Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 29 2014, 10:21 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SCOTT L. BARNHART GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Keffer Barnhart LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
COREY HAMERSLEY )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 53A05-1309-CR-477
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Kenneth Todd, Judge
Cause No. 53C03-1205-FA-458
September 29, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge
Following a jury trial, Corey Hamersley was convicted of Attempted Murder,1 a
class A felony; Criminal Recklessness as a class C felony;2 Criminal Recklessness as a
class D felony;3 and Resisting Law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor.4 Hamersley
was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of thirty-four years with six years suspended and
the balance executed. Hamersley presents three issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Hamersley’s
motion to continue the jury trial?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence
Hamersley’s statement to police?
3. Is the sentence imposed inappropriate?
1
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-5-1 (West, Westlaw 2012) (attempt); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (West,
Westlaw current through 2012 Second Regular Session) (murder). The version of the attempt statute in
effect at the time this offense was committed classified attempted murder as a class A felony. This statute
has since been revised and in its current form reclassifies the offense as a Level 1 felony. See I.C. § 35-
41-5-1 (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular Session and
Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly). The new classification, however,
applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014. See id. Because this offense was committed
on May 11, 2012, it retains the former classification.
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-2(c)(3)(A) (West, Westlaw 2012) (shooting a firearm into an inhabited dwelling). The
version of the criminal recklessness statute in effect at the time of this offense was committed classified
this offense as a class C felony. This statute has since been revised and in its current form reclassifies the
offense as a Level 5 felony. See I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a),(b)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw current with all 2014
Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular Session and Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th
General Assembly). The new classification, however, applies only to offenses committed on or after July
1, 2014. See id. Because this offense was committed on May 11, 2012, it retains the former
classification.
3
I.C. § 35-42-2-2(b)(1), (c)(2)(A) (firing shots in an occupied neighborhood). The version of the
criminal recklessness statute in effect at the time of this offense was committed classified this offense as a
class D felony. This statute has since been revised and in its current form reclassifies the offense as a
Level 6 felony. See I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a),(b)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of
the 2014 Second Regular Session and Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly).
The new classification, however, applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014. See id.
Because this offense was committed on May 11, 2012, it retains the former classification.
4
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-44.1-3-1 (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second
Regular Session and Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly). This statute has
been revised, but in its current form, the offense for which Hamersley was convicted remains unchanged.
We therefore have cited to the current version of the statute.
2
We affirm.
In May 2012, Hamersley was a twenty-one-year-old student at Indiana University
in Bloomington. Hamersley lived in the Terra Trace apartment complex on the south
side of 15th Street near the intersection of 15th and Lincoln. Margaret and David
Greischar lived in a one-story, yellow house on the north side of 15th Street, across from
Terra Trace.
On the morning of May 11, 2012, at approximately 6:30 a.m., Margaret awoke to
the sound of gunfire, which she initially believed to be fireworks. Margaret called the
police to report the disturbance. Margaret then stepped out onto her front porch, which
faced Terra Trace, and could hear a male yelling in a “very angry” voice. Transcript at
344. In the same timeframe, Jason Heap, who lived at Terra Trace, heard a popping noise
and looked outside his apartment window. Heap saw Hamersley, who was naked but
wearing a hat on his head, crawling up a hill on the other side of the street. Heap did not
see any other persons with Hamersley. Heap also observed that Hamersley had a gun in
his hand.
Shortly thereafter, Margaret’s husband, David, went outside the house and was
confronted by a naked Hamersley. Hamersley asked David, “which window would you
like?”, implying that he was going to shoot out the windows to the house. Id. at 355.
David rushed back into the house and told Margaret to call 911 because “he’s got a gun.”
Id. at 346.
3
While Margaret was on the phone, Hamersley appeared at the back door to the
house and tried to push his way in. Margaret and David braced themselves against the
door and managed to secure it. Margaret noted that Hamersley had “really wide eyes, he
looked very wild, and he was talking crazy,” saying things like, “where are my demons?”
