending, “DFAS re-investigated [the a]ppellant’s eligibility to occupy a sensitive
position,” and, following the reinvestigation, restored the appellant to work. PFR File,
Tab 8 at 7. The appellant contends that “[u]pon information and belief, DFAS found
[the a]ppellant to be eligible to occupy a sensitive position and restored him to work in
a sensitive position.” Id. Even assuming that the appellant has been returned to duty in
2014, we find that his 2009 removal, I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtabs 4a, 4c, is still within our
jurisdiction because there is no indication that the appellant has consented to divestiture
of Board jurisdiction or that the agency has completely rescinded the action being
appealed. See Himmel v. Department of Justice, 6 M.S.P.R. 484, 486 (1981).
7
could ultimately change the outcome of the decision” because the Board “can
only consider whether [the a]ppellant was given the appropriate procedures under
5 U.S.C. § 7513,” and there is no dispute that the agency provided those
procedures. PFR File, Tab 7 at 10-11. The appellant, by contrast, asserts that
Gargiulo does not bar the appellant’s constitutional due process claim because
Gargiulo is “limited to shielding from review only those agency procedures and
determinations that are part of the sensitive position eligibility process” and does
not eliminate the due process requirement that an agency appoint a deciding
official with genuine decision-making authority. PFR File, Tab 8 at 4-5, 15-17.
¶11 We recognize that employees do not have a property interest in access to
classified information and that the termination of that access does not implicate
any due process concerns. Flores v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 287,
¶ 9 (2014). Like a security clearance, the granting of eligibility to occupy a
sensitive position is a matter within the Executive’s broad discretion to make
determinations concerning national security. Id. Therefore, just as it is obvious
that no one has a right to a security clearance, it is likewise clear that an
employee has no property interest in eligibility to occupy a sensitive position, and
the denial of the appellant’s eligibility to occupy a sensitive position is not itself
subject to due process requirements. Id.
¶12 Nevertheless, by virtue of being an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511, and
thus removable only for cause, the appellant did have a property interest in his
continued employment. Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶ 10. Therefore, he was
entitled to due process, including notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond,
prior to being removed. Id.; see Gargiulo, 727 F.3d at 1185 (although Mr.
Gargiulo had no due process rights relating to the procedures used to determine
whether to suspend or revoke his security clearance, he did have due process
rights concerning his indefinite suspension). It is the appellant’s removal, not his
loss of eligibility to occupy a sensitive position, that triggered due process
protections. Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶ 10. The Board may review the due
8
process protections afforded in the removal proceedings without second guessing
the underlying eligibility determination. Id.; see Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 15
(the Court did not have occasion in Egan to decide if the Board was authorized to
consider a claim that an agency denied due process in taking an adverse action
based on a security clearance determination).
¶13 In Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶¶ 3-4, 26-28, which involved an indefinite
suspension based in part on the suspension of a security clearance, the Board held
that, if there are “viable alternatives” to the indefinite suspension, due process
requires that the employee be afforded an opportunity to invoke the discretion of
a deciding official with authority to select such alternatives. The Board found
that the right to invoke the deciding official’s discretion exists only in such cases
where there is doubt as to the appropriateness or necessity of the penalty and that
due process does not demand that the deciding official consider alternatives that
are prohibited, impracticable, or outside management’s purview. Id., ¶ 27.
¶14 In the instant matter, the deciding official indicated in her decision letter
that “I have no authority to review, change, or influence the determination made
by CAF concerning either your access to sensitive information or whether your
reply was timely filed.” I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4c. The deciding official also
noted in the decision letter that the agency had no available positions that did not
require access to sensitive information. Id.; HT at 14, 16 (testimony of the
deciding official that she “had to remove” the appellant because all of the
positions at DFAS were categorized as non-critical sensitive, and there were no
positions that were not classified that way). She further noted that “I have
decided to take this action because your continued assignment to a set of
temporary, non-sensitive duties for an indefinite period of time does not promote
the efficiency of the service.” I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4c. In addition, the
agency’s representative indicated that DFAS “has no ability to impact, negotiate
or change the risk determinations made by the DOD WHS,” and “DFAS is bound
by the risk determinations notwithstanding DFAS’ desire to keep what it might
9
determine are excellent employees in DFAS’ employ.” I-1, IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 1
at 11-12. The deciding official testified that she did not consider any penalty
other than removal and did not conduct a Douglas factor analysis because “I
didn’t have a choice. That was the only thing that we, that we had, only option
we had.” HT at 16. The deciding official testified that, because all DFAS
positions were classified as non-critical sensitive, there were no positions to
which she could have assigned the appellant. Id. at 14, 16. She further testified
that she did not have a choice in deciding to remove the appellant, that she was
told that she had to remove him, and that she would not have removed him if she
had been given the choice. Id. at 18-19. The deciding official testified that,
although she signed the decision letter, she did not prepare it. Id. at 19.
