UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4191
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
REGINALD ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:13-cr-00012-1)
Submitted: September 16, 2014 Decided: October 1, 2014
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Steven Hunter, STEVE HUNTER & ASSOCIATES, L.C., Lewisburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Miller A. Bushong, III, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Beckley, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Anderson pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court
calculated Anderson’s advisory Guidelines range as ten to
sixteen months, imposed an upward variance, and sentenced
Anderson to twenty-four months’ imprisonment. He appeals.
Anderson’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but challenges
Anderson’s sentence. Although advised of his right to file a
supplemental pro se brief, Anderson has not done so. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review the district court’s sentence, “whether
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines
range[,] . . . under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This
standard of review involves two steps; under the first, we
examine the sentence for significant procedural errors, and
under the second, we review the substance of the sentence.
United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007)
(analyzing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51). Significant procedural
errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
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failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51. If there are no significant procedural errors,
we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
When the district court imposes a variant sentence, we
consider “whether the . . . court acted reasonably both with
respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). Such a sentence is unreasonable if the
district court “provided an inadequate statement of reasons or
relie[d] on improper factors in imposing a sentence outside the
properly calculated advisory sentencing range.” Id.
After hearing argument from counsel and giving
Anderson the opportunity for allocution, the district court
concluded that an upward variance under § 3553(a) to twenty-four
months’ imprisonment was necessary to comply with the purposes
of sentencing. In reaching this conclusion, the court properly
considered Anderson’s history and characteristics, his
underrepresented criminal history, the fact that he was a repeat
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offender, and the need for the sentence to afford adequate
deterrence.
The district court’s consideration of relevant 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and articulation of the reasons
warranting an upward variance from the Guidelines range support
our decision to defer to the district court’s determination as
to the extent of the variance. United States v. Diosdado-Star,
630 F.3d 359, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming substantive
reasonableness of variance sentence six years greater than
Guidelines range because sentence was based on the district
court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a) factors).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. Counsel’s
motion to withdraw from representation, as set forth in his
brief, is denied. This Court requires that counsel inform
Anderson, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Anderson requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this Court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Anderson. Finally,
we dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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