Id. at 347. Margaret also noticed that Hamersley had a silver handgun. Margaret and
David sought safety by hunkering down behind a refrigerator on the other side of the
kitchen. Hamersley continued pounding on the door and trying to gain entry. The
pounding stopped and shortly thereafter, Hamersley began firing shots into the house.
One bullet passed within two feet of the Greischars and lodged in a kitchen wall. The
Greischars crawled into their living room and sought cover behind a heavy oak desk.
Hamersley finally moved away from the Greischars’ back door and started walking down
the alley.
Another neighbor, Samantha Weigel, witnessed Hamersley firing shots at the
Greischars’ home. She overheard Hamersley saying, “come on guys we’ll fire again on
three,” after which Hamersley counted to three and fired more shots in rapid succession
at the Greischars’ door. Weigel did not see any other individuals with Hamersley.
Hamersley did not appear to Weigel to be staggering or stumbling around. Rather, she
explained that Hamersley took an “affirmative,” “purposeful” stance when he fired his
gun. Id. at 484.
Officer Dana Runnebohm of the Bloomington Police Department responded to the
scene. Officer Runnebohm first encountered Hamersley near the Greischars’ home and
saw Hamersley raise his right arm and fire his gun into the air. Officer Runnebohm
4
described Hamersley as being “deliberate in his actions.” Id. at 426. Officer Runnebohm
positioned herself behind a tree, pointed her service weapon at Hamersley, and yelled at
him several times, “police, drop your weapon.” Id. at 427. Hamersley took a “shooter’s
stance” with both hands on his gun and fired a shot in Officer Runnebohm’s direction.
Id. at 430. When Hamersley pulled the trigger, Officer Runnebohm heard Hamersley
say, “you will.”5 Id. at 434. Officer Runnebohm retreated to a garage area for better
protection. Hamersley then moved closer to the Greischars’ home and fired more shots at
the house. Officer Runnebohm then moved back to her position near the tree and again
ordered Hamersley to drop his weapon. Hamersley took a few steps in Officer
Runnebohm’s direction and again, taking a shooter’s stance with both hands on his gun,
fired his weapon at Officer Runnebohm a second time.
Additional officers arrived at the scene as Hamersley walked down the alley
toward Terra Trace. Hamersley did not comply with those officers’ commands to drop
his weapon, so those officers opened fire on Hamersley, shooting him twice, once in the
back of each leg. While on the ground, Hamersley thrashed his legs around and tried to
kick the officers who were trying to subdue him. Hamersley also stiffened his arms to
keep from being handcuffed. The officers managed to seize Hamersley’s weapon, which
was identified as a nine-millimeter Ruger P-89 semiautomatic pistol.
A crime-scene investigation recovered seventeen nine-millimeter casings in the
area of 15th Street and Terra Trace. Additionally sixteen casings of that type were
5
Officer Runnebohm could not hear what Hamersley ended this statement with or if he even spoke
additional words.
5
recovered from behind the Greischars’ home. Seven of Hamersley’s bullets left holes in
the Greischars’ rear door and one bullet went through the doorknob. In total, six bullets
entered the Greischars’ home. One bullet lodged in a wall near the refrigerator, having
narrowly missed Margaret and David. Hamersley also fired shots at two cars parked in
the alleyway beside the Greischars’ home, both of which sustained bullet damage. All
thirty-three casings were analyzed and determined to have been fired from Hamersley’s
gun. Hamersley’s gun had a fifteen-round magazine, which meant that with one bullet in
the chamber, the gun could carry a total of sixteen rounds.
Immediately after being taken into custody, Hamersley was transported to
Bloomington Hospital, arriving at 7:28 a.m. Hamersley underwent surgery for his
gunshot wounds. After a brief time in recovery, Hamersley was taken to a private room
on the fourth floor short-stay unit. Nurse Mary Senior attended to him upon his arrival in
his room. Nurse Senior noted that Hamersley’s vital signs were normal, that he was alert
and cooperative and tracked her movements around the room. Hamersley answered
questions appropriately and knew his name, his date of birth, and was aware that he had
undergone surgery. Hamersley did not appear disoriented, confused, or scared, and in
fact, was able to clearly speak, explaining to Nurse Senior that he was a student at
Indiana University and that he thought he might be under arrest for murder. Hamersley
never complained of dizziness or abnormal sensations and he never referred to objects
that were not present.
