and fall. Appellant further failed to show that Clark County had express
knowledge of the alleged condition, the district court found, and thus, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. This
appeal followed.
This court reviews summary judgments de novo. Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and other evidence on file, viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. To withstand
summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rely solely on general
allegations and conclusions set forth in the pleadings, but must instead
present specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual
issue supporting her claims. NRCP 56(e); see also Wood, 121 Nev. at 731,
121 P.3d at 1030-31.
Appellant argues on appeal that the factual dispute regarding
who had control of the area where appellant fell should be resolved by a
jury, and that the facts, among others, that the area was near the front of
Planet Hollywood, that Planet Hollywood's construction had been going on
shortly before appellant's fall, and that there was no way to walk to Planet
Hollywood from the direction appellant approached without walking on
the boards create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary
judgment. Appellant also argues that NRS 41.033 does not shield Clark
County from liability when Clark County was aware of the hazardous
condition.
Having considered the parties' briefs and appendices, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
in favor of respondents. Respondents submitted evidence in support of
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their summary judgment motion showing that the Planet Hollywood
construction project was completed before the date that appellant alleges
she fell and that they were not engaged in construction in the area where
appellant alleges she fell. In response, appellant failed to produce any
evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to
whether respondents were responsible for the condition of the sidewalk in
the area where appellant alleges she fell, despite that she was allowed
additional time to conduct discovery to determine who was in control of
the area. NRCP 56(e); see also Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1030-31
(concluding that while pleadings and other proof must be construed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that party must set forth
specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial).
Additionally, appellant failed to provide any evidence that creates a
genuine issue of material fact for trial as whether Clark County had
express knowledge of any hazardous condition of the sidewalk. See NRS
41.033 (prohibiting actions against political subdivisions of the state based
on failure to discover a hazard). We therefore conclude that the district
court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of respondents,
and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
A
Hardesty
Ct.A AA;
, J.
Douglas Cherry
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cc: Hon. Douglas Smith, District Judge
Kathleen J. England, Settlement Judge
Stovall & Associates
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP/Las Vegas
Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP
Eighth District Court Clerk
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