¶15 The appellant has not identified any viable alternatives to his removal in
this case, and we find no such alternatives. Given the record evidence
establishing that all positions within DFAS were classified as non-critical
sensitive, any alternative to removal that would have retained the appellant in his
Accounting Technician position, reassigned him to another position within
DFAS, or indefinitely assigned him to non-sensitive duties without his being
assigned to a position in the civil service was either prohibited, impracticable, or
outside the purview of DFAS management. See 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1) (defining
“employee” as an individual appointed in the civil service); 5 U.S.C. § 2101(1)
(the “civil service” consists of all appointive positions in the executive, judicial,
and legislative branches); Bracey v. Office of Personnel Management, 236 F.3d
1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We are aware of no setting in the federal
employment system in which an employee is considered to hold a ‘position’
consisting of a set of ungraded, unclassified duties that have been assigned to that
employee on an ad hoc basis.”); cf. McFadden v. Department of Defense,
85 M.S.P.R. 18, ¶ 20 (1999) (an agency is not obligated to accommodate a
disabled employee by permanently assigning her to light-duty tasks when those
tasks do not comprise a complete and separate position).
10
¶16 When an agency has effected an indefinite suspension without pay pending
the completion of an investigation and/or resolution of an appellant’s security
clearance status, the Board has suggested that placement on administrative leave
“may” be a viable alternative to suspension without pay. See Buelna,
121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶¶ 4, 28. Here, however, there was no pending adjudication of
the appellant’s eligibility to occupy a non-critical sensitive position. Rather, such
eligibility had been denied and the appellant’s removal had been proposed. Even
assuming that there was a “practicable” alternative in the sense that someone in
DFAS management may have had the authority to create a non-sensitive position
for the appellant to occupy, see Haeuser v. Department of Law, Government of
Guam, 97 F.3d 1152, 1159 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (contrasting the terms
“practicable” and “practical,” with “practicable” referring to something that can
be put into effect, and “practical” referring to something that is also sensible and
worthwhile), the Board does not have the authority to determine whether such an
alternative would be practicable, see Skees v. Department of the Navy, 864 F.2d
1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“If the Board cannot review the employee’s loss of
security clearance, it is even further beyond question that it cannot review the
Navy’s judgment that the position itself requires the clearance.”); see also
Conyers, 733 F.3d at 1155 (“Egan, at its core, explained that it is essential for the
President and the DOD to have broad discretion in making determinations
concerning national security.”). The Board is not permitted to second-guess the
agency’s determination to classify positions as non-critical sensitive.
Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not established a due process
violation in the absence of a showing that there were viable alternatives to his
removal. See Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶¶ 26-28.
The appellant has not proven harmful error.
¶17 The administrative judge found that the appellant did not prove that the
agency committed harmful error when it failed to forward a letter it had received
from the appellant’s bankruptcy attorney to the CAF. ID at 4, 12-13. This letter
11
was sent to the agency in response to the CAF’s Statement of Reasons (SOR) to
Deny Eligibility for Occupancy of a Sensitive Position, indicated that the
appellant had filed a bankruptcy petition to “help resolve his financial situation,”
and enclosed a copy of the appellant’s outstanding creditors listed on his
bankruptcy petition. I-2, IAF, Tab 10 at 17-28, 37. The administrative judge
held that there was no violation of agency procedures because the letter in
question was not signed by the appellant or provided by a representative
designated by the appellant. ID at 12. She further found, in any event, that the
appellant did not show that he was subjected to harm because the letter contained
additional evidence of the appellant’s delinquent accounts with no evidence that
they had been resolved. ID at 12-13. The administrative judge held that,
although the appellant argued that the CAF’s decision would have been
appealable if the agency had treated the letter as a response and forwarded it to
the CAF, “[h]e does not argue, nor does the record show, that the CAF in receipt
of the letter was likely to have found the appellant eligible for a [non-critical
sensitive] position.” ID at 13.
