UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4365
DEMORIUS L. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(6:10-cr-00907-HFF-2)
Submitted: September 29, 2011 Decided: October 4, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Maxwell B. Cauthen,
III, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Demorius Lamar Anderson pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006), and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2006). The district court sentenced Anderson to a total of 248
months imprisonment, consisting of 188 months on the conspiracy
charge and a mandatory consecutive 60 months on the firearm
charge. Anderson’s counsel filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in
counsel’s view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether Anderson’s sentence was reasonable.
Anderson filed a pro se supplemental brief challenging his
sentence and asserting an entrapment defense. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing leads
us to conclude that the district court fully complied with Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Anderson’s guilty plea. The court
ensured that Anderson understood the charges against him and the
potential sentences he faced, that he entered his plea knowingly
and voluntarily, and that the plea was supported by an
independent factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). The entrapment claim
Anderson asserts in his pro se brief is barred by his entry of a
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valid guilty plea. See United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489,
490 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we affirm Anderson’s
convictions.
We have reviewed Anderson’s sentence and find that it
was properly calculated and that the sentence imposed was
reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
see United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010).
Anderson challenges on appeal the drug quantity attributed to
him and the enhancement he received for his leadership role in
the offense. Because Anderson filed no objections to the
presentence report and did not object at sentencing, he has
waived appellate review of these issues absent plain error. See
United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1997). A
review of the presentence report and sentencing Guidelines
reveals no plain error.
Moreover, the district court followed the necessary
procedural steps in sentencing Anderson, appropriately treated
the Sentencing Guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and
considered the applicable Guidelines range, and weighed the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors in light of
Anderson’s individual characteristics and history. We reject
Anderson’s claim of sentence disparity and conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
chosen sentence, which was within the advisory Guidelines range.
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See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178,
193 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying appellate presumption of
reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentence).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Anderson, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Anderson requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Anderson. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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