Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Sep 15 2014, 8:58 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ERIN L. BERGER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF J.C., )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 87A01-1403-JV-134
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE WARRICK CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David O. Kelley, Judge
Cause No. 87C01-1112-JD-314
September 15, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J.C. brings this interlocutory appeal to challenge the juvenile court’s determination
that he is competent to stand trial.1 J.C. presents one issue for our review, which we
revise and restate as whether the juvenile court’s finding that J.C. is competent to stand
trial is clearly erroneous.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 19, 2011, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition against J.C.
alleging that he committed child molesting, as a Class B felony, if committed by an adult.
On August 20, 2012, J.C. moved for a psychiatric examination to determine whether he
was competent to confront a juvenile adjudication. Following a hearing on September
20, the juvenile court requested an evaluation by Dr. Sean Samuels, a licensed Clinical
Psychologist and Master of Legal Studies. Dr. Samuels’ evaluation of J.C. included a
diagnostic interview, mental status examination, juvenile adjudicative competence
interview, documentation review, and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. He noted the
“presence of a Pervasive Developmental Disorder (i.e. Autistic Disorder)” and concluded
that, at that time, J.C.
[did] not have the basic capacities associated with competence to stand trial
in juvenile court given significant difficulties in the areas of appreciation
and understanding of charges, penalties, and pleas; understanding and
appreciation of trial participant’s roles; ability to assist counsel; and ability
to make a decision in his best interest.
Appellant’s App. at 16.
1
J.C. is no longer a minor but remains within the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
See Ind. Code § 31-30-2-1(a).
2
Based on the conclusion of Dr. Samuels, on February 14, 2013, J.C. moved to
dismiss the State’s petition. At the conclusion of a hearing on March 14, at which Dr.
Samuels testified, the juvenile court took J.C.’s motion under advisement and, on March
28, after finding an additional evaluation necessary, ordered a second evaluation of J.C.
by Dr. Willard Whitehead, a psychiatrist. Dr. Whitehead’s evaluation of J.C. involved
document review, an interview of J.C., a mental status examination, and an assessment of
the thirteen McGarry criteria for competency to stand trial.2 In contrast to Dr. Samuel’s
opinion, Dr. Whitehead concluded that “the diagnostic criteria for Autism and Asperger’s
were not met,” and he opined that J.C. “has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceeding against him.” Id. at 30.
The court then held a competency hearing on January 16, 2014, at which Dr.
Whitehead testified. Following that hearing, the juvenile court found J.C. competent to
stand trial. In relevant part, the court’s order stated:
The standard for competency to stand trial was established by the
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402[, 402] (1960)[,]
with a one word sentence requiring that the defendant “has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.”
***
2
The thirteen McGarry criteria, as delineated in Dr. Whitehead’s report, are Appraisal of
Available Legal Defenses, Unmanageable Behavior, Quality of Relating to Attorney, Planning of Legal
Strategy, Appraisal of the Roles of the Principal Participants in the Court Room, Understanding
Courtroom Procedure, Appreciation of Charges, Appreciation of Range and Nature of Possible Penalties,
Appraisal of Likely Outcome, Capacity to Disclose Available Pertinent Facts, Capacity to Realistically
Challenge Prosecution Witnesses, Capacity to Communicate Coherently, and Self-Serving vs. Self-
Defeating Motivation. Appellant’s App. at 27-30.
3
Dr. Samuels used the Wechsler Adult Intelligen[ce] Scale and a
Juvenile Adjudication Comprehensive Interview.
Dr. Whitehead used the “McGarry Criteria” which uses 13 situations
to determine competency to stand trial. This assessment tool (CAI) was
developed by A. Louis McGarry at the Harvard Medical School.
The Court finds that the McGarry criteria addressed the necessary
issues in greater detail and addressed the ultimate question in far greater
detail.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the juvenile has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational certainty and is therefore competent to stand trial for the
allegations of the delinquency petition.
