habeas corpus petition is not a substitute for and does not affect the
remedy of direct review); NRS 34.730(3) (providing that the clerk of the
district court shall file a habeas corpus petition as a new action separate
and distinct from any original proceeding in which a conviction has been
had); Daniels v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 580, 688 P.2d 315, 316 (1984)
(recognizing that a post-conviction proceeding is separate from the direct
appeal), overruled on other grounds by Varwig v. State, 104 Nev. 40, 752
P.2d 760 (1988); Groesbeck v. Warden, 100 Nev. 259, 260, 679 P.2d 1268,
1268-69 (1984) (recognizing that a post-conviction habeas corpus petition
is a petition seeking collateral review).
Nevertheless, we affirm the denial of the petition because it
lacked merit. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341
(1970) (holding that a correct result will not be reversed simply because it
is based on the wrong reason). The July 9, 2004, decision to grant parole
in cases C182002/C182000 stated that appellant could be granted parole
to his consecutive sentence "effective . . . when eligible." The record
indicates that appellant would not have been eligible for parole until
November 2004. However, after the decision to grant parole, but before
his eligibility for parole in this case, appellant was convicted in case
C181882 and sentenced to serve a total of two consecutive terms of 48 to
120 months, concurrent to this case. NRS 213.1213(1) provides that
eligibility for parole for a prisoner sentenced to two or more concurrent
sentences is based on the sentence with the longest term before the
prisoner is eligible for parole. Because the sentences in case C181882
were imposed to run concurrently with this case and because parole
eligibility for case C181882 provided a longer term than parole eligibility
in this case, the sentences in case C181882 are controlling. Thus,
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appellant was not eligible for parole in cases C182002/C182000 in 2004. 2
Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Department of Corrections made
any error in structuring his sentences and calculating his parole eligibility
dates. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3
/1,..toet4; , J.
Hardesty
es
Douglas iris Cherry
2 It does not appear from the documents in the record that the July
2004 decision to grant parole was ever formally rescinded by the Parole
Board. Regardless of whether the 2004 decision was formally rescinded,
the condition precedent required by the decision—that appellant be
eligible for parole—was not met in this case. Because appellant was never
actually paroled from one sentence to another, he failed to demonstrate
that he had a liberty interest in this decision or that any due process right
was violated. See Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17 (1981); see also Kelch
v. Dir. Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 107 Nev. 827, 830, 822 P.2d 1094, 1095
(1991).
3We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in
proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude
that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent
that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those
submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings
below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance.
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(0) I947A 401:c.
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Christopher D. Mack
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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