While being tended to by Nurse Senior, Hamersley initiated a conversation with
an officer who was waiting in the alcove of his hospital room. Specifically, Hamersley
6
inquired about the officer’s weapon and then asked the officer where his (i.e.,
Hamersley’s) gun was located and indicated that he wanted it back. The officer noted
that Hamersley was oriented, that he was tracking the conversation, and that his mood
and reactions appeared normal.
At 1:03 p.m., Detective Sarah Carnes of the Bloomington Police Department
conducted an audio recorded interview of Hamersley in his hospital room. The interview
lasted approximately an hour and twenty-three minutes. Detective Carnes read
Hamersley his Miranda rights. Hamersley stated that he did not have any questions about
those rights and noted he “can” make the process quicker by “not” talking to Detective
Carnes. State’s Exhibit 185. Hamersley then proceeded to answer questions. Detective
Carnes transitioned the interview from general background questions to Hamersley’s
memory of the events of the previous night and earlier that morning. At all times during
the interview, Hamersley was oriented as to time and place, was “very cooperative” and
“polite,” and was able to track the conversation and respond appropriately to questions.
Transcript at 1019. Detective Carnes had no concerns that Hamersley was intoxicated at
the time she interviewed him.
During his trial testimony, Hamersley admitted that he ingested a liquid form of
LSD, consumed alcohol, and smoked marijuana. Hamersley told Detective Carnes that
he had been to three bars, the names of which he recalled, between the hours of 7:00 p.m.
and 3:00 a.m. After the bars closed, Hamersley walked home. Although Hamersley did
not have a dog, he claimed that later that morning, he took his dog for a walk. He further
explained to her that while out walking his dog in the nude, he was shot by police once in
7
each calf with their “bean bag guns”. Id. Hamersley was “pretty sure [he] had a gun in
his hand” and that this is why the police shot him. Id. Hamersley also talked about the
presence of helicopters that morning and a swarm of police officers. Hamersley believed
that at some point during the previous night, he had been picked up by undercover
detectives conducting a drug-trafficking investigation. He later stated that the individuals
he knew as Ron and Sprout had acted as undercover police and had driven him around
after the bars closed.
Detective Carnes then revisited the subject of where and how Hamersley had fired
his gun that morning. Hamersley first reiterated that he had only fired his gun into the
air. He also stated that a police officer had approached him and asked to see his gun and
then the officer handed his gun back to him. Hamersley ultimately admitted to Detective
Carnes that he may have fired his gun at a police officer, that he shot out car windows
because “glass is way more fun to break than anything else,” that he shot at the
Greischars’ back door in an attempt to break in, which gave him an “adrenaline rush.”
Exhibit 185. Hamersley told Detective Carnes that he was fully aware of what was going
on and he was in his right mind when he did these things.
Detective Carnes also questioned Hamersley about his intent in shooting at Officer
Runnebohm. Hamersley acknowledged that he shot at the officer when she told him to
drop his weapon. He first claimed that he intended to strike the officer’s “flack jacket”
without hurting the officer. Hamersley then admitted that he “aimed center mass” when
he shot at Officer Runnebohm. Id. Hamersley volunteered, “I was like dude how cool
would it be to say I shot a cop – that was like literally the thought that went through my
8
head before I pulled the trigger.” Id. He concluded by saying, “[n]ot many people can
say they shot a cop and got away with it.” Id.
On May 16, 2012, the State charged Hamersley with attempted murder, a class A
felony; criminal recklessness as a class C felony (shooting a firearm into an inhabited
dwelling); criminal recklessness as a class D felony (firing shots in an occupied
neighborhood); two counts of pointing a firearm, class D felonies; and resisting law
enforcement as a class A misdemeanor.6
On October 30, 2012, Hamersley filed a motion to suppress challenging the
admissibility of his statement to police while he was in the hospital. The basis of
Hamersley’s argument was that he was interrogated while he “was in a state of psychosis
caused by the LSD ingestion that had not resolved.” Appellant’s Appendix at 101. The
trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on March 12 and April 5, 2013.
