J-S58003-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
HENRY CULVER,
Appellant No. 321 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 13, 2012
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-02-CR-0008632-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 1, 2014
Appellant, Henry Culver, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after his jury conviction of murder of the first degree, person not to
possess a firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, terroristic
threats, and simple assault.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the background of this case, as follows:
The Commonwealth’s evidence established that on
December 14, 2011, the victim, Scott Goodman, was at the
home of his father, Albert Goodman. The elder Goodman was
sitting in his home when he heard an argument coming from the
kitchen. [(See N.T. Albert Goodman Trial Deposition (AGTD),
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), and 2701,
respectively.
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9/01/11, at 7-8, 11).2] He recognized both voices[:] that of his
son and that of [Appellant], with whom he was also familiar.
[(See id. at 9-11).] Mr. Goodman walked into the kitchen and
saw [Appellant] shoot his son. [(See id. at 13, 52, 54).]
[Appellant] then turned to Mr. Goodman and told him to back off
or he would be next. [(See id. at 16, 61-62).] Mr. Goodman
then fled out the front door while [Appellant] left through the
back door. [(See id. at 16-17, 64-65).]
At approximately the same time that Mr. Goodman was
leaving his house, a witness, [Rasheeda3] Saxton, was arriving.
She saw [Appellant come from the back of the house,] get into
his car and drive off. [(See N.T. Trial, 9/19/12, at 126-29).]
While she was walking toward the Goodman residence, she
heard Albert Goodman calling for help and, as she went around
to the back, she saw Scott Goodman lying on the ground,
bleeding. [(See id. at 129-31). [When police arrived on the
scene, Ms. Saxton told them that “Hank (meaning Appellant) did
this.” (Id. at 116).] Scott Goodman was taken to the hospital
where he eventually died of his wounds.
LaPerry Raymond, the mother of [Rasheeda] Saxton, also
testified. [(See id. at 181-86).] She said that during that
evening, she was on the phone with Scott Goodman. She heard
a door slam and Scott told her to hold on. [(See id. at 185).]
He then told her that it was “Hank” and he would call her back
later. [(See id.).] A few minutes later, her daughter called and
told her that Scott Goodman had been shot. [(See id. at 185-
86).] . . .
[Detective Kenneth Ruckel of the Allegheny County police
department testified that he found a black leather glove with a
zipper near the cuff at the scene of the murder. (See N.T. Trial,
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2
Because of his his poor health, Albert Goodman’s trial deposition was
videotaped in advance of trial. He passed away prior to trial, and the jury
viewed the videotaped deposition. (See N.T. Trial, 9/19/12, at 232-33).
3
The trial court spells Ms. Saxton’s first name as “Rashida,” however a
review of the notes of testimony reveals that the proper spelling is
“Rasheeda.” (See N.T. Trial, 9/20/12, at 123). For the sake of consistency,
we will spell Ms. Saxton’s first name as “Rasheeda.”
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9/18/12, at 42). A dark brown glove that was inside the black
one as though the two were worn together contained Appellant’s
DNA. (See N.T. Trial, 9/20/12, at 287).]
The Commonwealth also presented evidence concerning
[Appellant’s] arrest sometime later in Miami. . . .
* * *
After receiving a tip as to where [Appellant] might be
found, Deputy US Marshal[] Ty Fallow and others went to this
location [at a rescue mission in Miami, Florida]. [(See id. at
207-09, 222).] They observed [Appellant] and Marshal[] Fallow
addressed [him], “Mr. Culver, Hank, Henry.” [(Id. at 212).] At
this point, [Appellant] turned around. [(See id.).] Later, as
they were asking him his name, he told them that his name was
Rocky Wallace. [(See id.).] He showed them an ID [from the
rescue mission] that bore the name Rocky Wallace but had his
photograph on it. [(See id. at 212-13).] [Appellant] was
[detained] and transported to the Dade County Jail [where
fingerprint analysis confirmed that he was Henry Culver and he
was then arrested]. [(See id. at 213; N.T. Trial, 9/20/12, at
253).] He was in a holding cell for a lengthy time as he waited
his turn to be processed. The defendants’ names are called out
frequently. Marshal[] Fallow observed that on all but one
occasion when the jail called out for Henry Culver, [Appellant]
did not respond. [(See N.T. Trial, 9/19/12, at 213-16).] Once,
however, when a nurse called the name Henry Culver, he did
verbally respond. [(See id. at 215-16).]