Id. at 32-33. J.C. then filed this interlocutory appeal, which we accepted.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
J.C. contends that the juvenile court erred when it found him competent to stand
trial, and therefore, when it denied his Motion to Dismiss.3 In In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d
631, 635 (Ind. 2004), our supreme court addressed the issue of competency in juvenile
delinquency proceedings as follows:
[A] juvenile alleged to be delinquent has the constitutional right to have her
competency determined before she is subjected to delinquency proceedings.
A juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled to have the court apply
those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason
have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). Without question, these include the
right to adequate notice of the charges, appointment of counsel, the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront
opposing witnesses. Id. at 31, 34, 39, 41, 42, 56. The cornerstone of these
substantive rights is competence to understand the nature of the charge and
to assist in a defense. In our view the want of competence renders the other
rights meaningless. “[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone.” Id. at 13. “It has long been accepted that a
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
3
Because the competence issue is dispositive, we do not address the juvenile court’s denial of
J.C.’s motion to dismiss.
4
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to
a trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see also Wallace v.
State, 486 N.E.2d 445, 453 (Ind. 1985) (“An accused has a constitutional
right not to be tried if he does not have the ability to comprehend the
proceedings or to assist in his defense.”). Principles of fundamental
fairness require that this right be afforded in juvenile proceedings.
Further:
The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which
allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the parents.
***
[T]he parens patriae doctrine gives juvenile courts power to further
the best interests of the child, which implies a broad discretion unknown in
the adult criminal court system.
***
In essence the code affords juvenile courts a degree of discretion and
flexibility, unparalleled in the criminal code, to address the needs of
children and to act in their best interests.
Id. at 635-37.
We review “[d]eterminations of competency to stand trial . . . under the clearly
erroneous standard.”4 Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2009). We reverse
the juvenile court only if its determination is “unsupported by the facts and circumstances
before the trial court together with any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id.
In finding whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial court, as the trier of
4
We note that J.C. points us to the wrong standard of review (de novo) and, without reference to
the case’s subsequent history, relies on State v. Coats, 981 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), vacated, 3
N.E.3d 528 (Ind. 2014), for support. However, as the preceding citation explains, our supreme court
vacated the decision in Coats, which means, of course, that the case is not good law. See Chandler v. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 658 N.E2d 80, 80 n.1 (Ind. 1995). In any event, Coats dealt with a specific issue of
statutory interpretation that warranted de novo review, which is not present here. See Coats, 3 N.E.3d at
531.
5
fact, decides what weight is to be given to expert testimony. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs.
Admin. v. Hospitality House of Bedford, 783 N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “We
will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses when reviewing the
trial court’s judgment. The relative weight to be accorded conflicting experts rests within
the exclusive province of the trial court as the trier of fact and will not be disturbed . . . on
review.” Id.; see also State v. J.S., 937 N.E.2d 831, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“It was for
the juvenile court to assess the credibility of the reports and the parties, weigh the
evidence, and reach a conclusion as to competency.”).
In light of this standard, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s judgment is clearly
erroneous. When faced with a competency determination, the court solicited the opinion
of Dr. Samuels. After hearing testimony from Dr. Samuels and after submission of his
evaluation, the trial court determined that it could not decide the issue without more.
Thus, it appointed a second expert, Dr. Whitehead, who also testified and submitted a
report. When the experts’ opinions conflicted, the court, as the trier of fact, weighed the
evidence and assigned greater credibility to the opinion of Dr. Whitehead. Specifically,
the juvenile court found that Dr. Whitehead’s methods—his use of the McGarry
criteria—“addressed the necessary issues in greater detail and addressed the ultimate
question in far greater detail.” Appellant’s App. at 33. Whitehead’s assessment supports
the court’s judgment.
Thus, the juvenile court’s judgment is not clearly erroneous. Because its decision
is supported by the facts and circumstances before it, including the reasonable inferences
6
drawn therefrom, the juvenile court reasonably exercised its exclusive power to weigh the
evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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