During the suppression hearing, Hamersley admitted that he had used LSD “upwards of
fifty times over . . . the two years” preceding the instant offense. Transcript at 226.
Hamersley claimed that on May 10, 2012, he voluntarily ingested LSD in liquid form
when his friend, Sprout, provided it to him. Hamersley claims that he fell asleep at a
friend’s house and that he has no memory of the events that followed and that he did not
remember making a statement to Detective Carnes. On May 8, 2013, the trial court
denied Hamersley’s motion to suppress his statement taken on May 11, 2012.
6
The State also charged Hamersley with class D felony possession of a controlled substance and class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, but the State dismissed these charges prior to trial.
9
On May 15, 2013, Hamersley filed a motion to continue the jury trial scheduled
for May 20, 2013, so that he could secure testimony of an expert witness, who Hamersley
claimed would testify about the intoxicating effects of LSD. After holding a hearing on
the motion, the trial court denied Hamersley’s motion for a continuance. Prior to the start
of the trial, Hamersley asked the court to reconsider his motion for continuance, and the
trial court again denied Hamersley’s motion to continue the jury trial.
A jury trial was held from May 20 to May 29, 2013. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the jury found Hamersley guilty of all counts, save one count of pointing a
firearm. The guilty verdict on the remaining charge of pointing a firearm was merged
with the attempted murder conviction.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 30, 2013. The trial court
sentenced Hamersley to thirty years for attempted murder, with twenty-four years
executed and six years suspended; to four years for class C felony criminal recklessness,
to be served consecutively to the attempted murder sentence; to one and one-half years
for class D felony criminal recklessness, to be served consecutively to the attempted
murder sentence and concurrently to the C felony criminal recklessness sentence; and to
one year for resisting law enforcement, to be served concurrently with the attempted
murder sentence. Hamersley therefore received an aggregate sentence of thirty-four
years, with six years suspended and the balance executed. Hamersley now appeals.
1.
Hamersley argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
continue the jury trial so that he could secure the testimony of an expert witness to
10
provide testimony regarding the effects of LSD. Hamersley acknowledges that his
request for a continuance was non-statutory. Where a motion for continuance is filed on
non-statutory grounds, we review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny
the continuance for an abuse of discretion. Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or where the
record demonstrates prejudice to the defendant from a denial of the continuance. Id.
With this standard of review in mind, we also consider that:
Every defendant has the fundamental right to present witnesses in his or her
own defense. This right is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the
prosecutor’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. At the same
time, while the right to present witnesses is of the utmost importance, it is
not absolute. In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the
State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt
and innocence.
Tolliver v. State, 922 N.E.2d 1272, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations and quotations
omitted), trans. denied.
We initially note that months before trial, Hamersley informed the court of his
intentions to call an expert witness who would discuss the effects of LSD on the human
mind. The first expert Hamersley sought retired while the case was still pending.
Hamersley sought a second expert witnesses, but, despite diligent efforts, was unable to
make contact with him. Five days before the jury trial was scheduled to begin,
Hamersley filed his motion to continue to allow him to present the testimony of Dr.
Jonathan Lipman, Ph.D., a forensic consultant and expert witness in neuropharmacology,
11
neurotoxicology, and idiosyncratic effects of drugs and their interactions on human
behavior. Hamersley’s motion to continue was based on his desire to secure testimony
from Dr. Lipman about “the effects of LSD on the human mind.” Appellant’s Appendix
at 234.
In a three-page order denying Hamersley’s motion to continue, the court stated,
“the question of the materiality and admissibility of the expert testimony sought to be
obtained is central to the question of whether the trial should be continued to obtain it.”