Marshal[] Fallow also testified that he was present when
[Appellant] was provided with several intake forms including a
property form. [(See id. at 219-20).] This form itemizes the
property that was on his person when he was arrested. [(See
id.).] It has a place for the inmate’s signature. Marshal[] Fallow
observed [Appellant] sign the name Rocky Wallace to that form.
[(See id. at 220).] [The Commonwealth] introduced [the
document] into evidence at trial. [(See id.).]
(Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/14, at 3-4, 5).
Appellant’s counsel moved to suppress any testimony regarding
Appellant’s refusal to acknowledge his name. (See id. at 248). The trial
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court ruled that all statements made by Appellant prior to having been read
his Miranda4 rights would be excluded, but that the property intake form
that Appellant signed after his rights had been read to him was admissible.
(See id. at 248-49). The trial court instructed the jury that it was to
disregard any statements made by Appellant prior to being given his
Miranda warnings, but could consider whether or not he signed the property
intake form using a fraudulent name. (See id. at 250-51).
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the
aforementioned charges. On December 13, 2012, the court sentenced
Appellant to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole on the
murder of the first degree conviction, plus a concurrent aggregate term of
imprisonment of not less than nine and one-half nor more than nineteen
years on the remaining counts. The court denied Appellant’s post-sentence
motions on January 17, 2013. Appellant timely appealed.5
Appellant raises two questions for this Court’s review:
I. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence that
[Appellant] signed a different name on a property inventory form
when he was booked in jail considering [Appellant] had invoked
his right to remain silent and the question, which asked for his
name, was calculated to elicit an incriminating response?
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4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5
On May 7, 2013, Appellant filed a timely statement of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to the court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court
filed an opinion on January 17, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
[Appellant’s] post[-]sentence motion that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence where the three witnesses
who implicated [Appellant] in the shooting provided entirely
inconsistent and contradictory accounts of the incident, the
witnesses’ statements and actions immediately after the incident
suggested they were covering up what actually occurred, the
prosecution provided only a contrived and far-fetched motive for
the shooting, and two of the Commonwealth’s primary witnesses
had a motive to fabricate their accounts of the incident?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 6).
In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that “[t]he [c]ourt erred in denying
defense counsel’s motion to suppress evidence that [Appellant] signed the
name ‘Rocky Wallace’ on a property inventory form when he was booked in
the Dade County Jail.” (Id. at 34). Specifically, Appellant claims that “the
[trial] court erred in admitting evidence of [his] false signature as it was
obtained in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.”
(Id.). We disagree.
Our standard of review of a challenge to a court’s ruling on a
suppression motion is well-settled:
Our standard of review of a denial of
suppression is whether the record supports the trial
court’s factual findings and whether the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error.
Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only
the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole.
Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and
may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its
legal conclusions based upon the facts.
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In addition, [i]t is within the suppression court’s sole
province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony. The suppression court is
also entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence
presented. Finally, . . . the Commonwealth has the burden of
establish[ing] by a preponderance of the evidence that the
evidence was properly obtained.
Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1045-46 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(en banc), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 120 (Pa. 2012) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
. . . [W]e note that not every statement made by an
individual during a police encounter constitutes an interrogation.
Miranda rights are required only prior to a custodial
interrogation. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of [his] freedom of action in any
significant way. Furthermore, volunteered or spontaneous
utterances by an individual are admissible without the
administration of Miranda warnings. When a defendant gives a
statement without police interrogation, we consider the
statement to be volunteered and not subject to suppression. . . .
Interrogation is police conduct calculated to, expected to, or
likely to evoke admission.
. . . . [O]ur Supreme Court [has] stated . . . that a statement
made in a custodial setting would not be suppressed where the
suspect . . . is merely responding to biographical questioning[.]