¶18 The appellant asserts in his cross petition for review that the administrative
judge erroneously found that the agency did not violate its procedures and that
the appellant was not subjected to harm as a result of the alleged error. PFR File,
Tab 4 at 26-32. In this regard, the appellant contends that the agency’s point of
contact (POC) between the CAF and the appellant was responsible for ensuring
that the appellant understood the procedures for responding to the SOR and that
the appellant’s response was forwarded to the CAF. Id. at 27. The appellant
asserts that the POC did not forward the letter he received from the appellant’s
bankruptcy attorney to the CAF or at least ask the appellant whether that letter
was intended to be his response to the SOR. Id. at 28-29. The appellant further
contends that, if the POC had forwarded the letter to the CAF as a response to the
SOR, the CAF would have based its letter of denial on the facts of the appellant’s
financial situation, rather than on his failure to timely respond to the SOR, and
12
likely would have granted the appellant conditional eligibility and reexamined his
financial record at a later time. Id. at 29-31.
¶19 Pursuant to DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, “[t]he head of the local
organization of the individual receiving an SOR shall designate a POC to serve as
a liaison between the CAF and the individual.” I-2, IAF, Tab 12 at 71, 86. “The
duties of the POC will include, but not necessarily be limited to, delivering the
SOR; having the individual acknowledge receipt of the SOR; determining
whether the individual intends to respond within the time specified; ensuring that
the individual understands the consequences of the proposed action, as well as the
[need] to respond in a timely fashion”; explaining how to obtain time extensions
and procure copies of investigative records as well as the procedures for
responding to the SOR; and ensuring that the individual understands that he can
obtain legal counsel or other assistance at his own expense. Id. at 86-87. No
unfavorable administrative action shall be taken unless the individual concerned
has been afforded an opportunity to reply in writing to the CAF within 30
calendar days. Id. A failure to reply within that time period “will result in
forfeiture of all future appeal rights with regard to the unfavorable administrative
action,” and responses to the CAF must be forwarded through the head of the
employing organization. Id. at 86-87.
¶20 The appellant has not identified any particular provision of DOD
Regulation 5200.2-R that the agency violated when it apparently determined that
the letter from the bankruptcy attorney did not constitute a response to the SOR.
See HT at 23, 28-29 (testimony of a POC that the letter from the bankruptcy
attorney was not a response to the SOR, but merely information forwarded to the
POC to assist the POC in helping the appellant respond to the SOR). Even
assuming, however, that the agency committed a procedural error, the appellant
has not shown that the agency likely would have reached a different result in the
absence of such an error. Harmful error is error by the agency in the application
of its procedures that is likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion
13
different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(3). Although the appellant established that it was possible
that the CAF could issue a conditional letter of eligibility if it is informed that an
employee has filed a bankruptcy petition, see HT at 38-39, he has not shown that
it is likely that the CAF in this case would have reached a different conclusion if
it had known that the appellant had filed a bankruptcy petition, see Johnson v.
Department of Transportation, 24 M.S.P.R. 475, 476 (1984); see also Parker v.
Defense Logistics Agency, 1 M.S.P.R. 505, 514 (1980) (the mere theoretical
possibility of prejudice cannot suffice as a basis for inferring actual prejudice).
Thus, he has not shown that it is likely that the agency would not have removed
him in the absence of any procedural error.
¶21 Accordingly, the agency’s petition for review is GRANTED, the
appellant’s cross petition for review is DENIED, the initial decision is
REVERSED, and the appellant’s removal is SUSTAINED.
ORDER
¶22 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.113(c)).
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
the court at the following address:
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, DC 20439
The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
14
2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held
that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and
that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.
Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.
Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.
Additional information is available at the court’s website,
www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se
Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of
Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court
appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of
attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for
Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems
Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor
warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
FOR THE BOARD:
______________________________
William D. Spencer
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.