Id. at 256. The court continued:
Despite the passage of more than a year from the filing of the charges and
the additional time granted to [Hamersley] to make a demonstration to the
contrary, there is nothing before the Court that evades the principle . . .that
‘temporary mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication is not an
excuse for a crime.’ . . . Or, to state it differently, there is nothing before the
Court that would allow it to conclude that the testimony of a
neuropharmacologist describing ‘the effects of LSD (voluntarily ingested)
on the human mind’ . . is, in and of itself, relevant and material to any issue
which might conceivably provide a defense in this case.”
Id. The trial court determined that Hamersley’s purported defense was simply an
argument about voluntary intoxication, which the court noted is not a defense to a crime
under Indiana law. See Berry v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35, 42 (Ind. 2012) (holding that
“temporary mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for a
crime”). The trial court therefore concluded that because the sought-after testimony was
not relevant or material to a legal defense, there was no just reason to delay the trial.
We agree with the trial court’s assessment. “[V]oluntary intoxication is not a
defense in a prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration in
determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense. See Orta v.
12
State, 940 N.E.2d 370, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code Ann. §
35-41-2-5 (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular
Session and Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly). The
Indiana Supreme Court has held that I.C. § 35-41-2-5 eliminates the requirement that a
voluntarily intoxicated defendant have acted “knowingly” or “intentionally” as to those
crimes that include those elements. Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 517 (Ind. 2001).
Therefore, voluntary intoxication is sufficient to place the voluntarily intoxicated
offender at risk for the consequences of his actions, “even if it is claimed that the capacity
has been obliterated to achieve the otherwise requisite mental state for a specific crime.”
Id. In other words, evidence of voluntary intoxication does not negate a defendant’s
mens rea, but rather satisfies it. Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509.
Hamersley explained to the court during the hearing on his motion to continue that
on the morning of the incident, he was “in a psychotic state due to an ingestion of LSD.”
Transcript at 251. In his motion to continue, Hamersley explained the importance of Dr.
Lipman’s testimony, asserting that the jury would need “an understanding of the effects
of LSD as it may preclude any possibility of conviction on the charge of attempted
murder based upon an understanding that a person who is laboring under psychosis
cannot form the requisite specific intent to commit the crime of attempted murder.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 234.
13
As noted, Hamersley does not deny that he voluntarily7 ingested LSD.
Hamersley’s conduct thereafter was a product of his voluntary intoxication. The trial
court was correct in concluding that Dr. Lipman’s testimony about the effect of LSD on
the human mind related to his voluntary intoxication, which, as noted, is not a legal
defense in Indiana. Because such evidence was not relevant to a legal defense, it would
not have been admissible. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hamersley’s motion to continue so he could secure such testimony.
To the extent Hamersley frames his argument as a challenge to the effect of the
denial of his motion to continue, i.e., to exclude Dr. Lipman as a witness in support of his
defense and in support of his argument that his statement to police was involuntary, such
argument fails because Hamersley failed to make an offer to prove at trial. See Harman
v. State, 4 N.E.3d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. To reverse a trial court’s
decision to exclude evidence, there must have been error by the court that affected the
defendant’s substantial rights and the defendant must have made an offer of proof or the
7
An involuntary intoxication defense is not supported by the facts. An involuntary intoxication defense
disputes the existence of intent. Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. 2000). I.C. § 35-41-3-5 (West,
Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular Session and Second Regular
Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly) provides: “It is a defense that the person who engaged
in the prohibited conduct did so while he was intoxicated, only if the intoxication resulted from the
introduction of a substance into his body: (1) without his consent; or (2) when he did not know that the
substance might cause intoxication.” As noted above, Hamersley admitted that he voluntarily ingested
LSD. In fact, Hamersley admitted that he had used LSD “upwards of fifty times over the [preceding] two
years.” Transcript at 226. Hamersley described his prior experiences with LSD, but claims that he did
not know it could cause intoxication. Hamersley’s statements are self-serving and do not establish
involuntary intoxication.