Generally speaking, general information such as name, height,
weight, residence, occupation, etc. is not the kind of information
which requires Miranda warnings since it is not information
generally considered as part of an interrogation. Such questions
are not calculated to, expected to, or likely to elicit an
incriminating response, or . . . asked with [the] intent to extract
or an expectation of eliciting an incriminating [response]. Also,
there is no requirement that a suspect be advised of any
Miranda rights where the police seek biographical, general
information . . . .
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Commonwealth v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694, 698-99 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Garvin, the appellant was arrested for prostitution and related
charges after soliciting undercover police officer, Joseph Ferraro. See id. at
695-96. During the booking process, Officer Ferraro was required to obtain
information from the appellant in order to fill out a medical checklist. See
id. at 696. Officer Ferraro read the questions on the form to the appellant
prior to giving him his Miranda warnings. See id. One of the questions
was, “Are you receiving any type of treatment?,” to which the appellant
responded, “Yes,” voluntarily indicating he was receiving treatment for HIV.
Id. The appellant moved to suppress his responses, but the court denied his
request, and he appealed. See id.
Like Appellant does here, the appellant in Garvin argued on appeal
that the suppression court erred because, Officer Ferraro “knew or had
reason to know that the questions, though biographical in nature, were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[,]” thus violating his
right against self-incrimination. Id. at 697; (see also Appellant’s Brief, at
34). This Court disagreed, concluding that “the record supports the
suppression court’s finding that Appellant’s responses to the standard
questionnaire were not suppressible and that the medical checklist fell within
the ‘routine booking exception.’” Garvin, supra at 701-02.
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Similarly, here, Appellant signed a standard form during booking at
the Dade County Jail. (See N.T. Trial, 9/19/12, at 219-20). Marshal Fallow
testified that he routinely gives the property intake form to an individual
when he enters the jail in order to record the items on his person that will be
held by the facility and given back to him when he is released, testimony
that was within the sole province of the trial court to believe. (See id. at
219-20); see also Galendez, supra at 1046. Therefore, we conclude that
the suppression court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s
motion to suppress the property intake form.6 See Galendez, supra at
1045-46. Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.
In Appellant’s second issue, he challenges the weight of the evidence
to support his conviction. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 41-54). This issue lacks
merit.
Our standard of review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
well-settled:
A verdict is not contrary to the weight of the
evidence because of a conflict in testimony or
because the reviewing court on the same facts might
have arrived at a different conclusion than the fact[-
]finder. Rather, a new trial is warranted only when
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6
Moreover, we note that the court properly found that Appellant’s use of an
alias on the property intake form was relevant to show consciousness of
guilt. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 6); see also Commonwealth v. Robinson,
721 A.2d 344, 352 (Pa. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 (2000) (“Use of
an alias has been recognized as evidence of a consciousness of guilt.”)
(citation omitted).
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the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that
it shocks one’s sense of justice and the award of a
new trial is imperative so that right may be given
another opportunity to prevail. Where, as here, the
judge who presided at trial ruled on the weight claim
below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying
a new trial is the lower court's determination that the verdict
was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that new
process was or was not dictated by the interests of justice.
Thus, only where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable
abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial
based on the weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.
Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91-92 (Pa. 2014) (citations
omitted; emphasis in original).
In this case, Appellant has not argued or demonstrated that the trial
court palpably abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial
on the basis of the weight of the evidence. He merely argues that the
witnesses offered contradictory testimony and suggested a motive for
fabricating their stories. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 41). Thus, Appellant has
failed to advance an argument that invokes the appropriate standard of
review. See Morales, supra at 91-92.
Moreover, our independent review of the record reveals that the trial
court properly viewed the issue as one of credibility, which the jury was free
to resolve in Appellant’s favor, and determined that the verdict “did not
shock [its] sense of justice.” (Trial Ct. Op., at 9). Therefore, we conclude
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that the trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion in deciding the
weight of the evidence issue, see Morales, supra at 91-92, and Appellant’s
second claim does not merit relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/1/2014
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