Further, to the extent that Hamersley argues that his intoxication rose to the level of psychosis, we note
that “temporary mental incapacity, when induced by voluntary intoxication, normally furnishes no legal
excuse, or defense to, a crime.” Jackson v. State, 273 Ind. 49, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980) (cited in Berry
v. State, 969 N.E.2d at 38). Thus, any evidence that Hamersley’s voluntary ingestion of LSD may have
resulted in a psychosis would not have supported an involuntary intoxication defense.
14
evidence must have been clear from the context. Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274 (Ind.
2004). An offer to prove consists of three parts: “(1) the substance of the evidence, (2) an
explanation of its relevance, and (3) the proposed grounds for its admissibility.” Nelson
v. State, 792 N.E.2d 588, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d
934, 939 (Ind. 1998), reh’g granted on other grounds), trans. denied. “[T]he purpose of
an offer to prove is ‘to preserve for appeal the trial court’s allegedly erroneous exclusion
of evidence.’” Arhelger v. State, 714 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999) (quoting Bradford v. State, 675 N.E.2d 296, 302 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied).
Hamersley only generally stated in his motion to continue that Dr. Lipman’s
testimony would cover “the effects of LSD on a human mind.” Appellant’s Appendix at
234. During the hearing on the motion to continue, Hamersley did not further explain
what those effects were or how they were relevant to the present case. Hamersley did not
take any steps to make an offer to prove at trial. Hamersley has therefore waived his
argument to the extent that he frames it in exclusion-of-evidence terms.
In any event, as we noted above, Dr. Lipman’s testimony would not have been
relevant to any legal defense. Hamersley admitted that he voluntarily ingested LSD.
Furthermore, we note that Hamersley was able to get his defense (valid or not) before the
jury when he testified he had no recollection of the events of the morning of May 11. In
further support of his defense, Hamersley also presented the testimony of Dr. Chad
Schultheis, who had interviewed Hamersley while he was at the hospital and determined
that Hamersley’s “incident” was “clearly related to substance use.” Transcript at 911.
Dr. Schultheis further explained that Hamersley suffered “an acute confusional state,” id.
15
at 912, meaning that Hamersley was “incredibly intoxicated” such that the “excessive
amount of substances . . . cause[d] him to be not aware of everything going on around
him.” Id. at 916.
Hamersley also asserts that Dr. Lipman’s testimony was also needed to address his
claim that “his statement to police was involuntary” and that “Hamersley was so
intoxicated that he was in a state of mania” when he gave his statement to police.
Appellant’s Brief at 12. Hamersley maintains that Dr. Lipman’s testimony would have
helped explain to the jury some of the nonsensical statements Hamersley made during his
statement to police.8
Here, Hamersley’s claim that Dr. Lipman’s testimony would have undermined his
confession to police is pure speculation. Hamerlsey did not make an offer to prove, but
simply characterized Dr. Lipman’s testimony as being about the effects of LSD on the
human mind. Hamersley did not establish a nexus between Dr. Lipman’s testimony and
the voluntariness of his statement. Further, blood and urine tests taken in the hospital
revealed no LSD in Hamersley’s system. Several individuals, including a nurse and
Detective Carnes, who interacted with Hamersley at the hospital around the time he gave
his statement each noted that Hamersley was alert, not confused, oriented as to time and
place, cooperative, and polite. It is therefore unclear as to whether Dr. Lipman’s opinion
about the effects of LSD on the human mind could have been used to undermine
Hamersley’s statement to police.
8
For example, Hamersley claimed that helicopters were around on the morning of the incident which
were in fact not present, that he was out walking a dog that he did not have, and that he had been picked
up the night before by two undercover officers investigating drug trafficking.
16
2.
Hamersley argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
audiotape of his statement to police into evidence. Specifically, Hamersley argues that
his statement to police was not voluntary because he made the statement while suffering
from a psychosis brought about by his ingestion of LSD.
Our standard of review is well settled. The admission of evidence is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision thereon will not be reversed absent a
showing of manifest abuse of discretion resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Johnson v.
State, 831 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A decision is an abuse of discretion if it is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.
We consider the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling and any unrefuted evidence
in the defendant’s favor. Id. We will take into account the foundational evidence from
the trial as well as the evidence from the motion to suppress hearing which is not in direct
conflict with the trial testimony. Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420.
The burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his statement
was voluntarily given. Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. 2000). “A waiver of
one’s Miranda rights occurs when the defendant, after being advised of those rights and
acknowledging that he understands them, proceeds to make a statement without taking
advantage of those rights.” Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d at 1211-12. Thus, an express
written or oral waiver is not required to establish that a defendant waived
his Miranda rights. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 1997); Cook v. State, 544
17
N.E.2d 1359 (Ind. 1989). In deciding whether Miranda rights were voluntarily waived,
we consider the totality of the circumstances to ensure that the waiver was not induced by
violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant’s free will.
Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209.
Here, there is no evidence of police coercion. In fact, Detective Carnes did not use
deceptive tactics to induce a confession. The location of the interview is a neutral factor,
for although Hamersley was confined to a bed, there was only one police officer present.
The interview lasted approximately an hour and a half and at no point did Hamersley ask
for a break or seem tired. In fact, Hamersley was very conversational throughout the
entire interview.
With regard to his mental state, Hamersley points out his manic state during the
incident that had occurred earlier that day. Hamersley’s mental state at the time of the
incident, however, does not equate to his mental state at the time he gave his statement.
The record reveals that Hamersley is an intelligent person with no history of mental
health problems. Moreover, his statement was given nearly six hours after the incident
occurred.
Hamersley asserts that his level of intoxication rendered his statement involuntary.
Our Supreme Court has held that a confession may be given knowingly and voluntarily,
notwithstanding voluntary intoxication. Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797 (Ind. 1999). We
will deem a defendant’s confession incompetent only when he is so intoxicated that it
renders him not conscious of what he is doing or produces a state of mania. Id.
18
Intoxication to a lesser degree only goes to the weight to be given to the confession, not
its admissibility. Id.
As evidence of his intoxication, Hamersley points out that during the interview he
made statements that were not true or simply did not make sense. For instance,
Hamersley points to the fact that he purportedly saw helicopters that were not there, that
he referred to walking a dog that he did not have, and that undercover officers had picked
him up and driven him around. Hamersley maintains that such illogical and unfounded
statements prove that his statement was not the product of rational intellect.
Confounding Hamersley’s claims is evidence from numerous individuals,
including Nurse Senior and Detective Carnes, that Hamersley was coherent, alert,
oriented as to time and place, and that he was able to answer questions appropriately and
track the conversation. Detective Carnes testified that Hamersley could correct her if she
misspoke, that he never appeared agitated, but rather was “very cooperative” and “very
polite” and even helped her draw a diagram of the crime scene. Transcript at 1019.
Detective Carnes had no concerns that Hamersley was intoxicated at the time she
interviewed him.
Considering the above, we conclude that Hamersley’s alleged intoxication did not
render his statement to police involuntary. See Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d 227 (Ind.
2000). The nonsensical statements that he made during the interview go to the weight to
be given to the confession, not to its admissibility. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting into evidence Hamersley’s statement to police.
19
3.
Hamersley challenges the sentence imposed. In sentencing the defendant, the trial
court was meticulous in addressing each mitigating factor proffered by Hamersley. The
court noted that this case was “unique” in that Hamersley, “but for the abuse of alcohol
and substances was certainly of good character and law abiding” prior to this incident.
Transcript at 1485. The trial court rejected Hamersley’s proffered mitigating
circumstance that the difference in culture between Sheridan, Indiana and Bloomington
played a factor in the lifestyle of drugs and thrill-seeking that Hamersley chose to follow
when he came to Bloomington. The court noted that Hamersley was “still responsible for
the poor judgments that you make that lead you to indulge in such substances and the loss
of judgment and the poor conduct and behavior that can result from that.” Id. at 1487.
The court acknowledged that there was apparently no criminal objective to be gained by
his conduct and that the offense resulted from his “intoxicated state.” Id. at 1490.
The court found Hamersley’s history of drug abuse to be neither an aggravating
nor mitigating factor, but rather an “explanatory factor” as to how Hamersley found
himself in the position he is in. Id. at 1491. With regard to the impact of the incident on
the victims, the court found such to be an aggravating factor. The court did not find
Hamersley’s age to be a significant factor with regard to its sentencing determination.
The court afforded minimal weight to the fact that Hamersley assisted the drug task force
with regard to its investigation of drug trafficking. The court gave some mitigating
weight to Hamersley’s expression of remorse, stating that he believed his remorse was
“genuine.” Id. at 1492. The trial court also considered as a mitigating circumstance that
20
Hamersley voluntarily sought rehabilitation when he was released to home detention. In
its balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court found that the mitigating
factors “slightly” outweighed the aggravating factors. Id. at 1493.
The court pronounced the sentence as follows: thirty years for attempted murder,
with twenty-four years executed and six years suspended; four years for class C felony
criminal recklessness, to be served consecutively to the attempted murder sentence; to
one and one-half years for class D felony criminal recklessness, to be served
consecutively to the attempted murder sentence and concurrently with the C felony
criminal recklessness sentence; and to one year for resisting law enforcement, to be
served concurrently with the attempted murder sentence. Hamersley therefore received
an aggregate sentence of thirty-four years, with six years suspended and the balance
executed.
Hamersley argues that the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Article 7, section 4
of the Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme Court the power to review and revise
criminal sentences. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014). Pursuant to
Ind. Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme Court authorized this court to perform the same task.
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 2008). Per App. R. 7(B), we may revise a
sentence “if after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7).
“Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial court.”
21
Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Hamersley bears the burden on appeal
of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864.
The determination of whether we regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on our
sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Bethea v. State, 983
N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1224).
Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers.”
Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is not our goal in this endeavor
to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in each case. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274.
Accordingly, “the question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is
more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.”
King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original). Our
Supreme Court has indicated that, when analyzing the appropriateness of a criminal
sentence, there is “no right answer ... in any given case.” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8
(Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1224). Rather, appellate review
and, where appropriate, revision “ultimately boils down to the appellate court’s
‘collective sense of what is appropriate, not a product of a deductive reasoning process.’”
Id. (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). Ultimately, we “focus on the
forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent,
number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id.
We first consider the nature of the offense. Hamersley fired at least thirty-three
shots from a semi-automatic handgun. He fired some of those shots in the air, some of
22
the shots at vehicles and buildings in a residential area, and fired six shots into the
Greischars’ home. Hamersley fired two shots at Officer Runnebohm, both times taking
an aggressive stance and aiming at center mass. That Hamersley claims he did not know
he could react the way he did following his use of LSD is not a defense to the crimes.
Aside from his admitted drug use and his reaction to the ingestion of LSD prior to the
incident at hand, Hamersley stated in the PSI interview that he had never experienced any
mental health issues that would warrant treatment. An independent psychological
evaluation did not find any indications of mental illness.
With regard to the character of the offender, we note that although Hamersley does
not have a documented history of criminal behavior, he admitted that he has used LSD
upwards of fifty times over a two-year period and that he has used other illegal
substances. To be sure, Hamersley has a minor history of delinquent behavior, which
included a pretrial diversion for a marijuana possession charge. Despite admitting to his
frequent use of illegal drugs, Hamersley denies that he has a substance abuse problem.
Although the record demonstrates that Hamersley was an accomplished student
during high school and at Indiana University, those facts do not excuse his choice to
abuse marijuana, LSD, and alcohol. We do recognize that Hamersley expressed remorse
for his actions and that the trial court found such to be genuine.
Having considered the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, we
cannot say that Hamersley’s twenty-eight year executed sentence, which is less than the
advisory sentence for the most serious offense for which Hamersley was convicted (i.e.,
23
attempted murder),9 is inappropriate. With due consideration to the trial court’s decision,
we affirm the sentence imposed.
Judgment affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.
9
See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-4 (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second
Regular Session and Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly) (“A person who
commits a Class A felony (for a crime committed before July 1, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed
term of between twenty (20) and fifty (50) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years”).
24